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1 THE CONCEPT OF RATIONAL FREEDOM

The Problems of Philosophy

"The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nature, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason."

Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy

Bertrand Russell once said that most people would rather die than think, and indeed that’s just what they do. In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and Tractatus Politicus, Spinoza argued that ‘the more a man is guided by reason, the more he is free’. There is one big idea running through this essay. This idea is the connection of reason and freedom that belongs centrally to the mainstream tradition of Western moral and political philosophy and that therefore the most advantageous way to examine conceptions of future alternatives is to locate them within broader historical and philosophical movements and traditions. There are a couple of reasons for this approach. First and foremost, the idea that reason and freedom are connected is not only the most structured, coherent and satisfying line of emancipation in history, it comes with a social dimension that recognises the coincidence of the freedom of each individual with the freedom of all individuals. It is built on an ethic that is expansive and induces the individual not only to ascend to reason but to make connection with others. Secondly, one hears plenty of ‘new’ politics. New in relation to a specific context and a specific practice maybe. But one is reminded of Aristotle’s wry comment that there’s nothing new, just a lot of things that we have forgotten. In this sense, the environmental claim to be breaking new ground much of the time looks like recovering lost ground. Which is no bad thing. Local knowledge and commons system integral to using, valuing and sharing the world are cultural resources dating back hundreds of years. They are being lost, as plenty of other human powers have been lost, to a rapacious capitalism busy expropriating anything and anyone capable of being turned into exchange value. Which brings us to the third point, politics as a division between right and left. To criticise capitalism as ‘rapacious’ and exploitative would immediately identify an argument and a politics as being on ‘the left’. Not necessarily. This criticism is mounted on the basis of the tradition of ‘rational freedom’, dating back to Plato and Aristotle, taking in the Judaeo-Christian heritage including Augustine and Aquinas, and whole number of philosophers who are absolutely central to the Western intellectual tradition – Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza, Montesquieu and Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx. In other words, those who maintain the connection between reason and freedom occupy the centre ground and are firmly within the tradition of Western civilisation, that is civilisation as social and moral order built with ideas, shared ethics, shared commitments, constitutive ties, reciprocity - all those things other than raw, independent money and power.

Which comes to the fourth and final point here. Capitalism, the system of private accumulation, is parasitic upon civilisation in the same way that it is parasitic on labour and nature. It practises its ‘free’ market economics and indulges its entrepreneurial spirit within the framework of civilisation that past generations built and which others keep alive in an endless struggle to resist the encroachment of the pecuniary motive. Capitalism, with its systemic imperative to accumulate, is concerned only with the internal accumulative logic of the system and its self-expansion of values. It destroys the notion of ends but cannot supply any of its own other than the pursuit of self-interest. Capitalism “has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment'”. It is significant that this, one of the most cited passages in Marx’s Manifesto of the Communist Party, is based on Thomas Carlyle’s coruscating verdict on capitalism in Past and Present. Significant because it begs the question, the left and right wing of what? Taking in the sweep of the whole of Western civilisation and its ethics and philosophy, it is capitalism which has gone to extremes and which, in the grip of its inexorable accumulative logic, continues to do so. The centre ground has been pulverised. When Green parties say ‘neither left nor right but in front’, I take this ‘in front’ to be a reclaiming of the centre ground, a recovery of sanity and balance after a period of hubris. The alternative to this reconstitution of the centre ground in the future is, of course, nemesis.

What this interpretation will indirectly question is the view that the critique of capitalism is, by definition, left wing and also extremist. This interpretation actually holds that it is capitalism which possesses the thoroughgoing 'revolutionary' and extremist character, subverting and repudiating the underlying values and organizing concepts basic to Western civilisation. Extreme in the way that constants of civilisation – a sense of the sacred, an overarching ethic, community, local knowledge, customary rights – are hollowed out, even enclosed, expropriated, and taken to market in the thirst for exchange value.

There are no values and concepts affirmed in this paper which are not derived from or inherent in the Western mainstream. They may be given a radical or democratic twist, but only to bring out the latent revolutionary message of the originals themselves. Does anybody seriously believe that what Plato and Aristotle defined as the good life corresponds in any way with capitalism? 

So here is a paradoxical formulation: the thinking in this paper is revolutionary because it is traditional and because it affirms that our great historical heritage of building civilisation through religion and science, art and architecture, philosophy and ethics could produce something better than capitalism. The view affirms the old Platonic trinity – which dates back to Pythagoras – of the true, the good and the beautiful. Modern mathematics and physics are putting that heady notion within human comprehension. In contrast to these potentialities of the higher part of human nature, capitalism looks like a primitive stage in evolution, a period the human race has to go through as it learns how to use its complicated technics in a wise and sober sense. 

This argument has an underlying unity which can be understood as a conceptual gathering organised around the idea of ‘rational freedom’. This idea is a powerful prism through which to gain an informed glimpse of some disturbing aspects of capitalism in light of our inherited culture and civilization. 






It is in light of these four unit ideas that the underlying conception of this paper should be defined. The paper is concerned with human emancipation where 'emancipation' is understood as leading to 'freedom' in the distinctive sense of rational mastery of the self and external reality. There are three aspects to this human emancipation.

1.	emancipation occurs in the relationship between human beings and nature: freedom in this respect is the full realization of human reason in the natural world. This realisation of the human potential does not necessarily mean the domination of nature, though this has certainly been its historical incarnation. Human reason is capable of recognising the embeddedness of human beings as natural beings in the natural world and therefore identifying freedom as the intellectual appreciation of natural necessity, ordering human affairs accordingly. 
2.	emancipation proceeds within the realm of human society. This is of course the distinctive achievement of Socrates in bringing philosophy down to earth and into the human world. Philosophy has possessed a moral, social and political core since Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The idea that the emancipation of society is coincidental with the emancipation of individuals in and for society follows the Platonic and Aristotelian premise that the human individual is a zoon politikon – a social animal. 
3.	emancipation as the realisation of community follows the premise that human beings are social beings. The realisation of this social nature implies the elimination of conflict between determinate social groups, sectional interests that divide community, 'classes'. It certainly means the end of domination, oppression and exploitation of some groups by others. Plato’s argument that justice is the social virtue par excellence seeks to order society according to notions of the good life.
4.	emancipation of the mind is the lynchpin of the whole process. This follows from the identification of the rational faculty as the distinctive characteristic of homo sapiens. In distinguishing between nous or (knowledge, reason) and doxa (opinion, ignorance), the ancient Greeks affirmed that the more that human affairs was governed in accordance with the true, the more it is free. The essence of this claim is the complete understanding of the moral freedom and self-sufficiency of the human species. The human being as a rational being is free, self-creating and self-determining within natural and social relationships, recognizing no alien superior beyond the bounds of rationality. Which begs the question of what happens when human powers are alienated and human agents have their lives determined by systemic imperatives, bureaucratic edicts and instrumental rationality.

Having outlined the contours of rational freedom as a conception of human emancipation, it will be clear that the central ideas of this paper derive from the mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition. From this perspective it will also be seen that, for instance, Adam Smith, the apostle of free markets is also a moral philosopher who, on many substantial points, is aligned with the philosophical tradition against many of the features of the modern capitalism with which his name is routinely associated.

This approach emphasises freedom in the human relationship to nature, society and the mind; these three dimensions are connected by freedom as the supreme aim and value connected to the achievement of human reason. Freedom and reason are the supreme values in Western culture and civilization, the points of departure and arrival in all undertakings worthy of the name moral, political and social, and in connection with the ideas of movement and community they constitute the distinct identity of Western thought and civilisation. Freedom comprises the most important moral, social, political values of European culture and civilisation; reason is the highest expression of the vital role played by knowledge, thinking, concepts, and arguments. In this respect, freedom and reason are twin poles of valuation and cognition. 

‘Rational freedom’ therefore possesses an ethical element, involving value-assumptions and ultimate ends; freedom, happiness, the good society, the common good all fall within this rubric. And ‘rational freedom’ also possesses a cognitive element, connoting knowledge, the scientific understanding of the world. The conception both looks beyond the ‘is’ of actual existence by virtue of an ‘ought to be’ but proceeds in this vision through 'insight' into the existing world. Reason therefore apprehends the 'movement' of human history in terms of a progress towards freedom. 

2 FOUR KEY IDEAS 

The idea of the benevolent universe holds that there is a basic underlying rationality in reality which human beings can come to comprehend and which, if apprehended through what Descartes called ‘clear and distinct ideas’, will aid human beings in their activities to realise their goals and satisfy their aims. This benevolent universe has been conceived in many ways: as a deity, as creator and creation, a lawgiver, or as an impersonal Nature governed by immutable and inexorable laws, as both God and Nature interchangeably. The crucial point is that this universe is rational and therefore accessible to human beings, in so far as they use their reason and act in accordance with it. The benevolent universe more or less guarantees that rational efforts are not in vain; this ultimate reality shows human beings, through reason, how to transcend actual existence. 

The notion of ultimate reality entails the idea of transcendent and objective morality. This sees concepts of 'good' and 'evil' as being built into the universe, integral parts of reality which derive from above or from outside or from our 'innermost being', unalterable and universal; good conduct will be rewarded by nature and evil conduct punished. The 'good' here refers to those qualities or ways of life which most closely reflect the nature of the benevolent universe. To the extent that human beings live in accordance with their 'real' selves, putting aside immediate inclinations and impulses, they also live in accordance with the rationality of the benevolent universe. The good is that which corresponds to the human ontology and enhances life, bringing human beings into contact and union with ultimate and benevolent reality; evil is that which is a diminution and destruction of life, keeping human beings chained to mere actual existence and all of its frustrating desires, wants and inclinations. 

The elevation of the species is a notion which affirms the uniqueness of the human species. The human species alone is of transcending its own actual existence in order to achieve something higher. Humanity alone amongst all the species is capable of penetrating beyond immediacy and using reason to access ultimate reality, the higher benevolent universe, appreciating transcendent goodness. This power is fraught with dangers. The human species is unique in fitting the environment to its own nature rather than fitting itself to the environment. In the process, it can access not some ultimate and benevolent reality but become so enamoured of its powers that it becomes a prisoner of a new, artificial necessity. This in itself does not invalidate the point; it points to the need to be rational about reason. From Moses through Plato and Aquinas to Marx, the claim is repeated that it is reason that distinguishes the human species from all other species. This distinctiveness is qualitative and fundamental in that it means that the human species alone possesses what the Stoics called the ‘divine spark’, the spark of transcendence which gives the reasoning animal alone the potential to become the 'lord of nature'. A recent version of this idea came with Teilhard de Chardin and his Omega Point. Human beings are created in the image of God and are distinguished from animals by their ability to reason, to think, to use language, to create and maintain 'culture' over and above external nature. Whether this elevated conception of the uniqueness of the human species is hubris destroying the ecological basis of human life on earth is the key question. Again, it all depends on the rational use of reason, whether human beings are rational enough to apprehend the good and the true and identify human purposes with those of the benevolent universe. The claim to uniqueness, even superiority of culture over nature, does not give the right to some irresponsible domination of nature. This may be how religion and science have been understood and used, but this is in large part misuse. Dominion in The Bible refers to stewardship. Bacon is completely misinterpreted with respect to putting nature on the wrack. Higher being comes with a higher sense of 'duty', something which includes a moral responsibility with respect to nature. That said, the idea remains a form of speciesism which elevates human culture above nature and other species. A more appealing aspect of this uniqueness of the species, however, is the sense of oneness, giving an ideal of a common humanity sharing a common identity in the natural world and also a common future. Regardless of differences in terms of language, ethnicity, colour, gender, ability, virtue and vice, intelligence, inclination, foibles and so on there is an underlying or transcendent 'equality' which insists that human beings  - even those who do ‘evil’ and shun the good - are to be treated in the same way. Again, the fact that this way is different to other creatures highlights the flaw in speciesism and requires an ethic that embraces all life forms. 

The idea of community is a supreme moral value, a place, a principle, a constant of civilisation, a functional prerequisite of a viable social order, the condition and context of human self-realisation. Human beings as social beings require an extended sociality in order to individuate themselves. Aristotle used the phrase ‘all things common amongst friends’ to indicate how close bonds and ties could involve the sharing of material goods. Now, Aristotle defended private property against Plato, but his argument highlights a fundamental notion of sharing as an essential aspect of human nature, connoting a human sociability that is found in community, in communication as the sharing of hearts and minds, modes of experience, customs, traditions, feelings, attitudes, communitas as habitus, a communal modus vivendi which embodies and expresses the unity of the people in a 'spiritual' rather than merely a racial or anthropological sense. Marx the communist wrote precisely in these terms with respect to the company and companionship of the Paris working people, society as a need, an end in itself.


“When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time they acquire a new need - the need for society - and what appears as a means has become an end. This practical development can be most strikingly observed in the gatherings of French socialist workers. Smoking, eating and drinking, etc., are no longer means of creating links between people. Company, association, conversation, which in its turn has society as its goal, is enough for them. The brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures. (Marx EW EPM 1975). 

Company, association as community, conversation as communication, the realisation of the old religious ideal of the ‘brotherhood of man’, Marx affirms ‘the nobility of man’ over against the proletarian identity. It is a stark assertion of elevated rational species capable of transcending the limitations of actual existence to apprehend the ultimate and benevolent universe.

Company, association and communication are presented as the highest kind of human satisfaction available. What Marx refers to as ‘society’ is actually community, community not simply as a means to other ends but as the supreme end itself. Community is the cultivation and living of company, conversation, the on-going meeting of minds. Community is the extended sociality that is the key to the expansion of human intelligence. It is through community that human beings have been able to create and maintain both culture (inner excellence) and civilization (outer potency) and thus achieve elevation through reason. Conscious social intercourse and identification with fellow human beings generate good conduct, thoughts and actions, all those attributes which properly befit a species able to live in accordance with benevolent purpose. Community is therefore the highest moral value in that it enables human beings to overcome their mere immediate self, the self locked in a cycle of natural inclinations and chained to the world of actual existence, and realise their higher, moral selves. Community is reason, Plato’s world of Being that has left behind the limitations of the world of Becoming, heaven, true happiness, nobility and lordship over nature. In contrast, the isolation and separation from others that is associated with mere 'individual' satisfaction are evil, the falsification of the human essence, and amount to slavery to nature, one’s impulses, desires, wants. Hence, the idea of community is the supreme human achievement, living in accordance with the good, bringing together the ultimate and benevolent reality, objective morality and the elevation of the species. 

This general presentation of the fundamental ideas of rational freedom is a heuristic device which draws on many sources. There are big differences between Plato and Aristotle as there are between Aquinas and Averroes, and between Kant, Hegel and Marx. But behind the variety of formulations there is a consistency which holds at a very general level. 

These general ideas can be broken up further in terms of historical evolution and the unfolding of rational freedom in the Western tradition. This outline can only highlight the crucial sources out of a vast and complicated history.

The first source is Old Testament Judaism. The sacred texts and Hebrew prophets state the of monotheism, the idea that there is the one God whose ‘law’ prescribes the moral conduct for humans, in whom the benevolence of the universe is concentrated and who maintains a personal, direct relationship to the 'chosen people'. This idea comes with a powerful moral strain in that the ‘chosen people’ are those distinguished by 'righteous living', which involves keeping the commandments of God, treating others as they treat themselves, being generous and neighbourly in their conduct, and identifying their purposes with the community. The ultimate triumph of the just and omnipotent God is the triumph of 'good' personified. As the good triumph over the wicked, Jerusalem as the world of transcendence destroys Babylon as the world of actual existence. 

The second source is ancient Greek philosophy. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle together created philosophy, defined the terms and mapped the field. Both the ethical and the cognitive perspectives were created by the ancient Greek philosophers. Before Socrates came the natural philosophers arguing about the nature of the universe. The great achievements of Greek scientists not only generated a certain overweening arrogance but neglected the human world. Bringing philosophy down to earth meant addressing the why question as well as the what and the how. 

The key component of Plato’s transcendent 'idealism' is the idea that the world of empirical reality, 'actual existence', is a world of Becoming which is secondary in both logical and practical moral terms to the transcendent world of 'ideas' or 'forms', the world of Being. The world of Being is the true reality which human beings enter by virtue of their innate ideas, the reason that they are born with. Human beings transcend the world of particulars and its limitations for the true reality of the world of forms, leave the world of Becoming to enter the world of Being, on account of their rationality and intellect, the power of their thought. At the pinnacle of human society is the knower and lover of reason, the person who goes beyond the empirical world of particulars, the world immediately available to the senses, to enter the true reality, the world of forms, by thought – this person is the philosopher. Morality, goodness and happiness are achieved through rationality. 

In his political and social thought, Plato has been criticised for organising society on the basis of substantive inequalities. Plato’s conception is best conceived as an organic hierarchical functionalism in which individuals are fitted to positions best suited to their talents and proclivities. 
The point to grasp is that the hierarchy that Plato establishes in his philosophy is paralleled by the hierarchy he establishes in the political and social world in terms of valuations and ways of life. The best life is the life of reason. There is an intrinsic relation between philosophy and community for Plato and this relation is established by reason. Plato’s Republic delineates the perfect city governed by reason. And this reason determines the internal arrangements of the city according to functional capacity. The 'guardians' are the rulers of the city, the men and women of reason, who are the most qualified to rule by virtue of their transcendent vision, their ability to perceive and dispense impartial 'justice' in accordance with the immutable, objective, universal 'idea' or ‘form’ of the good. The old question of who guards the guardians arises only the practice of the imperfect empirical world of particulars. The familiar criticism directed towards Plato as a totalitarian justifying elite rule misses the point that Plato is establishing principle in the ideal world of Being, not practice in the world of Becoming. If the guards do need guarding, then the principle is flawed. This still leaves the practical problem of how to translate the principle into political arrangements, but Plato was concerned to establish the principle that the rulers ought to rule through knowledge of ultimate reality and impartial justice. Therefore the guardians hold no private property and have no particular or sectional interest of their own. They rule for the common good. They have true knowledge of the world of ‘forms’ and ‘ideas’ and can penetrate the immediate world of particulars and senses to perceive the higher good, the true reality. It follows that is in the true interest of every inhabitant of the city, including the metics and the slaves, that philosophers should rule. Those who accuse Plato of writing a blueprint for manipulative rulers cloaking their own self-interest in the claim to the general interest completely ignore the point that Plato’s philosophers are defined as the knowers and lovers of wisdom. Their reward is not political or material but the satisfaction for ruling impartially in accordance with the true, the good and the beautiful, in identification with and selflessly 'serving' the community. Idealistic maybe, but we are dealing with the world of ideal forms in comparison with the empirical world of particulars.
To ensure that the general interest prevails over particular interests, the lives of the guardians are arranged so that they are at one with the community. In the ideal city the guardians do not possess any private property or live in restricted familial relationships or individual houses. Through the thoughts and lives of the guardians, the community achieves its highest excellence. In the community the universal of reason is joined with the universal of human fellowship. 

The third source is Christianity. Adding a New Testament to the Old, Christianity extended the ideas of a divinely ordained objective morality. In Christianity, the chosen people are universalised beyond the identification with the tribe. God's people are the pure in heart, all who observe the 'law', Jew and Gentile alike. In being their 'brothers' keepers', Christians have a responsibility for the salvation of the souls of others, not only their own. The Christian mission extends to the whole of the human race, meaning that they have to spread the faith and work to establish as much of the 'kingdom' of heaven on earth as far as is humanly possible. Further, Christianity contains a very definite and categorical repudiation of the world of 'actual existence', with barbed reference to the world of 'Mammon'. The word Mammon is a transliteration into New Testament Greek of the Aramaic mamona, meaning 'wealth' or 'profit'. The attachment to wealth estranged human beings from God since 'No man can serve two masters . . . Ye cannot serve God and mammon' (Mt 6 : 24). Jesus Christ urged, 'Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness' (Lk 16 : 9). Christianity therefore enjoins individuals to avoid dishonest gain and use their money for the benefit of their fellow-men. The Sermon on the Mount affirms the spirit of poverty to be true happiness, the gateway to heaven. The mighty will be vexed and the humble will be raised, the meek will inherit the earth. There will be ‘a new heaven and a new earth’, a ‘new Jerusalem’, where ‘the dwelling of God is with men, and he will live with them… There will be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away’ (Revelation 21:1-6). This is a conception of transcendent hope and dignity. This notion confers a dignity on 'lowly' forms of human life, along with the hope that one day present suffering on the part of the poor in spirit will be rewarded by eternal bliss. 
That said, Christianity’s ‘otherworldly' orientation has always been combined with a strong political profile and even a recurrent radical message. This was apparent before the establishment of the church, when the 'poor' and the 'meek', suffering oppression and persecution in the Roman Empire, sought to create God's kingdom in a spirit of brotherly love and communal sharing of goods. 

The fourth source is the principle of human equality, a recurring theme in the Western tradition. This principle is the offspring of Christianity and classical philosophy. The shift from the hierarchical Platonic conception to intrinsic human equality began with Stoicism, the pagan 'religion' of intellectuals in the Roman Empire. Stoicism founded equality on 'reason' as the highest human faculty common to all members of the species. It is worth pointing out, however, that Stoicism, in Platonic manner, retains a hierarchy of ways of life in which 'wisdom' is declared to be the highest human quality. Christian doctrine in contrast holds that all human beings possess an ‘immortal soul’ and are equal 'in the sight of God'. St Paul began the codification of Christianity but the classic early statement of Christian thought is Augustine's The City of God. In this massive work, the Christian conception of human equality and human dignity is established with eloquence and vigour. In contrast to the self-serving evasiveness of the ancient treatment of the subject, Augustine emphatically rejects the principle of slavery. Augustine is no less forthright in his condemnation of unjust and oppressive government, likening tyrannical rulers to leaders of criminal gangs. Augustine’s words are worth quoting in full:

Set justice aside, then, and what are kingdoms but great robberies ? because what are robberies but little kingdoms? for in thefts, the hands of the underlings are directed by the commander, the con​federacy of them is sworn together, and the pillage is shared by the law amongst them. And if those ragamuffins grow but up to be able enough to keep forts, build habitations, possess cities, and conquer adjoining nations, then their government is no more called thievish, but graced with the eminent name of a kingdom, given and gotten, not because they have left their practices, but because that now they may use them without danger of law: for elegant and ex​cellent was that pirate's answer to the great Macedonian Alexander, who had taken him: the king asking him how he durst molest the seas so, he replied with a free spirit, "How darest thou molest the whole world? But, because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief: thou, doing it with a great navy, art called an emperor."
Now, to war against one's neighbours, and to proceed to the hurt of such as hurts not you, for greedy desire of rule and sovereignty, what is this but flat thievery in a greater excess and quantity than ordinary?

This city of the actual world is in marked contrast to the divine city, the city of the righteous and the pure in heart. The ‘city of man’ is the mundane city of vice, egoism, materialism, oppression and violence. Yet Augustine states a view of human progress, human beings moving out of the darkness in one determinate direction towards the light. The original Fall of the human race has been redeemed through Christ's early presence, death and resurrection, opening the way to eventual salvation. ‘The society which is the City of God realizes in an eminent degree the two values, justice and peace (Justitia and Pax)’.
Of course, the Stoic and the early Christian principle of equality is not the modern principle; the Augustinian philosophy of history is not the Enlightenment conception of progress. A moral and spiritual conception of equality operates on a plane above the practical sphere of government policy and social relations. In castigating tyrannical rulers as criminal gangs, Augustine is not advocating emancipation as the overthrow of these autocratic rulers within the ‘city of man’, to be replaced with just ruling increasing material prosperity and distributing it more equitably. His point is that the ‘city of man’ as such, as a mere empirical sphere of worldly existence is necessarily limited, transitory and ephemeral compared to the ‘city of god’ beyond the senses. But these principles are the foundation of later views. For all of Augustine’s condemnation of the earthly city, it was the city of people’s everyday existence. The earthly city mattered to the people who had to live there; it mattered to Augustine. And it continued to matter. The justice, peace and equality that Augustine valued as attributes of the city of god were valued also by members of the earthly city. However transcendent, Christian ideas fed into the temporal realm. Christianity’s equality of moral responsibility fed into modern doctrines of legal, political and social equality. Attempts by the apostles of the ‘free’ market refer to the equality of ‘everyone’ voting with their money, according to their ‘contributions’ (Friedman). Compare this ‘equality’ with Christianity’s equality of each through the possession of an immortal soul. This moral and spiritual conception of equality is the source of modern equality, not economics and material notions of desert and contributions. Only equally transcendent individual units, those possessing an 'immortal soul', can reasonably claim a formal (and a substantive) equality in terms of political decision-making and legal provisions. And no philosophy of historical progress would make sense without being infused with an idea of transcendence. 

The principles drawn ancient Greece and Rome, and from Judaism and Christianity lasted well beyond the end of the classical and medieval eras. The ideas of the ultimate and benevolent universe, objective morality, the unique nature and destiny of the human species, and the moral value of the community became the absolute presuppositions of the culture and civilisation that followed. Life in society would be meaningless in the absence of these presuppositions at its foundation. This point needs to be remembered when addressing what Durkheim calls the ‘anomie’ of the modern world. The inversion of creative human subject and created object is associated with the Weberian pathos of means displacing ends, rendering the world meaningless. Which begs the question whether civilisation can survive capitalism’s disenchantment of the world. 

3 REASON
The ethical or transcendent aspect concerns ends. The other perspective of the Western tradition, the cognitive perspective, concerns means. Civilisation would itself be meaningless if it contained the assumptions of transcendence only. People who do nothing but wait in expectation of the heavenly civitas deii do not build civilisations in the earthly sphere. The cognitive perspective concerns reality, what it is and how it can be known. This is the world of science and technology, the instrumental manipulation of the world of actual existence. The transcendent ethics of the elevated rational species living in accordance with an objective morality to access the ultimate and benevolent reality establish ends which inspire — but they point beyond the existing reality. Without complementation they live in a half-world, somewhere between here nor there. 

In dealing with meaning and a rationality of means and of ends, a number of critical observations concerning the architectonics of civilisation are in order. Community in itself is an abstract notion. Who isn’t in favour of ‘community’? And how many powerful groups have sought to conceal a sectional interest behind a claim to the communal good? Only misanthropes would take issue with Marx’s affirmation of company, association and conversation. Additional clauses and qualifications with respect to social relations and scale of sociality to avoid a vague, remote, abstract and utterly impossible ‘identification’ with ‘the human species’ as a whole. As social animals, human beings need the companionship and communication that follows association, but this ‘need for society’ says nothing about the actual arrangements of the community. The 'sharing' of all important things in common is a sublime ideal, but question begging this side of heaven. The question was put to Jesus Christ that if men and women had been married several times on earth, to whom would they be married in heaven. The answer is that the spiritual plane is beyond the limitations of the material plane. Turning the question on its head, how can people live on the material plane in accordance to principles appropriate to the spiritual plane? Does all things in common refer not only to material goods but also to marriage-partners?

The empirical facts of egoism, avarice, vanity, possessive individualism, competitiveness, desire, lust denote real aspects of human nature which are manifested in human society and politics. They cannot be 'spirited' away in some simple sense, transcendence merely being an escape from hard realities. The question comes down to how human beings can move from here to there? Whatever the answer to that question, it is clear that the journey starts in the reality of the here, with all its imperfections. The point is that the ethical perspective setting ends in abstraction of the means for realising them sets an impossibly high ideal and, ultimately, becomes an impotent ought-to-be with no critical and practical purchase within actual reality. 

The uniqueness and superiority of the human species is the most question begging of all in that it sets – or seems to set – the human species apart from other species and above nature as a whole. The elevation of the human species seems to be bought at the price of the denigration of nature as a whole. The idea seems to invite the destruction of the ecological basis of human life. Human beings are distinguished on account of their 'reason'. But how, exactly, does this elevate the species? The notion involves a whole number of ambiguities and paradoxes. Human intelligence, knowledge and understanding may be quantitatively different — extended sociality creating the 'larger' brain — from other species but is it qualitatively different from the ways these species adapt themselves to their environment? It is too soon to answer that question. Human beings have transformed their environment to fit their needs and purposes, but this is an ‘adaptation’ that is generating a whole range of adverse ecological consequences that threaten human life as we know it. In ecological terms, human beings continually show themselves to be less 'adaptable' and less fitted to their environment than other species of animals. But to be aware of the ecological failures of human technical and instrumental manipulation of external nature is itself evidence of the rational faculty. The criticism is not a repudiation of reason but a demand that reason live up to its fullest and highest possibilities, including an ethical and ecological component and supplying the ends to guide means.

 Reason, in other words, is an end to achieve and is not to be judged by stages that fall short of the ideal. The rational capacity of human beings affirms the ability of individuals to transcend their individual selves and achieve goodness through identification with the community. If one tests the claim empirically, in terms of historical experience, the claim is fantastical. What is unique and distinct about the human species in this respect is not its rational nobility and elevation but its capacity for organised intra-species competition, conflict, torture and war. 

“The critical issue is that human beings are different from animals. Man creates symbols and bases his culture upon them; the flag and patriotism are examples, as are status, religion, and language. The capacity to create and deal with symbols, actually a superb achievement, also accounts for the fact that we are the cruellest species on the planet. We kill not out of necessity but out of allegiance to such symbols as the flag and fatherland; we kill on principle. Thus our aggression occurs on a different level from that of animals, and not much can be learned from animals about this distinctively human form of aggression.” (May 1976 ch 7). 

Human beings ‘kill on principle’. The capacity to create and deal with symbols is an achievement that also accounts for the fact that human beings are the cruellest species in terms of organised conflict and war on principle. That is not the case against reason, it is the case for reason. May is worth quoting further here, lest the impression be given that he rejects reason as inherently self-deluding and destructive.

“The word power comes from the Latin posse, meaning "to be able." We can see the vicissitudes of the emergence of power as soon as a baby is born into the world—in his cry and in the waving of his arms in demand that he be fed. The cooperative, loving side of existence goes hand in hand with coping and power, but neither the one nor the other can be neglected if life is to be gratifying. Our appreciation of the earth and the support of our fellows are not gained by abdication of our powers, but by cooperative use of them”. (May 1976 ch 1). 

Here, Kant’s argument is required. The historical record, experience, cannot establish the limits of human possibilities, rational or otherwise. That potential lies in rational human nature as a potential for creating a future which is feasibly different and better than the present. Were it otherwise, nothing would change. The fact that human beings had never driven motor vehicles, flew in aeroplanes or used the Internet up to 1800 was not proof that they could never do these things. And that’s the point. The rational faculty is the potential to put an end to intra-species (and inter-species) competition and conflict.





Turning now to the idea that morality is objective, something universal and eternal, an integral part of the universe. The empirical world exhibits a wide variety of moral codes and practices according to time and place. This variety can be made to conform to a common objective standard only by losing concreteness and practicality. But this rejection of objective morality implies that there is an irreducible element of subjective and contingent valuation in moral experience. How does this avoid moral relativism in the understanding of good and evil? Does this mean that slavery in the southern states of the USA is not worthy of moral condemnation because, by the values of that time and place, it was acceptable, justifiable, supported by notions of racial inferiority? The treatment of women in ancient Greece? The Japanese treatment of prisoners of war? Without objective morality, why do we feel that Hitler’s extermination of peoples to be abhorrent? This is not some instinctive fear or concern with self-preservation, since the abhorrence is felt at historical distance. 

The point is that varied moral values and practices are the products of varied and contingent circumstances in time and place, they are not really parts of the ultimate and benevolent universe. If morality is subjective then there is no good reason why a life of sharing, co-operation, altruism should be preferred to the life of possession, competition, and egoism. Without objective morality, there is no way of defining the terms of the good life or of confronting empirical reality with an ideal for which there are compelling arguments. Is the argument for the 'benevolence' of the universe a matter of faith incapable of intellectual demonstration? What are the intellectual proofs? If benevolence cannot be demonstrated, if there is no ultimate reality beyond empirical existence, then no good reasons can be given in support of an endeavour which enjoins us to sacrifice the limited and transitory pleasures of empirical reality in order to gain the greater reward of the ideal society. It is the problem of making the kingdom of 'heaven' intelligible and accessible. Religions can evade this difficulty since only with death is the truth or otherwise of the claim resolved. This escape clause is not available to political movements concerned with creating heaven on earth. 

5 THE COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE

The notion of transcendence is the foundation of the visionary aspect Western thought. This future oriented perspective guided by ends motivates activity in the present with a view to building the future. But ideals outline and map that future, they do not actually construct it in practice. This requires technics, know-how. This is the cognitive perspective. The relation between the ethical and the cognitive perspectives is not one 'end and means', the former setting the end point, the former providing the know-how. There is an interpenetration between two perspectives, a cross-fertilization. Further, the ethical and cognitive co-exist in a state of permanent tension, sometimes complementing each other, other times contradicting each other.

The cognitive perspective holds that the ever-increasing knowledge of the workings of nature, human nature as well as the natural world, makes it possible to envisage a radical transformation and reorganisation of the conditions of human life. This perspective proceeds not from a vision of some ultimate ideal world but from the empirical world itself. It is a perspective which is firmly focused not on what human beings ought to do, think and want, but on the things that human beings actually desire in the everyday world – basic needs like sufficient food, drink, shelter, but also a diverse range of activities, companionship. The cognitive approach deals with the science, technique and organisation in their attainment. Here the notion of human beings being chained to the actual present is confronted not by a transcendent ideal but by knowledge and technical power, freeing people from want, fear, ignorance, idleness. The cognitive perspective focuses on the way that science, technique and organisation satisfy the 'materialistic' aspect of human aspirations. Putting the ethical and the cognitive together means giving moral transcendence and community a material foundation in practical power and plenitude. The ideal and the real are therefore reconciled. Socrates is said to have brought philosophy down to earth. In the process, however, earth is raised up to the level of philosophy. This means that the realization of the material aspirations of human being in empirical life within the moral framework of an ideal organization of society. 

There are three key ideas in the cognitive perspective. In the first place, the natural world is knowable and therefore can be made to serve human purposes. There is no 'rationality', still less benevolence, in the universe, only in the human skill and insight in investigating nature to discern its laws. Nature is considered to be a machine rather than a living organism. As nature is subjected to scientific investigation and technical manipulation, the human intellect is considered the key to advancing knowledge and therefore power. With disenchantment, the benevolent universe becomes value neutral. Where once the moral guarantee for the ultimate success of human endeavour was given by the benevolence of ultimate reality, now human goals are dependent on the advance of human knowledge. But not the reversal: where once the good life was defined in living in accordance with the moral nature of the benevolent universe, now it is realised through the satisfaction of material aspirations.

The scientific examination of nature is accompanied by the scientific examination of human society. As nature is denuded of moral purpose, so too is society and politics. The natural and the social world are made neutral and indifferent to ends. Disenchantment is also a demoralisation. Society is made an object of scientific study, capable of being understood, managed and manipulated. Again, scientific laws replace moral ends. Society ceases to be an arena concerned with the realisation of moral purposes but instead needs to be understood in terms of its institutions of government, law and order, crime and punishment, war and peace, economic production, consumption and exchange, education or the family. All of these social institutions can be examined in terms of their actual processes and regularities, with no need to have recourse to such moral and value-laden notions as the good, justice, right, or to such political values as power, control, authority and obligation. In other words, the cognitive approach is also a demoralisation and a depoliticisation, it robs society of all those things it is to be human above and beyond observable material actualities. The approach lacks vision; it narrows the horizon to the actual world and is not concerned with moral values and political ideals that point to alternate possibilities. The production, distribution and exchange of societal goods of all kinds - economic, cultural, political etc - proceed, like external nature, in a 'law-like' manner. These can be examined scientifically, by recourse to logic and empirical observation. 

In the third place, human values, morality and the 'good society' are derived from human interests, wants, desires, needs, as experienced in the actual world rather than something 'given' by an ideal deriving from objective morality. Morality is whatever is conducive to the attainment of satisfaction in the here and now in terms of human appetites, natural instincts, possibilities and limitations. 

It is apparent that the cognitive perspective, embracing natural and social science, has become dominant in the modern age. It was, however, present in the Western tradition from the start and in fact, with Thales and the other natural philosophers of ancient Greece, was in the field first. One can find it in Epicurus, for whom there is no spiritual reality, no transcendent deity, no personal immortality in the universe, only the actual empirical world. Once people accept this reality as the only reality and identify their nature within with the nature without, then life can properly be enjoyed. The here and now is all that there will ever be, make peace with the world since there is nothing else to come. 

There are a couple of aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy which are pertinent here. Plato upheld a transcendent or other-worldly conception of the good in light of the ultimate reality beyond the senses. In contrast, Aristotle's conception of the 'good life' is defined in this-worldly terms of balanced satisfactions which focus on human needs as given in empirical reality. Aristotle is keen to relate moral and social 'values' to variables and regularities observable in actual societies, establishing causes and effects. Further, Aristotle turns away from Plato’s ideal of organic functionalism to examine existing political societies as they actually are. Aristotle here does two important things, classifying political units in terms of the nature of power wielded in them and then defining conflicting groups within these units according to their social position, as determined by their differential possession of material wealth. Aristotle therefore identifies the conflict between the rich and the poor as the basic conflict in society. 

The cognitive perspective involves claims which are open to question. To begin with, it seems implausible that the 'increasing' knowledge of nature and apparent 'mastery' of it is in itself a benign, let alone a benevolent process. In ‘mastering’ nature, it seems that human beings have shackled themselves within a new necessity dominated by their own technics. Human beings have conquered nature but have in turn been conquered by their own powers in alien form. This worship of technical powers is a new religion based on the optimistic faith that the growth of knowledge ultimately ends in human happiness and freedom. The understanding and mastery of nature is the ‘ascent of man’ out of a state of ignorance and barbarism towards the state of enlightenment through increasing scientific knowledge. 

The increasing sophistication in the understanding of nature has led to a greater humility, with further advances tempered by a greater sense of awe and even mystery. The self-understanding of science is now much more sophisticated, with new discoveries and new knowledge being met not with overweening confidence but with an awareness of reach a new plane of ignorance. 

The idea that with the perfect knowledge of society it will be possible to organize society in accordance with rational and scientific understanding stands revealed as the technocratic utopia it is, not only impossible but also undesirable. The notion of a scientific government is born of the view that individual human action and conduct and collective social structures, processes and relationships, are essentially the same as the law-like phenomena found in nature (which in turn is based on the questionable assumption that external nature also behaves in such law-like manner). The scientific approach is an explicit denial of 'transcendence', of a world beyond the senses, an ultimate reality beneath or behind the observable and the measurable, a world beyond present immediacy. If human beings are governed by a law-like natural necessity, then what role creative human agency, choice, action? Law-like regularity, cause and effect, can be demonstrated after the fact, but not before or while the fact is in the process of creation. The perspective of science in this regard not only proceeds from but actually remains within the narrow horizon of existing empirical fact. How can such a science account for such regular aspects of human behaviour as spontaneity, unpredictability, inconsistency, irrationality and self-contradiction? The most profitable line to develop here is Spinoza’s argument that such behaviour is the result of 'inadequate ideas' with respect to the self-contained substance of God/Nature. The difficult part lies in seeing human life and society as ever being so rational as live wholly in accordance with ‘adequate ideas’. 
Scientific speculation predates Socrates, the natural philosophers were in the field before the moral philosophers. The ‘Age of Reason’ in the seventeenth century was succeeded by the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. If science in itself was going to set us free, it would have done so by now. This observation reveals something about science, technology and knowledge in the modern world. Far from rendering human conduct and the processes and structures of society 'transparent', the world evinces nothing so much as power out of control. An assertive and confident scientism is plainly untenable. The failure lies in believing that the cognitive approach was self-sufficient, causing it to systematically exclude ideas belonging to the moral perspective of transcendence. Historical experience indicates that this scientistic paradigm has continually misfired and fallen far short of its claims. For this reason, the cognitive dimension is one dimension of reason, not the only one. One returns again to the ethical perspective that seeks to transcend a reality given to the senses by reference to ends. It is highly questionable whether any kind of 'hedonism' focused exclusively on the satisfaction of material or natural satisfactions in the empirical here and now could ever be considered a fulfilling human life. It certainly bears no relation to the moral experience of all known civilisations, it offers no adequate foundation of values and no convincing account of the cooperative structures that an enduring social order requires. No lasting society or civilisation has been built on satisfaction of individual material aspirations alone. The view sounds more like the short term live for the day and very soon gone rampages of Hittites and Vikings. And it may fit the approach of rapacious, greedy modern consumers as they help themselves to what remains of nature’s largesse. Which makes the point that everyone is in some way a practical 'Epicurean', in that in the immediate sense all individuals see their 'good life' in terms of plain material aspirations and satisfactions. But values and morality, like community, culture and civilisation, do not follow from natural needs. The simple fact that it is difficult to sacrifice immediate satisfactions for the sake of enduring general principles (e.g. truthfulness, respect for life, helping one's neighbour, etc.) indicates that morality necessarily entails transcendence in some way. 
 This observation points to the conclusion that it is the idealistic perspective concerning values, morality and ends that establishes the foundation of civilisation, the physical world being built by technique, organisation and know-how in accordance with the ideal. The inadequacy of scientism, hedonism and humanism shows that empirical, hard, worldly, secular materialism stands in need of a principle of transcendence, an overarching end or vision which is not derived  from or translatable into the desires and satisfactions experienced in the world of the senses. This principle of transcendence has succeeded in evoking a spirit of sacrifice and self-denial on the part of generations whose ‘contributions’ together built civilised society. No scientific approach to nature and society could on its own have produce anything like civilisation. The words of James Lovelock are pertinent in this respect.

“I am too committed to the scientific way of thinking to feel comfortable when enunciating the Creed or the Lord's Prayer in a Christian Church. The insistence of the definition "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth" seems to anaesthetize the sense of wonder, as if one were committed to a single line of thought by a cosmic legal contract. It seems wrong also to take it merely as a metaphor. But I respect the intuition of those who do believe, and I am moved by the ceremony, the music, and most of all by the glory of the words of the prayer book that to me are the nearest to perfect expression of our language. When atheistic science can inspire anything as moving as Bach's St Matthew passion or as seemly as Salisbury Cathedral I will respect it but not be part of it.” (The Ages of Gaia 2000: ch 9).

Civilisation is more than the physical, more than a power than can be measured and quantified, but something that points to something that is enduring in the human spirit. The point is that civilisation is most profitably considered as a unity of the ethical and the cognitive, combining an active concern with the ‘here’ with a view to getting to the ‘there’. This combines the ideal and the real, the transcendent and the material, the visionary and the scientific, in a seamless web.

The disenchantment that Weber referred to was described by Herder as a ‘disgodding’. Nature was conceived as a machine rather than as a living organism and the universe was relieved of its benevolence. At the same time as the gods departed, Christianity retreated from central stage and the idea of transcendence passed to secular political philosophies concerned with creating earthly heavens. 

What characterises this secular idealism in the modern world is the way that the human capacity for transcendence is located in the advance of scientific knowledge and understanding. The good society is no longer an ideal requiring moral conviction but is capable of realisation through technique and organisation. Science and technics brings the attainment of the ideal within historical time and space, not as a result of living up to a moral conception of the good life but as the direct result of rational human action. 

The Lutheran revolution proclaiming spiritual self-sufficiency through the direct relation of the individual to God must therefore be viewed alongside the Copernican revolution which, in assigning the earth a humble place in the universe, made the human race just one natural species among many others, inhabiting just one planet among many others. The Copernican revolution ought to have led to humility and modesty on the part of the human species, instead the very fact of being able to make such scientific discoveries encouraged a certain pride and optimism in the powers of human reason. The fact that scientific method was able to discover the humble and modest position of the human species on a planet that could no longer be considered the centre of the universe was itself a source of inspiration. Copernicus and Kepler were followed by Galileo and Bacon, then Newton. Instead of humility in face of our small place in the universe, there was hubris. Francis Bacon’s The New Atlantis in 1627 was quick to give a concise statement of the idea that the advance of scientific knowledge – the ‘advancement of learning’ to use the title of another of Bacon’s books - leads logically and inexorably to the increasing of human mastery over nature, and also to the rational organization and control of society:

The End of our Foundation is the knowledge of Causes, and secret motions of Things; and the enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible.

Two hundred years later and Saint Simon was developing the technocratic ideas which were to unite utopian and scientific socialism.

In the ‘Age of Reason’ philosophy took its cue from science and freed itself from theology, even though the first of the modern philosophers trod warily with respect to religion – Hobbes, Vico, Descartes, Spinoza. With Descartes we enter the realm of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ achieved through the method of doubt. For Vico the condition of knowing something is to have made it. Locke’s empiricism raises the very sensory experience formerly condemned as the mere world of particulars as the only reliable way in which to acquire knowledge of the natural world. Hume made reason the slave of the passions. Onwards to the Encyclopaedists and the French 'materialists' of the eighteenth century and the religious and theological casing of civilisation is finally cracked: war is declared between science and religion. With the palpable evidence of the achievements associated with scientific advance all around, the moral authority of the church and the weight of tradition could not resist. The contest gave science a cause to rally behind, a crusade seeking the triumph of the natural over the supernatural, knowledge over belief, discovery over ignorance and reason over superstition. The gods were to be banished from human life. But much else went with them – ends, values, purposes, morality as something that was shared, and not least the humility and modesty that could restrain the new scientific powers within their limits.

The fact that this war of science and religion is still going on, albeit in increasingly sterile terms, should indicate that for all of the many victories of science and the many defeats of religion in the past three hundred years, there is something awry in the notion that the advancement of scientific learning alone suffices for human life. The perspective of transcendence, ethics and idealism has been pulverised but never routed or extinguished. The sooner this phoney war is declared over, the sooner it will be possible to press on to the task of being rational about reason, a task which requires recovering the ethical component of reason, of identifying the ideal within the real.

This is to argue that a sane and balanced approach is to see the ethical and the cognitive as complementary perspectives which apprehend the same reality from different angles but with goals that are not contradictory if each remains within its own sphere. This makes it possible to overcome the pathos of means and ends that afflicts modern society. The apparent sundering of a 'unified' ethical framework by the instrumental rationality of modernity has denied modern human society its innermost spiritual substance, rendering the world meaningless with every advance in scientific knowledge. The more we know about the world, the less that world has any meaning. Without the perspective of transcendence, scientific knowledge and reason closes in on an ever smaller world, knowing more and more about something that matters less and less. One of Richard Dawkins’ books is entitled The Greatest Show on Earth. It is a book about life on earth which, for all of its celebration of diverse forms of animal and plant life, is curiously silent about the threat to the global ecology. Interestingly, Dawkins’ objected to the religious overtones of James Lovelock’s Gaia thesis from the first. He prefers nature as a machine to Nature as a living self-regulating organism. The difference is this. When a machine breaks down, the parts are replaced from the outside. When Nature breaks down, it repairs itself. Nature may well be ‘the greatest show on Earth’ but human beings, as part of Nature, want a meaning that is greater than being part of a food chain, a struggle for survival, a cycle of life and death. And Nature needs more than that. Life is wholly unintelligible without the sense of transcendence.
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant is the pinnacle of the Enlightenment, for this reason – it negotiates a path beyond the conflict of knowledge and belief, reason and empiricism, and ought to have ended the war between science and religion long ago. Kant's philosophy is an intellectually sublime synthesis of ethical and cognitive perspectives. Uniting Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism, Kant's philosophy of the knowledge of nature is wholly secular. For Kant, the knowledge of the external world of 'phenomena' comes from the experience of the senses as made intelligible and organised by the categories of human reason. The world of ‘things-in-themselves’ is beyond human experience and is inaccessible to human reason. There can therefore be no transcendence here. 

The world of 'practical reason' or morality, however, is radically different. Human beings are co-creators and co-legislators of this moral world, the world of ‘noumena’, and partake of a real world as distinct from a merely 'phenomenal' world. Whereas once either revelation (religion) and nature (science) had been the fountain-head of morality, Kant makes human reason the source of being able to understand good and evil, to prescribe right conduct through the ‘categorical imperative’ and to author the universal. The moral law of reason enjoins human beings to live in accordance with the ‘categorical imperative’. Kant defines a number of formulas which in essence convey the substance of the gospels in a secular idiom. The categorical imperative affirms the fundamental equality of rational moral agents, arguing that human beings be treated as 'ends in themselves'. True freedom is achieved if, in moral conduct, human beings follow the law of reason only, in contradistinction to natural inclinations and without regard to practical consequences. This is the moral and rational foundation which enables culture and civilization to flourish. With this foundation secure, human beings can look forward to a future of 'perpetual peace'. 

Kant’s philosophy transfigures the ideals of transcendence into the ethico-rational freedom of citizens who live as co-legislators in a moral world of their own making. Without any recourse to supernaturalism, Kant’s ethico-rational freedom transcends the world of empirical reality, rising above the limitations of a world beset by antagonism, desire and natural inclinations through the power of human reason. Human reason is called upon to impress its sign upon empirical reality, thus expanding the sphere of human freedom. Kant’s ethico-rational freedom encompasses Plato’s sublime morality, the righteous, the poor in spirit, the Gospel love thy neighbour as thyself, the Protestant emphasis on good works, and it does so without any need to have recourse to such elitist or selective notions as Platonic guardians, the ‘chosen people’, the elect, or, reaching into the century after Kant, ‘the party’. Kant achieves this by emphasising the creative power of human reason within each and all, conceiving human beings as co-authors of their moral existence and co-legislators in a universal kingdom of ends. In establishing the limits of reality within the confines of reason and nature, Kant actually opened up the possibility of the most expansive moral and rational freedom, a 'kingdom of ends' which is realised in the three dimensions of nature, society and the mind. 

6 THE REASON OF ANCIENT GREECE
It is sometimes claimed that just as ancient Greek is ‘dead’ as a language, so too ancient Greek philosophy is of little relevance in the modern world. It is certainly true that the politics and the ethics, like the physics and metaphysics of the likes of Plato and Aristotle, is at odds with modern conceptions at many points. But that is all the more reason to retrieve and revitalize their views. Human beings have not changed much over two thousands. For all of sophistication, it still looks like the vanity, greed, lust and stupidity just with mobile phones. Studying the ancient Greeks makes us more knowledgeable not just about past human beings but teaches us something about who we are now, and what we could be. Plato and Aristotle were mighty thinkers who wrote about the problems that confront human beings in every age. And they may well have produced better solutions.
Platonic sublime beauty and harmony and Aristotelian balance and flourishing are particularly appealing at a time when increasing numbers of people are deeply troubled by the nature of the modern world, not only those who have lost out materially in the global processes of production, investment and trade, but also those whose comfortable lifestyles have not bought peace of mind in the Global North. Many people feel that there is something awry in the system itself. The world does not seem to be on the right path. There is a growing awareness of and concern with the massive destruction that technological development has caused. Images of the Amazon rainforests being cut down and going up in smoke, ice-cap’s melting in the Arctic, record droughts one year being followed by record floods the next, learning that the extinction of species is proceeding at a rate not seen for 65 million years, set off feelings of despair. Hearing climate scientists connect ecological destruction with human made global warming climate change in the very least puts a question mark against the notion of industrial ‘progress’. The notion of ‘progress’ implies movement from one stage to a better or higher or more advanced stage. The end point of the industrial revolution seems to be an ecological wasteland that destroys the natural basis for human life. Even more troubling in an immediate sense is the prospect of being destroyed by weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical, biological, all of which were produced by the very scientific techniques which were supposed to issue in human enlightenment. Means of production have become means of destruction. The image of highly trained technicians, dressed in the clean white garb of laboratories and hospitals, working in concert to produce "weapons-grade" bacteria is nauseating. The greatest intellects have been reduced to means and are working to ends that they have not themselves set. Some direct their ire against science and the scientists. But science is never and can never be about ends. The responsibility for the misfiring of science lies somewhere else, however much we can lament the way that many scientists are content to be enlisted in a system that is palpably going wrong. And this is the point, something has gone wrong in a social system that is capable of producing, but not being able to control and know how to use, the awesome tools of modern science, technics and organisation. That something is alienation, the inversion of subject and object, the inversion of means and ends. Failure to tackle the problem at its source in alienative reasons means that the system will continue to attempt solutions by the very means that caused the problems. Where once ethics and politics sought to create a public life that corresponded to and enhanced the human ontology, now we seek solutions in human cloning. Where once we sought eudaimonia, happiness or flourishing as a quality of human faculties and capacities in their exercise, now we seek to understand the chemistry of the brain so as to produce a feeling of well-being through the taking of a happy pill. Not true happiness, of course. But where once Paideia and Bildung referred to a process of socialisation into public life, now all we require is a process of droning for the system.

To describe the spectacle of science and scientists being reduced to life-denying tools as nauseating is apt. In "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity," written in 1935, Edmund Husserl presented a clear message. "The European nations are sick. Europe itself, it is said, is in crisis" (Husserl 1970: 270). And Husserl was clear as to what had gone wrong: "The European crisis has its roots in a misguided rationalism" (Husserl 1970:290).

The reduction of nature to a machine and examined by a mathematically based science has generated the awesome technologies that powered the modern world, has enveloped us all in materialism. A highly productive economic system taps directly into natural inclinations, desires and wants but locks the human in the immediacy of the senses. In raising potentialities, mechanistic materialism locks the human gaze at the immediate level of the senses. This kind of mechanical, instrumental thinking has come to dominate not only all modes of human reasoning, taking the place of culture and ethics. As Ellul argued, technique is not a culture, a philosophy or a way of life. The face that we think it is constitutes the core of the modern crisis. Within alienative, exploitative relations that invert means and ends, science and technology cast a giant shadow that shrouds all other forms of human knowledge and inquiry. Most important, the domination of modern science and technology extinguishes the possibility of gaining knowledge of the "meaning" of human life itself. Science is being made to carry a weight that it cannot bear. Science stands on the wrong side of the fact/value, object/subject divide to answer the need for ‘meaning’. Science deals with the ‘how’ question and can say nothing about ‘why’. The ‘why’ question addresses "meaning" and this requires natural or ordinary language rather than mathematical or scientific articulation.

The temptation to abandon rationalism as such should be resisted. Postmodernism as a decadent liberalism is merely the latest instance of a common twentieth-century indulgence, the last thing that is needed in addressing the problems that face us. Postmodernists consider science like everything else to be a social construction and that ‘truth’ is in some way a made up notion. Perhaps the law of gravity should be tested as a social construction by taking a running jump from the top storey of a very tall building.

Most of all, we need to be rational about reason. Husserl was clear that the crisis was not caused by rationalism as such but a ‘misguided rationalism’, he denied that "the European crisis . . . [means] that rationality as such is evil" (Husserl 1970:290). Rather, what is required is the reform of reason, to expand reason so that it could not only account for material bodies in motion, but also for the meaning of human life. This was what Husserl called "phenomenology," giving a ‘rational account’ (logos) of ‘appearances’ (phenomena).

What Husserl meant by phenomenology comes out in the critique of modern rationality with respect to Einstein:

“Einstein's revolutionary innovations concern the formulae through which the idealized and naively objectified physics is dealt with. But how formulae in general, how mathematical objectification in general, receive meaning on the foundation of life and the intuitively given world - of this we learn nothing; and thus Einstein does not reform the space and time in which our vital life runs its course, (p. 295)

In declaring that "the scientist docs not become a subject of investigation" (p. 295), Husserl is arguing that, modern science, in always speaking the language of mathematics, "objectifies" the world. Science understands ‘how’ material things work and can predict and thus manipulate their movements, but is silent on the ‘why’ of this manipulation. Science can say nothing about the unique "meaning" or "the vital life" that human beings, scientists included, actually experience. "No objective science can do justice to the very subjectivity which accomplishes science" (p. 295). 

The idea that science is itself dehumanizing was confronted and passionately rejected by Jacob Bronowski in The Ascent of Man. He took on the accusation that science reduces human beings to numbers by going to Auschwitz, where people were reduced to numbers in person, not by science, but by arrogance, ignorance and dogma. He quotes Oliver Cromwell, ‘I beseech you in the bowels of Christ, think again that you may be mistaken’. Any science worthy of the name thinks that it may be mistaken and tests for error, contrary evidence. It would be more accurate, then, to regard science as without ethical implication. The dehumanisation is inherent in the use of science, the wider relations and culture within it is set. Science gives the technician the potential to manipulate the natural world, but can know and say nothing about what human beings should do with that potential or what it is like for a human being actually to live in the world it brings about.

And here we come to the fundamental clash between the ancients and the moderns, making it clear why we need to recover some essential truths that have been forgotten. In discovering that the earth revolves around the sun, Copernicus turned the human world on its head. The Earth is not, as Aristotle thought and the Church expounded, the centre of the universe. As scientific fact this observation is incontrovertible. 

In The Unnatural Nature of Science (1992), the embryologist Lewis Wolpert argues that science is difficult because it is systematically counter-intuitive. Wolpert insists that science is an affront to common sense, not an extension of it. Richard Dawkins makes a good case for this point. ‘Newton's law that objects stay in motion unless positively stopped is counter-intuitive. So is Galileo's discovery that, when there is no air resistance, light objects fall at the same rate as heavy objects. So is the fact that solid matter, even a hard diamond, consists almost entirely of empty space’. (Dawkins 2006 ch 7).

All of this is true and all of this indicates the value and the power of science in its own sphere. It is one this replacing intuitive common sense with systematic research in science (Dawkins 2006 ch 10), it is something entirely different to replace the intuitive common sense of human beings in real life. Human beings do not live their lives as though the world is round, as though they are objects in motion – as though the sun is the centre of the universe. For human beings, the Earth is and always will be the centre of the human universe, the everyday world in which human beings live. Kant writes about the awe and wonder that the starry skies ‘above’ inspire him, connecting the above with the moral law within. To see the ‘starry skies above’ human beings must look upwards, out and away from ourselves. We say that ‘the sun is rising’ or ‘the sun is setting’, poetical descriptions of what we experience that are false from an astronomical perspective. Science is indeed counter-intuitive. Which is why science cannot be and can never be the basis of culture and civilisation, a way of life. Wittgenstein thought it possible to create a perfect language of perfect meaning, but he discovered that the air was too rarefied to breath and the surface was too icy to walk upon. It is the grit underfoot that makes it possible to walk on the surface. Ordinary language, like ordinary life, speaks against the Copernican revolution. 

The humility and modesty that is assigned to human beings as a result of the Copernican revolution should be properly assigned to science itself. Instead, there has been an overweening confidence that denies and denigrates essential constants of a humane way of life, ethics, religion, poetry, art, culture. Science, dealing with ‘how’ but silent on ‘why’, displays hubris when, in showing the humble and modest place that the human species and planet Earth have within the universe, assumes a superiority over other modes of human experience. Art, poetry, literature, religion, architecture, music etc all speak to human beings in ways that have at least as much meaning as science and it is arrogance, ignorance and dogma to assert one mode of knowledge and understanding as superior to others, denigrating and displacing others.

The purpose of Aristotle's physics is not just scientific but science that comes with an ethical component with respect to human life. Whether or not Aristotle’s science is accurate – he got much right and much that he got wrong took centuries to falsify – the purpose of his physics is to speak for ordinary life. Aristotle sought to articulate the phenomena and explain how the natural world appears from a human perspective and to the naked eye. This approach does not shut human beings and the question of ethics and meaning out of science. In On the Heavens Aristotle argues that the earth is the centre of the universe around which the stars move eternally in fixed circular orbits. From the perspective of modern science, the argument is false, and anyone who continues to hold it is a crank, like a flat-earther. But from a phenomenological perspective, the argument is more compelling. Aristotle gives a logos, a rational account, of how the world presents itself to earth-bound human beings. In contrast to the modern scientist, Aristotle is able to explain what the world means to us. For Aristotle, the scientist no less than the ordinary human being, is "a subject of investigation." 

What is not being questioned is the legitimacy of science as such, but how far the scientific method can be extended into ordinary life. So one can agree with Dawkins that science is counter-intuitive. We have known since Plato that the world is not as it appears to the senses. If nature is written in the language of mathematics, as Galileo argued, do we have to replace ordinary language with mathematics? And what of those who do not understand mathematics? Do they cease to be?

We have been this way before. The natural philosophers were in the field before Socrates, before the invention of moral and political philosophy. It was the overweening confidence that scientific advance had produced that motivated Socrates to pose the question of meaning.
The physical environment is far more simple than the social environment and the human psyche. The natural philosophers who came before Socrates are far more modern in their philosophical views than Socrates, Plato or Aristotle. 

Democritus intuited the possibility of a mathematically based science able to explain atomic motion. Democritus thought that the "soul" – as it was then understood - was merely the motion of tiny particles moving at the speed of fire, just as contemporary neuroscientists seek to explain consciousness by reducing it to the firings of neurons in the brain. If this is all that the ‘soul’ or consciousness is, why does anything matter? Why do human beings accept that consciousness is as consciousness does? Human beings arguing over ethics and politics may or may not be delusional, their principles being no more than the product of neurons firing in the brain. But it is the fact that they are arguing, thinking in Descartes sense, that gives it meaning and means that it matters. People arguing the relative merits of pop music and classical music, Beatles or Beethoven, Elvis or Beatles, Liverpool or Manchester United can be explained in terms of neuroscience but the merits or otherwise of the arguments and the actions cannot be. And it is the actions and the arguments that constitute human life, what they make out of the physical building blocks. The physical processes supply the bricks, human ethics, culture, thinking, meaning is the cement that builds the civilisation. Remove that meaning and reduce consciousness to neurons, and the world is unrecognisable. Reduce the world to what science says it is and it becomes inhabitable. Human beings can exist in it, but they cannot live in it, they cannot flourish in a world they cannot see themselves in. Which is the point that, regardless of the facts of astronomy, human beings are the centre of their own world. 
Modern science and the extension of the scientific method over ethics and politics is against Plato and Aristotle. But that doesn’t mean that Plato and Aristotle are ‘outmoded’. Plato and Aristotle are aware of the arguments against them and addressed them. It was not out of ignorance of science that they took the positions they did. In criticizing Democritus on this very issue, they are also criticizing a basic tenet of modern science. And in a modernity characterised by a ‘misguided rationalism’, Plato and Aristotle should be taken very seriously indeed.

In commenting on Einstein, Husserl uses the word "meaning." In making a distinction between ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, in confining science to the ‘how’ so as to establish the legitimacy, indeed the centrality to ordinary human beings in ordinary life, of ‘meaning’, we need to be clear what the word ‘meaning’ itself means.

It is important to recall exactly what this word itself means. It has at least two different senses: (1) ‘to have in the mind,’ "to intend," "to have a purpose," as in "I meant to do it;" (2) "to signify," ‘to serve to show, convey or indicate’, ‘signification’, ‘purport’, as in "the word 'science' means ‘knowledge reduced to a system; the facts pertaining to any department of mind and matter in their due connections’ (The University English Dictionary). 

Putting these two senses of the word together, the statement, "the meaning of life," implies that life has a purpose which can be signified or shown in ordinary language. And it is the possibility of this that the modern scientific view explicitly denies. From the perspective of modern scientific viewpoint, the way ordinary human beings, speaking ordinary language, experience their ordinary everyday life has no epistemological significance. It is in this sense that science is dehumanizing.

This essay addresses the problems of the modern world by going back to the philosophical views of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle on account of their profound appreciation and attempt to comprehend the meaning of human life. The arguments of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle come from within and stay true to the geocentric, life as lived, perspective expressed by ordinary language, as opposed to the heliocentric perspective and mathematical language of the scientists. On point of fact, the scientists are right. But the world they describe exceeds human grasp. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are worthy of revival for the way that they bring science within the confines of human experience. At a time when science is busy reducing human mind and body to physiological processes whilst exalting the external universe, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle remind us about a good deal of what it means to be a human being and to live a human life. Living in this sense is so much more than existing. Human beings are more than survival machines. Michelangelo could have survived as flesh, bone and sinew without the strenuous efforts required on his part to finish the frescoes on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. But he couldn’t have lived without sculpture, painting and architecture. These works create a world beyond the empirical and make a future which is something more than that given by the immediate physical environment. Take the idea of a unicorn. The unicorn as a flesh and blood animal, a physical object, may not exist, but the idea is no less real for that. Human beings live by ideas. They cannot survive without them. Culture, in the broad sense including technics, saved the human race during the ice ages. It may have to do so again. As the burgeoning environmental crisis forces us to re-examine ourselves, our powers and our purposes, the guidance of Greek reason has never been more needed. 

7 PYTHAGORAS AND HARMONY

There is harmony at the heart of the cosmos, an order beyond the senses which is accessible by symbols. Philosophy, science, religion, music and the arts are not mutually exclusive. They approach the same reality beyond the senses from different angles to give a more rounded and more fully human appreciation of the world and our place within it. The pivotal figure here is Pythagoras, mathematician, philosopher, vegetarian leader of cults and the source of the quote the ‘music of the spheres’. Philosophy, science, religion and the arts explore the single reality, the One, addressing the mystery of the world's existence and our existence as human beings. Since they all use different methods and follow different paths to try to achieve a deeper understanding of existence, each may appeal to different temperaments. What they share in common is the goal of exploring human knowledge and experience, attempting to bring what is hidden to light in a publicly articulate form. Philosophy, science, religion and the arts can enrich one another, and a fully rounded human being will find himself becoming naturally interested in all three. The problems that arise will stem from the encroachment of one into the sphere of the others. 

Philosophy is one of the most fascinating and valuable things that civilization has produced. And, like the others, its future is likely to be richer than its past. If philosophy originates in the awareness of the gap separating the ‘is’ of the empirical world, which all can access by the immediacy of the senses, from the ‘ought-to-be’, which all feel if not always understand, then the eternal promise of philosophy is the affirmation that human beings are capable of narrowing and maybe, in some ultimate and ideal sense, closing that gap through reason. Reason as a praxis. Philosophy as a way of life available to all as rational beings.

Pythagoras taught the means to attain freedom through rational conduct and the philosophic life. Pythagoras is the origin of the Platonic trinity of the true, the good and the beautiful. His metaphysics enables the Intellect to apprehend and to know the ultimate truth. His moral precepts ensure the conformity of human conduct with the perfect goodness. His aesthetics cultivate the adoration of the supreme beauty, inspiring the Muses and the Arts. Mathematics, music, art and architecture – the highest human achievements - all adhere to the cosmic principle of harmony – the music of the spheres. The failure to respect harmonic laws generates ugliness and disorder, which is to sin against the Muses. Respect for harmonic laws presupposes a state of soul open to Intelligible Beauty and gives human beings access the divinely beautiful order of the cosmos. The beauty in the eye of the beholder is the divinely beautiful order of the cosmos which human beings are capable of seeing if their souls have been opened by mathematics, music, philosophy, art and architecture.

One would imagine that we live in Pythagoras’ world, a world built on the theorem to which he gives his name, a world of mathematics and science. Nothing could be further from the truth. To understand Pythagoras as a mathematician and scientist is to completely misunderstand him, to turn his mathematical achievements against his spiritual purpose. Since Nietzsche and Weber, the idea of Occidental rationalism producing not freedom and happiness but the opposite has filled libraries. Science and technics produce not power but the illusion of power, an instrumental rationality that not only pulverises nature but envelops human beings too. For all of the claims to progress, Western civilisation expresses a continual reliance upon the force of technique and organisation rather than the integration of technics within a human culture based on harmonic principles and fitted to the divine order. Western science and technics continues to misfire precisely because it has misread Pythagoras and disobeyed the laws of harmony. Pythagoras is present at the birth of Occidental rationalism, stepping out from the mythic past in the 6th century, preparing the ground for an emergent consciousness. What followed was a very partial realisation of what Pythagoras had in mind, a partiality that cut reason off from the soul and turned rationalism against itself. Pythagoras mapped out a path for growth according to a plan laid up in Heaven. Civilisation has continually strayed from that path, and for this reason, a false conception of power inducing the abstraction of the technosphere from the ecosphere, the biosphere, from the cosmos. The missing spirituality is also a missing materiality in that the absence of the one skews the character of the other. Pythagoras laid down the framework for a spirituality that came to terms with the material world. The Pythagorean synthesis of science and religion, of spiritual and natural philosophy, remains what it had been from the start, the ideal guide for a balanced, sane civilization that has embedded knowledge and power in a divinely ordered cosmos.

Superficially, it would seem that we live in Pythagoras’ world already, a world in which applied mathematics has created a technics and culture distanced from nature and necessity. Pythagoras’ emphasis on Number revealed the secret which made modern technology and the technical mastery of Nature possible. But this is only one side of the path for growth that Pythagoras laid out. Pythagoras created a careful system of checks and balances which brought matter and spirit together and was intended to integrate technics within a culture which led to soul to a higher plane. Pythagoras did not reduce the world to number but sought to raise it to an appreciation of the metaphysical and sacred aspect of Number. It is the partial realisation of Pythagoras’ doctrine that has achieved this reductionism. For Pythagoras Numbers concerned quality, not quantity. To reduce Numbers to quantity reduces life also to quantity, with predictably dehumanising consequences. For Pythagoras, Number reflected the One and its emanations. Numbers, especially those from 1 to 10, are archetypal beings. To reduce them to quantity alone is a denial of their true nature. In Pythagorean terms, this is to commit blasphemy. What Pythagoras proposed was nothing less than the idea of sacred number and geometry. This idea, which ought to have been the basis of Occidental civilisation and rationalism, was lost. As a result, rationalism has proceeded without its moorings, capable of great achievements, capable of plunging the world into disaster. 

From this long range perspective, it is apparent how the perennial science versus religion debate is profoundly misguided. It is not that this side is right and that side is wrong but that both sides are incapable of true knowledge of the One in their separation. The fact the polarity of matter and spirit forces sides to be taken in the first place leads us to stray from Pythagoras’ carefully charted course. And science as much as religion has strayed from this path. The emphasis on Number as quality rather than quantity is evident than in the scriptures and rituals of Judaism and Christianity. Here we come across the Pythagorean precept to "honor first the Immortal Gods", Numbers, before embarking on any undertaking. The assertion of quantity over quality in the modern world means that number confers information and power but not meaning and wisdom; human beings rule nature with more knowledge but with less wisdom.

The Pythagorean universe is a measured one with graduated hierarchies filled by suitable beings fitted to their level: Higher Deities, lesser Gods, daimons, heroes, geniuses, and so on. Judaism, Christianity (particularly early and medieval), and Islam offered visions of angels standing in ranks between the earth and God. Angels have been out of fashion in this disenchanted world for some time. The ordered universe of divine hierarchies raising the soul to higher things has been replaced by a bureaucratised world of impersonal routine and regularity. The triumph of instrumental rationality has not only disgodded the world but denatured it, human beings too. In attempting to bring the Absolute closer to humanity through the limited terms of reason, we have created a personal God at the expense of absoluteness. This diminishes human beings, has them thinking small instead of aspiring to the One which is the divine order of the cosmos. Within the orderly universe in which hierarchies guide the soul to divinity, Pythagoras integrates matter within spirit. The subtlety of his position avoids the phoney war of science and religion that, pressing one sided claims against each other, violates the divine order. The Golden Verses say: "Men are children of the Gods, and sacred Nature all limits hid reveals." 

Within the whole, all things proceed in such a way as to accord justice to each other, just as every physical action is met with an equal and opposite reaction. This is not the personal God. The One has no personality and shows neither favour nor anger in response to human interest. Since the only Fall is the periodic one of soul into body, there is no vicarious salvation. All that there is is a migration around the states of being in which human beings attain freedom through the rational conduct that characterises the philosophic way of life. The path to freedom occurs through one's own natural capacities, efforts and acquired wisdom.

Pythagoras world view is based on the trinity of the true, the good and the beautiful. His metaphysics affirms that the Intellect can approach and know the truth; his morality affirms the rational conduct that ensures correspondence with the good; his aesthetics allows access to the Beautiful.
Pythagoras was a pioneer of music therapy, emphasising the beneficial effects of practical music on psycho-physical health. But he also used Music for the intellectual benefits of its speculative side. Music is the incarnation of the transcendent virtues of Number. In Music, the Numbers penetrate directly to the heart; in Mathematics, the Numbers occupy the brain. As music incarnate the transcendent virtues of Number in time, so the visual arts incarnate them in space, achieving beauty through harmony and correct proportion. The Greek architecture and sculpture attained the heights it did in the century after Pythagoras by respect for this correct proportion and harmony. Indeed, the high-points of Western and Islamic architecture have been achieved by this conformity to harmonic principles, as the measurement of Gothic cathedrals, early Renaissance churches, and the masterpieces of Islamic architecture prove. Violation of harmonic principles leads to ugliness, and is a denial of the divinely beautiful order of the cosmos, a sin against the Muses. A state of soul open to Intelligible Beauty brings obedience to harmonic laws and gives access to the divine order.

Pythagoras understood that human beings, also, are arranged in a hierarchy according to their receptivity to philosophy. From just above the animals to just short of Gods are different levels requiring different degrees of teaching. There has been much speculation about the most esoteric branch of his school, but Pythagoras was actively involved in public life as a political reformer and lawgiver to several cities. He defined politics as a field which concerned the improvement of all human beings, the lowest types as well as the highest. In giving women equal status with men, Pythagoras broke with custom, the names of his female disciples being recorded by his biographers to emphasise this point. It is apparent, then, that Pythagoras’ hierarchical principle is in conformity with the harmonic principle and avoids the caricatured form it took in Western civilization, a hierarchy based on class rather than type, power rather than talent, riches rather than character – material qualities rather than spiritual. There is nothing in Pythagoras of the Saved and Damned.

In line with the notion of the divinely ordered cosmos, Pythagoras could not invent his philosophy. Truth is a perennial and invariable quality of the divine order. This order alone is the origin, the One. Pythagoras studied widely in an attempt to grasp the One. Here he combined Orphism with a knowledge of the natural philosophers, Thales and Anaximenes. His synthesis also encompassed the mysteries of Egypt and the science of Babylon. He then distilled the essence of what he had learnt insofar as this would be useful to the age about to unfold. The goal was the discovery of the Divine within oneself (the 'Kingdom of God within you'') and was to be facilitated by contemplation of what "sacred Nature" reveals. 

What we are presented with here is the lost basis of civilisation. Pythagoreanism is just another contender amongst all the other religious could-have-beens of the early Roman Empire. Pythagoreanism did survive but only in its more esoteric aspect within Neoplatonism, itself a combination of theosophy, cosmology, arithmology, speculative music, and exotic religion. Similarly, Pythagoreanism also survived in the esoteric schools of Christianity and Islam. The result is the periodic and unconscious influence of Pythagorean themes, particularly in architecture and the other arts. This influence has manifested itself in other ways too. For Marsilio Ficino, Pythagoras was a link in his genealogy of "prisci theologi"; the Pythagorean school was cited as a precedent for heliocentric astronomy by the astronomers Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler; Kepler’s researches into the harmony of the spheres and geometry also revealed the influence of Pythagoras. Later came the "romantic" Pythagoreans, Thomas Taylor (1758-1835), who published the Theoretic Arithmetic in 1816, a translation of lamblichus's Life of Pythagoras, and Fabre d'Olivet (1767-1825), who published the Golden Verses in French. As a result, a number of semi-Pythagoreans populate the nineteenth century, although with little overall influence. The Theosophical Society at the end of the nineteenth century gave a stronger boost.
Whatever the explicit impact, Pythagorean influence is more underlying and unconscious. One sees this in such things as diet consciousness, vegetarianism and the whole-food movement; in architecture; the search for syncretism in religion; the attempt to incorporate Oriental wisdom into the West; researches into ancient Egypt and Babylon; the interest in sacred geometry and the golden ratio; meditation; music therapy; the new physics; the interest in communal living, eco-communes and spiritual communities; the belief in reincarnation. Whether those involved in these activities realise it or not, Pythagoras is the origin of all these diverse impulses, its unifying centre point. Pythagoras ought to have been the tutelary genius of past civilisation, instead there has been but a very partial realisation of his vision, focused on quantity to the expense of quality. That age shows all the signs of coming to an end. Perhaps, at the dawn of a new civilisation, Pythagoras is ready to claim his rightful status, the man who showed us how to bring our spiritual nature to terms with the material world.

One reason why Pythagoras has been treated as a figure lost in myth, with PYTHAGOREANISM understood principally in its esoteric aspect, because of the scattered nature of the Pythagorean fragments. 

Putting these fragments together and one sees the basis of a universal culture embracing the range of subjects: mathematics and science, metaphysics, psychology, ethics and politics, sociology, architecture and art. This offers more than general knowledge and information for study. Rather, it is the holistic way that these subjects are integrated so as to complement each other within a broader vision.

In a famous quote, Alfred North Whitehead stated "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." Given the extent to which Plato was influenced by Pythagoras and given the centrality of Plato within Western civilisation, one glimpses, albeit indirectly, the importance of Pythagoras himself. Pythagoras was the first to use the term philosophy, and adopt it proudly as an appellation. He also defined it as a discipline.
Despite the significant influence of Pythagorean thought in antiquity, Pythagoras seems a figure of myth and speculation unlike, say Confucius, Buddha, Socrates, Jesus Christ. Many things are known. Pythagoras is most famous as a mathematician. This is but one part of his achievement and even here he has been misunderstood. Most important of all, Pythagoras was both a natural philosopher and a spiritual philosopher, a man who was both a scientist and a religious thinker at the same time, with no duality. He was a political theorist. Although known mainly by his more esoteric schools, Pythagoras was involved in the public affairs of local government. He conducted extensive research into music harmonics and tuning systems and was credited with being  the first to discover the ratios of the musical scale. Pythagoras also advocated the therapeutic value of music. A vegetarian, Pythagoras taught the kinship of all living things. 

Much more is shrouded in mystery as a result of Pythagoras leaving no writings. Pythagoras, like Socrates and Plato after, saw philosophy as a way of life, a lived ethos, practice or process rather than something that is derived from book learning. It follows that his teaching was of an oral nature. Pythagoras did do some public speaking, he presented the true essence of his philosophic inquiries only to those students who were capable of understanding them. Like Plato, Pythagoras was no doubt sceptical about written philosophy. Presenting philosophic doctrines of ultimate concern through books could become an excuse not to live them. To Pythagoras, philosophy is a process. Only people could answer questions and engage in philosophical enquiry.

The Pythagoreans made Number "the principle, the source and the root of all things." (Theon of Smyrna, Mathematics Useful for Understanding Plato, 12.) The Monad, or Unity, is the principle of Number. The One, then, is not a number, but is the principle underlying number. This means that numbers—particularly the first ten—are manifestations of diversity in a unified continuum. As Theon of Smyrna put it:

Unity is the principle of all things and the most dominant of all that is: all things emanate from it and it emanates from nothing. It is indivisible and it is everything in power. It is immutable and never departs from its own nature through multiplication (1x1=1). Everything that is intelligible and not yet created exists in it; the nature of ideas, God himself, the soul, the beautiful and the good, and every intelligible essence, such as beauty itself, justice itself, equality itself, for we conceive each of these things as being one and as existing in itself.

Theon of Smyrna, Mathematics Useful for Understanding Plato, 66.

One represents the principle of Unity from which all things arise. Two, the Dyad, represents Duality. This is the beginning of multiplicity and of strife, but is also the possibility of logos, denoting the relation of one thing to another:

The first increase, the first change from unity is made by the doubling of unity which becomes 2, in which are seen matter and all this is perceptible, the generation of motion, multiplication and addition, composition and the relationship of one thing to another.

Theon of Smyrna, Mathematics Useful for Understanding Plato, 66.





unity, duality and harmony

In fine, the Pythagorean paradigm, based on the universal principles of pure Number and Form, denotes Unity issuing in Duality and the subsequent Triadic unification of duality as the dynamic, differentiated image of the One in three parts. This pattern is the archaic and archetypal paradigm of cosmogenesis in Greek myth and the early Ionian scientific tradition, a universal pattern concerning the creation of the world.

The abstract formula which is common to the early cosmogonies is as follows: (1) There is an undifferentiated unity. (2) From this unity two opposite powers are separated out to form the world order. (3) The two opposites unite again to generate life.

Cornford, "Science and Mysticism in the Pythagorean Tradition," part 2, 3

The Pythagorean view is that the kosmos is a "world-order" as an "ordered-world". The word kosmos means both order and ornament. To say that the world is ornamented with order is to say that the universe is beautifully ordered.

The idea of order is intimately connected with Limit (peras) and the Unlimited (apeiron), the two fundamental, most universal, principles of Pythagorean cosmology. The world or cosmos is compounded of Limited and the Unlimited, definite and indefinite elements.

Limit is a definite boundary; the Unlimited is indefinite and is therefore in need of Limit. Whilst apeiron may be translated as Infinite, it denotes infinite in a negative sense. This indicates infinite as infinitely or indefinitely divisible, and hence weak, as opposed to the modern understanding of the infinite as "powerful." To make the distinction between the ancient and modern understanding, apeiron is best translated as either Indefinite or Unlimited.

In both Pythagorean and Platonic cosmology, Limit and the Unlimited, Form and Matter, are woven together through numerical harmony, producing the phenomenal universe existing in the indefinite receptacle of space, a universe composed of universal constants and local variables. Plato’s Timaeus reflects the Pythagorean cosmogony showing how the Demiurge of the cosmos parcels out the stuff of the World Soul according to the numerical proportions of the musical scale. (Plato, Timaeus 35b f.)

There is a long, subterranean Pythagorean theme running from antiquity to the modern era, expressing itself clearly at certain times, but mainly fading into the background. This theme is characterised by the use of arithmetic and geometry as paradigms of whole systems. (see Buckminster Fuller. Some important sources for the study of this approach and geometrical forming principles include Keith Critchlow's Order in Space and Islamic Patterns, Ghyka's The Geometry of An and Life). The basic rationale is that since geometrical principles actually shape the phenomena of nature, then geometrical forms can be used to illustrate the harmonies and symmetries which exist between natural phenomena. This symbolic usage of number and geometry plainly appeals to something deeply rooted in the human imagination. Indeed, in being based on principles of natural order, such paradigms have greater validity than typologies which, as human invention, are merely arbitrary. In other words, "Pythagorean" models have more intrinsically in common with the phenomena they seek to classify than invented typologies of human classification. Whilst these limited, arbitrary models are prone to failure, falling short of the phenomena they seek to explain, Pythagorean cosmological symbolism is designed to show how the parts relate to each other within a larger whole, thus affirming the principle of unity underlying diversity.

According to Pythagoras, philosophy is a way of life. Pythagoras

likened the entrance of men into the present life to the progression of a crowd to some public spectacle. There assemble men of all descriptions and views. One hastens to sell his wares for money and gain; another exhibits his bodily strength for renown; but the most liberal assemble to observe the landscape, the beautiful works of art, the specimens of valor, and the customary literary productions. So also in the present life men of manifold pursuits are assembled. Some are influenced by the desire of riches and luxury; others, by the love of power and dominion, or by insane ambition for glory. But the purest and most genuine character is that of the man who devotes himself to the contemplation of the most beautiful things, and he may properly be called a philosopher.

lamblichus. The Life of Pythagoras, chapter 12

Pythagoras is reported to have been the first man to call himself a philosopher. Pythagoras distinguished himself from those who called themselves wise (sophos), by calling himself a philosopher, not wise but a lover of wisdom.

In the Republic (600a-b), Plato refers to the distinctive bios Pythagorikos, or the Pythagorean way of life. For Pythagoras, philosophy was more than an intellectual pursuit, it was a way of life, the aim of which was the assimilation to God. 

The school of Pythagoras in Croton seems to have been a religious society organised around the Muses, the goddesses of learning and culture, and their leader Apollo. The school possessed a monastic aspect, recognising a ‘rule’ of life, although most of the Pythagoreans did not live together.

Pythagoras was influenced by and Pythagoreanism remained closely related to the Orphism, an esoteric, private religion named after the legendary musician Orpheus. (Minar, "Pythagorean Communism"). The belief in transmigration or "reincarnation" was something that Pythagoras had in common with Orphism. Within Orphism, the soul, a divine spark of Dionysus, is bound to the body (soma) as to a tomb (sema). In living for the body, humanity lives in a condition of forgetfulness with respect to its true, spiritual nature. The soul is immortal, but, unless released through a series of purifications and rites, is bound to the "hard and deeply-grievous circle" of incarnations. (From an Orphic gold funerary plate, translated in Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, 5. (1 DK 18). With this release the soul regains its true nature as a divine being.








For Pythagoras, philosophy makes assimilation to God possible, a possibility ultimately grounded in the nature of human beings:

Pythagoras said that man is a microcosm, which means a compendium of the universe; not because, like other animals, even the least, he is constituted by the four elements, but because he contains all the powers of the cosmos. For the universe contains Gods, the four elements, animals and plants. All of these powers are contained in man. He has reason, which is a divine power; he has the nature of the elements, and the powers of moving, growing, and reproduction.

The Life of Pythagoras preserved by Photius, chapter 15

Humanity comprises a world-order in miniature, containing all of those principles which constitute the greater cosmos, of which human beings are a reflection, including the powers of divinity. This does not set human beings the task of becoming divine but of becoming aware of the divine, the universal principles each has within. This was the end of Pythagorean education (Plato Republic (500c). Human beings actualise the divine by coming to know the universal and divine principles which constitute the cosmos, Number for the Pythagoreans. Thus, to know the cosmos without is to know the divine element within, meaning that the human being becomes divine and harmonized since only like can know like. In this respect, philosophy is the care of the soul.

ACCORDING TO ancient sources, Plato received his doctrine of the tripartite soul from the Pythagoreans. This doctrine lies at the heart of Pythagoras' parable of the three lives, dividing humanity into the covetous, the ambitious, and the curious. "What the division specifies is the three typical motives of human action, and all three motives will be found in operation at different times in every normal human soul." (Stocks, "Plato and the Tripartite Soul," 210-11.) The covetous desire money and profit, the covetous desire honour and power, and the curious desire knowledge.

In line of descent from the Pythagorean tradition, Plato’s tripartite division of the soul is hierarchical: the reasoning part is superior to the "spirited" part and finally the part that desires the pleasures of nutrition and generation. The reasoning part is top of the hierarchy since it is this dimension of the soul which constitutes a distinctive humanity apart from the other animals. The three lives correspond to the Platonic tripartite division of the soul thus.

the three lives	the "platonic division"






It follows that bringing the three parts of the soul into a state of harmony achieves psychic health. This is not a state of equality but a state of attunement, in which balance is achieved as a result of each part receiving what it is due. When each part of the soul separates from the others and goes its own separate way, the psyche becomes a house divided, resulting in disturbance. As against dissociation and fragmentation, giving each part its due achieves psychic wholeness.

The Pythagoreans identified justice with proportion, particularly geometrical proportion, because it is through proportion that "each part receives what it is due." Plato's Republic, concerned with establishing the nature of justice, has this Pythagorean strain throughout. (for the Pythagorean view of justice as proportion see John Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, 81-83.) Thus, Plato argues that in the social realm, justice is achieved when each part of society receives its due, and is able to perform the function for which it is suited. Justice is a universal principle, therefore it functions in exactly the same fashion in the realm of the soul as it does in the realm of society. Hence, "justice is produced in the soul, like health in the body, by establishing the elements concerned in their natural relations of control and subordination, whereas injustice is like disease and means that this natural order is inverted." (Plato, Republic 444d (Cornford translation, 143). As Plato argues, in a distinctively Pythagorean passage:

...The just man does not allow the several elements in his soul to usurp one another's functions; he is indeed one who sets his house in order, by self-mastery and discipline coming to be at peace with himself, and bringing into tune those three pans, like the terms in the proportion of a musical scale, the highest and lowest notes and the mean between them, with all the intermediate intervals. Only when he has linked these parts together in well-tempered harmony and has made himself one man instead of many, will he be ready to go about whatever he may have to do, whether it be making money and satisfying bodily wants, or business transactions, or the affairs of state. In all these fields when he speaks of just and honorable conduct, he will mean the behavior that helps to produce and preserve this habit of mind; and by wisdom he will mean the knowledge which presides over such conduct. Any action which tends to break down this habit will be for him unjust; and the notions governing it he will call ignorance and folly.

Plato, Republic 444d (Cornford translation, 141-2)

Pythagorean philosophy, therefore concerns the care of the soul. The ethical and educational conceptions of the Pythagoreans organises this care.

For Pythagoras, philosophy represents a "purification" aiming at the assimilation to God. The universe is divine on account of its order (kosmos), and the harmonies and symmetries which it embodies and expresses. The universe is divine because these principles are the characteristics of divinity; these principles also innately subsist within the human soul. For the Pythagoreans, the soul is a harmony. (For sources and a discussion of the soul as a harmonia see Guthrie, A History of Early Greek Philosophy, vol. 1, 307 f.) If human beings are to become like God, then the soul must become aware of its harmonic origin, structure and content. Understanding the divine principle of Number is the source of all harmony and order, it is possible to makes sense of Heracleides’ statement that, according to Pythagoras, true "happiness consists in knowledge of the perfection of the numbers of the soul." (Quoted by Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis ii, 84.)

The Pythagoreans emphasised the use of proper music, diet, and exercise in order to nurture and maintain the natural harmony of the psychic and somatic faculties. According to lamblichus, "They took solitary morning walks to places which happened to be appropriately quiet, to temples or groves, or other suitable places. They thought it inadvisable to converse with anyone until they had gain​ed inner serenity, focusing their reasoning powers. They considered it turbulent to mingle in a crowd as soon as they rose from bed, and that is the reason why these Pythagoreans always selected the most sacred spots to walk. " (lamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, chapter 21.) These activities are a form of philosophic "purification" (catharsis) or "practice" (praxis), which serve to regulate the body and the emotions. Intellectual and psychic levels were combined through the study of mathematics and the natural world. The Pythagoreans approached the principles of harmony experientially through the study of harmonics on the monochord and through geometrical constructions. The Pythagoreans also pursued the study of purely abstract mathematics.

Bearing in mind that the end of all of these pursuits is to follow God, the Pythagorean approach to divinisation can be compared with the Christian mysticism of the late Hellenistic period and after. The first stage of "the mystical ascent" is known as ‘praxis’ and refers to the ethical purification of the soul. The second stage is contemplation or theoria. The contemplation of Nature and universal principles which characterises the Greek philosophic tradition is replaced in Christianity by the contemplation of scripture. The final stage, theosis, is the union of the mystic with God. 

In Hellenistic Christian mysticism of the late antique world, the first two stages of catharsis and theoria lose their significance once the final stage is reached. Once the summit is reached, the ladder can be kicked away. This cannot be said of the ancient Pythagorean approach to divinisation. To aspire to the summit is not a desire to escape from the world. The Pythagoreans do not oppose spirit to matter. Certainly, in line with Orphic belief, the Pythagoreans believed in reincarnation and conceived the body as limiting the soul. However, it was Orphism that sought exemption from the Wheel of Generation. Pythagoreanism took a different approach. Whereas the Orphics sought to transcend the world, the Pythagoreans sought to exist within the cosmos in a state of emotional repose and intellectual acuteness. The Pythagorean goal is not to escape the cosmos for some transcendent harmony but to become aware of, and enhance the function of, the transcendent harmony in the natural, psychological and social orders of the universe. ( Whilst the soul transcends the limitations of the body, the realm of time and space, humanity is nonetheless a microcosm and therefore a reflection of the divinely beautiful cosmos, linked together with nature, all other living beings, and the Gods through harmony, justice, and proportion. 

Pythagorean Political and Ethical Theory
THE key principles of harmonia had political implications. Just as the health of the balanced soul rests on harmonic proportion, so too does the living structure of a healthy state rest on the principle of justice. In this respect, Plato's Republic, as the study of justice in both the psychic and social realms, is thoroughly Pythagorean. The Pythagoreans identified justice with proportion, with geometrical proportion being the most perfect. Plato's tripartite division of the soul and of society favours more than a little of the earlier Pythagorean division. Identifying the three parts of the soul with three different parts of society, Plato is concerned to demonstrate how both the soul and society attain their peak of excellence when "each part receives its due" and when each of the three parts fulfils the particular function for which it is best suited. Plato and the early Pythagoreans were aristocrats, in the ancient Greek sense of the word, arguing that ‘the best’ qualified should govern for good government, as against political systems in which wealth, on power, or popular choice decided who should govern. Finally, the Pythagoreans were the first philosophical school to concern themselves with such social and political questions, as distinct from the natural philosophy of the earlier Ionian tradition.
With respect to Pythagorean ethics, the idea of "proper action" emerges from the ideas of philosophy as a way of life, and the nature of the soul and the cosmos. Personal conduct and relations to others is shaped in discovering the structure and nature of the soul, and in experiencing and coming to understand the principles of harmony. In fine, since each part is linked to the whole through harmonia, every action has consequences for which the individual is supremely responsible.

A Philosophy of Whole Systems
Pythagoras has invariably appealed to the more universal thinkers of every age through the way that his conceptions reveal intrinsic principles, existing both at the sacred "root of Nature's fount" and in the human character. In this, Pythagoras raises the possibility of an integrated approach to the study of Nature as a philosophical way of life.
The principle of harmonia is at the centre of Pythagorean thought. The Universe is One but the world is a unity in multiplicity. The phenomenal realm is a differentiated image of the unity of the Universe. Although the whole consists of many parts, the unity of the whole is maintained by the hierarchical principle of harmony, the logos of relation, which gives every part its place in the fabric of the whole.
Pythagoras' integrated approach encompasses mathematics, psychology, ethics, and political philosophy into a single comprehensive whole. This approach rejects the dualism of subject and object, knower and known which has scarred the intellectual and socio-political fabric of Western civilisation since its inception. An integral part of this bifurcation is the separation of science, religion and philosophy which continues to this day. The integrated approach of Pythagoras puts the many-sidedness of life and experience. Humanity achieves happiness when able to relate to both the universal and the particular, bringing together both the eternal and the temporal levels of being so as to be at home in the universe.

Natural science particularizes the universal, dissolving the phenomenal web of the whole into the multiplicity of the individual parts. By reducing living form and qualitative relations to mathematical and statistical formulations based on the classification of material artefacts, natural science quantifies the universal.

The Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy is concerned with the whole as well as the part, the true nature of the parts being determined in relation to the whole. Understanding that all things are essentially related to each other and to certain eternal forms and principles, the holistic approach seeks understanding by establishing the relation that the particular has with the universal. By approaching not individual parts alone but whole systems, it is possible to know the organic relation between multiplicity and unity and connect the temporal with the eternal.
Such an approach is perfectly compatible with scientific inquiry. Here the scientific spirit is conceived as the desire to study the universe in its totality, so that scientists examine both the part and the whole.

It is interesting to speculate whether the split between science, religion and philosophy pre-dates the industrial revolution as a cause, accompanies it as a collaborator or is a consequence of its quantification and commodification of life. At some point, an understanding of the world as mechanical replaced the understanding of the world as organic. Within certain social relations, technics escaped political, ethical and social control and split human knowledge and experience into separate domains. Freed from the religious and/or ethical element, which anchors scientific inquiry to the whole of life and human values, and from the philosophical element which mediates knowledge and belief, science ceases to be science in the older sense, narrows its perspective, becomes indifferent to ends and in the process is transformed into a servile means, an instrument, nursemaid of technology, a mere instrument in the development and employment of mechanization. Technics, the application of an art or a skill, practical knowledge, are certainly useful, but whether for good or ill depends upon the ends they serve. And here one sees the deleterious consequences of the fracturing of the integrated approach. The scientific revolution which turned nature into a machine occurred at the same time as the industrial revolution. The result was the mechanistic conceptualization of the natural order, of organic life, and of human beings. The ends of this mechanisation were economic imperatives, to accumulate capital. The expansion of material profit has been accompanied by the diminution of the human spirit. The justification of capitalist industrialisation is that by such means millions were raised out of material poverty. That remains the justification today on a global stage. The question of whether increasing material riches can bring happiness is frequently asked. But in terms of the limited premises of the industrial system it is either self-evidently true – happiness is the extra material satisfaction that comes from material increase – or nonsense – happiness beyond the material, calculable, quantifiable domain doesn’t exist and so cannot be measured. The far-fetched idea that the instrumental agency of the machine could elevate and perfect the human spirit reveals the incongruity at the heart of the modern rationalised world. Elevating and perfecting the human spirit is no part of the mechanised order. In this world, means have become enlarged to take the place of ends. Technics are useful in the service of the human good, but one of the results of the modern differentiation of the whole into its parts is a world with a plethora of means connected to instrumental purposes, not ends.
In the contemporary world, science is subservient to the military-industrial complex of the modern state. In the process, science has been conflated with technology, both in turn conflated with their products and not the process by which they are produced. The modern world has lost the ideal of a universal or inclusive science. The true scientist recognises the moral and philosophical dimension and so is concerned to relate the findings of scientific enquiry to the larger universal framework. In contrast, the modern scientists who have become ‘organisation men’ are no more than dull-minded technologist lacking any interest in universal principles, other than specific mechanistic applications. The irony here is that those who do study universal principles as principles-in-themselves, often discover that these principles have many applications in a wide variety of fields.
The artificial and disabling separation between science, religion and philosophy has had deleterious consequences which the endlessly, excessive materialistic mechanical order can only continue to generate rather than resolve. For the problem lies in the imbalance of matter and spirit, the enlargement of materialism in its most narrow aspect of wants to become the whole of human life. The problems of the modern world are familiar by now, indeed their very familiarity blunting and dulling their edge, issuing in an underlying anxiety and unease and a pervasive sense of looming crisis – gross materialism, hedonism and its consequences in terms of a decline in culture and a loss of civic and public values, environmental degradation and the bigger threat of ecological disaster, the deterioration of human values, the decline of the arts through the invasion of monetary values reducing everything to sensual immediacy, the denigration of personal excellence and achievement. The Pythagorean unity of all life has been broken up into its parts, quantified, given a price rather than a sacred number, and taken to market. This is to fail to see the parts for what they are in relation to the whole, resulting in a lack of balance.

 If imbalance is the problem, then it follows that the attainment of balance is the solution. This balance is harmonia, the idea that all things are linked together proportionately, by harmony. The Pythagorean view affirms the potential of humankind to become a sacred steward of the earth as co-creator with Nature. In failing to recognise this co-creation as a co-evolution, humankind descends into a destructive series of separations, each turning potential in ever more distant ideal. In detaching human purpose from nature and, in turn, in detaching technics from human purpose, humankind lives not in the sacred but exists in a hell of its own making. The power to create has to be used in awareness of and obedience to harmonic forming principles, respecting the boundaries set by natural necessity. Plato’s Republic concerned justice but the point is that the scales of justice are not just a matter of human ethics and politics but of human ethics and politics in light of Nature. It is as a principle of Nature that each should receive his or her due. If we poison our air and our rivers, we poison ourselves; if we destroy Nature, we destroy ourselves. If this is The Age of Stupid, then stupid actions will have stupid consequences. The lesson is to train the senses by the intellect and gain an awareness of and cultivate a respect for balance, proportion and harmony and seek this principles in the relationships of the parts within the whole. This is to cultivate the innate human ability through respect for harmonic principles so as to perceive things as they are, in their whole-part relations. This is a "philosophy of holism" that sees whole systems.

The modern age has continued the process of specialisation. An expert is one who knows more and more about less and less. Certainly, specialized knowledge is better than empty or misleading generalisation, but in an age characterised by a surfeit of information, the lack of an integrated approach and holistic understanding risks a split between extremes of unreliable generalisations and incomprehensible specialisations. What is worth saying cannot be understood, what can be understood isn’t worth saying. When minds join together, disciplines can inspire each other and produce a great cross fertilization of ideas. Information is useless without context. From a Pythagorean perspective, an excessive multiplicity of facts and compartmentalized data is useless and lacks any significance in a higher sense. This higher sense is achieved when one discerns the universal patterns which underlie all creation and understand the relation of the individual parts to the whole.

Contemporary physicists have come closest to Pythagorean conceptions. The more physicists penetrate beyond the mechanistic notions of 18th-century materialism, the more the picture of the universe they reveal resembles the cosmos of the Pythagoreans and Platonists. Each atom is a Pythagorean universe in itself. In it, one sees eternity in a grain of sand, consisting of an arithmetic number of particles which are geometrically distributed in space, dancing and moving to the music of the spheres like a cosmos in microcosm. The Orphic theologians taught that "the essence of the Gods is defined by Number." (lamblichus, The Life of Pythagoras, chapter 28.) In the modern idiom, this refers the formative principles defined by Number. Modern physics could certainly accept the latter. It means the same thing as the former. But if the Orphics could understand modern physics, and modern physicists could understand the Orphics, what becomes of the science-religion dualism?
Matter and spirit are different aspects of the one, placed on one underlying continuum. Modern physics would recognise this in terms of energy. Advancing from the atomic to the subatomic level, quantity becomes quality, energy becomes information. By proceeding from particulars to universals, many physicists now have the essential truth staring them in the face: "Through consciousness the universe is but one single thing; all is interdependent with all." (R.A. Schwaller de Lubicz, Nature Word, West Stockbridge, MA, Lindisfarne Press, 1982, 99).That this truth is common to all spiritual traditions indicates just what has been lost for millennia and just how science lost its moorings. By proceeding from matter to energy, from energy to intelligence (that is, pattern, logos), and from intelligence to Nous, modern physics has found something not dissimilar from the deux absconditus of the alchemists, a God so hidden in matter that no-one can see or define it clearly when it comes within view. Here we see the innate potentiality of eternal being. In teaching that the world of flesh, coal and diamond are made of the same basic stuff (carbon), the reality is made clear that soul and Form is the essential component of all things.

 A Pythagorean insight with important implications concerns the idea that the phenomenal universe is a combination of Limited and Unlimited elements. In the Timaeus, Plato draws on this insight when comparing the limited world of the Forms to a father, and the unlimited Receptacle of Space to a mother, the "nurse of becoming". (Plato, Timaeus 49) Their union produces the visible, phenomenal universe, the world of eternal principles manifesting in time and space. 

In this view of the phenomenal realm existing as a manifestation of "ordered chaos", human beings exist an intermediate realm. In conceiving the universe in which we live as mirroring the extratemporal and extraspatial world of perfect form in an imperfect way, Platonism thus focuses on the imperfection of human existence in actual existence. Thus Plato argues in the Timaeus that the receptacle of becoming, which human beings inhabit, was initially ' 'filled with powers that were neither alike nor evenly balanced.' (Plato, Timaeus 52e.) The receptacle might be compared to a sea, in which various currents provide for an ambient randomness. In terms of contemporary physics, light, as principle, travels in a perfectly straight line in the intelligible realm, but is its path warped to a degree by gravitational mass in the realm of manifestation.

The Pythagoreans identified the principle of Limit with the Good. However, the principle of the Unlimited is also required as a condition of manifestation. The principle of Unlimitedness is just as responsible for the organic beauty of the phenomenal realm working in conjunction with the principle of Limit. Thus, whilst all trees of the same species follow the same laws of growth, there exists an indefinite number of possibilities at each juncture of growth. The beauty of a forest is the result of the unlimited element which goes beyond the principle of Limit which would make every tree exactly the same. In similar fashion, the beauty of a musical composition relies on order and randomness (change); it ceases to be beautiful once either element come to predominate.

The Platonism prior to the Renaissance tended to focus on the transcendent world of forms, whereas the first Pythagoreans were more concerned with the incarnate manifestations of universal principles. They saw harmonia as a universal principle which is reflected on all levels of the beautiful cosmos, incorporating this principle into the fabric of their daily lives as well. Aristotle’s inability to understand how the Pythagoreans could view Number as possessing "magnitude" (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1080 b 16; 1080 b 31; 1083 b 9; and 1090 a 20.) is a failure to understand the incarnationalist dimension of Pythagorean thought.

The Pythagorean view of the universe as a living, harmonic mixture of Limited and Unlimited is able to combine both scientific and human centred views of the world, bringing the counter-intuitive and the intuitive together rather than seeing them as mutually exclusive alternatives. The idea of the universe as a living, harmonic synthesis is not only an essential scientific concept, but beautifully conveys the place that humankind occupies in the cosmos as a whole. Plato argues that time is a moving image of eternity "according to number." (Plato, Timaeus 37d). If this is so, then each generation of human beings stands at some point between the present moment and the timeless immensity of the eternal. This is the intermediate position and status of humanity, poised between time and eternity. The mechanical materialism of modern science has made human beings worthless specks meaninglessly situated in the infinite expanse of space. Bertrand Russell tried to make sense of this. Russell was the sworn enemy of visionary speculation and muddled logic. In A Free Man's Worship Russell faces a reality indifferent to humanity square in the face.

That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labour of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built.

Is that all there is? as the song goes. The answer is no. The roots of Russell's bleak resignation lies in the basic dualism of his thought. Ironically, the separation of science and logic as empirical from the ethico-rational approach of philosophy and religion offers a very strong inducement to seek relief in the very mysticism that Russell deplored. Russell’s one time colleague A.N Whitehead wrote well on this: "But if men cannot live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants." Russell hated inequality, injustice, war, cruelty, torture, repression in life just as much as he hated hocus-pocus in philosophy. He not only recognised these things for what they are, he fought them from first to last, from the First World War to the Cold War. Yet Russell’s dualism of Nature and humanity prevented him from providing an ethical and political position that was grounded in something more than pious, powerless hopes. The science based philosophy of A Free Man’s Worship means that we confront the world of injustice, war and oppression with nothing more than what Whitehead called disinfectants. Ironically, this fosters the very religious attitude that Russell spent a lifetime opposing, religion as the opiate that dulls the pain of a meaningless existence, as the heart of a heartless world, the soul of soulless conditions. Russell would have been as little happy with this outcome as Marx. To better than Russell, we need to overcome the dualism of Nature and humanity. If, as Russell argues, Nature is no more than an external and irresistible mechanism which is indifferent to human purpose, then there is little point in trying to co-operate with it.
In other places, Russell himself expresses a will to co-operate, and the fact that he seeks the means of this cooperation through reason, through philosophy, must be significant. In, The Problems of Philosophy Russell argues that philosophy is to be studied 'above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good'. (Russell (H.U.L. 1912), p. 250l Guthrie 2000 ch 4). This magnificence of mind takes us back to the Greek roots of rational philosophy.

The noble despair of A Free Man’s Worship is avoided in the Pythagorean view. In seeing each person as a microcosm, a complete image, of the entire cosmos, the purpose of the Pythagorean view is to seek this cooperation of humanity and Nature as a principle of harmony. Human beings are poised between time and eternity, one part in the particular world of manifestation, one part in the realm of eternal principles. This position between matter and spirit, gives human beings a immense freedom to learn, create and know, the only limits being respect for the principles on which creation is based. From this perspective, humanity is involved in a creative, never ceasing dialectic between time and eternity, incarnating eternal principles in the temporal sphere (mirroring the creative work of Nature), whilst elevating the particular to the universal through conscious understanding.

The creative endeavours of humanity attain their peak of excellence when human beings recognise their intermediate nature and as a result come to actively integrate the particular and universal aspects of their being. In this way, science and philosophy will be brought together as philosophia. Both science and philosophy deal with the relation of universal principles and particular phenomena. This approach avoids building a system of thought from ''the top down," deduced from purely a priori formulations, or from "the bottom up," abstracting observations from particular phenomena in ignorance of universal principles. The Pythagorean harmonic proportion is a purely universal principle, but it was discovered as a result of empirical experimentation on the monochord. It is in both its universal nature as well as in the usefulness of its particular applications that the value of harmonic proportion is found. The creative dialectic between time and eternity integrates otherwise purely theoretic and pragmatic approaches. Further, the recognition that all things are composed of constants and variables renders the twin dangers of Fundamentalism and Relativism redundant, since universal justice has its ways of correcting those who mistakenly believe that they possess the Absolute Truth or "everything is relative."

Finally, the Pythagorean approach is highly pertinent on the topic of value. There are occasions when an analytical approach to Nature is required for the purposes of abstract analysis, yet there are also times when a synthetic approach is required, stressing the unity of all being. Aristotle considered Number to be merely an abstraction, as opposed to an innately existing a priori principle. It is apparent, then, why he could become confused by the idea that abstract number possesses "magnitude." However, the immanent efficacy of Number lies in it being a geometrical forming principle in the sphere of natural phenomena. Aristotle was just as bewildered by the Pythagorean symbolism in which certain archetypal number forms are equated with principles such as "justice." Yet it is this approach that reveals quantity (number) and quality to be integrally related. Ernst Levy in "The Pythagorean Concept of Measure" explains how this operates in the realm of music, where each tone is actually a number, yet also a qualitative phenomenon possessing value.7S Quantity therefore is also quality. In the Pythagorean conception, Number is both creative paradigm and qualitative relation. This is also most apparent in what is called "sacred geometry." Levy argues that to fully appreciate what a unified scientific and philosophical synthesis offers "a new mental attitude is required which many among us will be reluctant to assume, because it is contrary to the scientifically determined mind. The definition of that attitude is simple enough. It consists in this, that we must be willing to ascribe equal reality and equal importance to quality and quantity." (Ernest Levy, "The Pythagorean Concept of Measure " 53).

Whilst employing antithetical pairs of opposites in a conceptual sense, the Pythagorean approach always concludes at a point which affirms the unity of the all.

The idea that Number and the cosmos as a whole possesses a dimension of meaning is meaningless from the perspective of modern mechanistic "science" and modern reductionist linguistic "philosophy." However, for the Pythagorean scientist and philosopher the recognition of meaning in the world forms the starting point of enquiry, not its end. The modern world is full of imperatives that derive from technique and organisation, instrumental means that have taken the place of ends. If one could encapsulate the whole Pythagorean corpus in one moral imperative, it would be “Seek truth and beauty together; you will never find them apart.” (Francis M. Cornford, "The Harmony of the Spheres," 27). To which, one may add, that if you can find truth and beauty, you will also find the good with them. The three are as integral to each other as the sides of a Pythagorean triangle – the holy trinity.

8 PLATO ON JUSTICE AND VIRTUE

Plato sought the remedy for political ills in philosophy: ‘I was forced .. to the belief that the only hope of finding justice for society or for the individual lay in true philosophy and that mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians become by some miracle true philosophers’ (Plato The Seventh Letter 1987:xvi). Plato’s Republic is an attempt to establish the conditions of good government through the integration of politics and philosophy. The subtitle, ‘Concerning Justice’, reveals Plato’s central concern to conceive the form that justice takes in the ideal state. Arguing that justice is the founding principle of the political community or state, Plato reveals the extent to which the unchecked pursuit of self-interest takes over and finally ruins public life in contemporary city-states. Those who quickly dismiss Plato as ‘authoritarian’ do not do justice to Plato’s critique of individualism and atomistic democracy.
By ‘Republic’ Plato means ‘constitution’, ‘state’ or ‘society’, an expansive ideal which encompasses the political and the social, the formal and the substantive. Within the ancient Greek ‘polis’, the problem of good government in the state and good government in the city were one and the same. 
Plato’s distinctive ‘rational’ conception of freedom emerges as he establishes the basic principle of inquiry early on in The Republic. Plato begins by asking what justice is. The question is both a moral and a political one, pertaining both to the individual and the community. To discover the true nature of political and social justice it is necessary to ‘first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less’ (9-45). Such an approach seeks an objective foundation for freedom. If god is not the measure of all things, as the Sophists claimed, then neither is man. Plato’s principle of inquiry holds that abstractions or forms are the measure of things human and that these determine an intellectual progression from the forms to their collective approximations and then to real individual. This approach establishes freedom as a collective project and explicitly repudiates individualism as capable of only a limited, narrow freedom. Aristotle criticised Plato’s holistic approach for elevating pure forms and abstractions over empirical individuals, but this misunderstands Plato’s approach. Whilst the argument concentrates upon justice in the individual, Plato argues that the question is best studied on the large scale. As Aristotle himself argued, man is a social animal. To understand what any individual is or could be, it is necessary to study environing social relations, associations and allegiances. Plato thus analyses justice in the community as a whole before proceeding to apply his conclusions to the individual.
Plato is enquiring into the basis of socio-political and moral obligation. Rejecting the conventional view of giving each individual his due as inadequate, Plato argues that the problem cannot be solved in the individual but must be studied ‘in larger letters’ in society as a whole. Plato proceeds to analyse the key elements of the human mind so as to argue that its well being, full development and happiness are secured by doing right and by not doing wrong.

 In the individual, justice consists in maintaining the proper balance between the three elements of the mind so as to ensure that each is ‘doing its own job’ (1987:145). Intellect, desire and ambition must all receive their due and proper fulfilment, being given their proper place in the good life. True morality depends upon each of the different elements being given due satisfaction, with no one coming to dominate at the expense of the others. 

 In society, justice consists in everyone fulfilling his or her proper function in the social order. This principle checks social disintegration, the evil that most concerned Plato. Social justice is achieved by each class in society coming to fulfil its proper function, not encroaching on the functions of the others. 

The most important aspect of Plato’s argument is the extent to which he affirms social justice as the most desirable goal to be pursued in the city, over and against material affluence and economic growth. Plato presents a long and closely reasoned argument to prove that the just are happier than the unjust. Plato proceeds from the idea of function to argue that the individual needs justice so that he is able to perform a particular function and hence achieve happiness. The just man is happy and the unjust is miserable: ‘injustice never pays better than justice’ (Bk I 1987:41/2). Human beings achieve happiness by conforming to their nature as active beings. Plato confronts the argument that, since it is natural for individuals to pursue self-interest without regard to others, justice is simply a question of convenience. In this view, the purpose of morality is simply to regulate an amoral society of self-seeking individuals. If the sanctions of morality were removed, individual behaviour would be as self-interested as ever, suggesting that injustice pays more than justice (Bk ii 1987:49/55).

To counter this argument, Plato identifies two underlying principles at the heart of society. In the first place, there is mutual need. Since individuals are not self-sufficient beings, they need to combine in society. In the second place, there is difference of aptitude. Each individual specialises in those things for which they have a particular aptitude. There is a need for the individual to specialise ‘on a single job for which he is naturally fitted’ (Bk ii 1987:59 60). Society regulated on these principles is a natural growth and individuals achieve happiness through exercising their capacities and fulfilling their nature.

 Since individual and society go together, justice possesses a fundamentally social dimension (Bk ii 1987:58). The origin of society stems from the fact that the individual is not self-sufficient but has many needs that require many relations to others for their satisfaction. The individualism that characterises the liberal conception of liberty is untenable from this perspective. Specialisation implies necessary interrelation. Since each is fitted to one type of work, individuals need to associate together so as to supply all with what each lacks. ‘The formation of a city is due .. to this fact, that we are not individually dependent, but have many wants .. and because each seeks the aid of others to supply his various requirements; we gather many associates and helpers into one dwelling-place, and give to this joint dwelling the name of city’. This results in a settlement which goes by the name of a ‘community’ or ‘state’ (Bk ii 1987:58).

Plato’s definition of justice is the origin of the ‘rational’ conception of freedom. Plato’s objective is to integrate short and long-range interests, the immediate and the long term, the individual good and the collective good in the service of the common good. Self-discipline is ‘a kind of order’ in which the better, rational element controls the weaker element, stretched beyond the individual ‘across the whole scale’ of the city-state (Plato Bk iv 1987:142 143). ‘It produces harmony between the strongest and the weakest and middle elements, whether you measure by the standard of intelligence, or of strength, or of numbers or money or the like’ (Bk iv 1987:143).

Since justice is the result of society being properly ordered, Plato’s Republic devotes substantial space to this ordering. Plato conceives society as a structured form of organic functionalism, ordering society according to a hierarchical division of functions – leadership, protection and labour – each belonging to their corresponding collectivities: rulers/guardians, auxiliaries, and metics. The members of each group are selected according to their natural capacities with respect to the three basic functions. Placing each individual according to their natural capacity realises the thoroughly harmonious and fully integrated state, a state which exhibits the four cardinal virtues or ‘qualities’ of wisdom, courage, discipline and justice (Bk iv 1987:138). Wisdom is the product of the knowledge of the Rulers whilst courage comes from the Auxiliaries. Discipline is the self-discipline that issues from the harmonious relationship between the three classes and their common agreement over ‘who ought to rule’. Justice is the realisation of the principle of functional specialisation through individuals doing the jobs for which they are fitted according to their natural aptitude, not interfering in areas for which they are not fitted.

Plato’s three classes are arranged according to an ascending hierarchy of functional purposes. The first class is the class of rulers, the Guardians, a governing elite whose function is to govern (Bk iii 412d). The Guardians ‘must always do what is best for the community’ and a close watch is kept upon them to ensure that this principle is adhered to (Bk iii 1987:119). The function of ruling is restricted to the wise. The second class is the class of auxiliaries, whose function it is ‘to assist the Rulers in the execution of their decisions’ (1987:121). The auxiliaries combine the functions of the civil service, the police and the army. The third class comprise all those engaging in economic activities, the farmers, manufacturers and traders. The function of this class is to secure the material needs of the community. The third class is kept under strict control and has no involvement in matters of government.

Plato’s argument, it will be noted, concerns good government. The public good comes before all else. The Guardian class serves the interest of the other classes and governs with the willing consent of the governed (1987:123 143). The knowledge of the Guardians ‘is exercised not on behalf of any particular interest but on behalf of the city as a whole’. This benefits the state ‘both in its internal and external relations’ (Bk iv 1987:139).

Plato makes no attempt to rest his argument upon the value of freedom. The implication is that the best regime for human beings will, by definition, be the one that realises true freedom. Freedom follows as a consequence of right principles and reasoning. Plato is establishing the foundations for his ideal state, his functional naturalism emerging as the organically free state of truly free human beings.

The Rulers and Auxiliaries are to live an austere life without private property and the family. The purpose of these requirements was to check the tendency for the public good to be sacrificed to the pursuit of personal interests. The end to be served is the happiness of the ‘whole community’ rather than ‘the particular happiness of a single class’ (Bk iv 1987:126).

The Guardians are concerned to secure the conditions for social unity, ensuring that extremes of wealth and poverty in the Third Class are avoided and that the state does not grow to become too large. The argument is pertinent in a contemporary world characterised by overscale cities that are riven by increasing polarities. For Plato, the Guardians ‘must at all costs’ prevent ‘wealth and poverty’ from ‘slipping unobserved into the state’. ‘One produces luxury and idleness and a desire for novelty, the other meanness and bad workmanship and a desire for revolution as well’ (Bk iv 1987:129).

The state should .. be allowed to grow so long as growth is compatible with unity, but no further. So we can add to the instructions we shall give our Guardians one to the effect that they are to avoid at all costs either making the state too small or relying on apparent size, but keep it adequate in scale and a unity.

Plato Bk iv 1987:131

Further, the Guardians must ensure that individuals may pass between classes according to merit and aptitude so that ‘the integrity and unity both of the individual and of the state will be preserved’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:131).

 Plato is now in a position to define justice. Plato’s ideal city is founded upon justice defined in terms of ‘giving to each his due’. From this perspective, justice ‘consists in minding your own business and not interfering with other people’, each individual doing ‘the job he was naturally most suited for’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:145).

I think that the quality left over, now that we have discussed discipline, courage and wisdom, must be what makes it possible for them to come into being in our state and preserves them by its continued presence when they have done so. And we agreed that it would be justice that was left over if we found the other three.

Plato Bk iv 1987:145

Since the qualities expressed by the community are those of the individuals composing it, Plato establishes a parallel between the state (society) and the individual. The argument proceeds from the three elements of each soul:

1)	reason – the faculty that calculates and decides;
2)	desire or appetite – instinctive craving;
3)	ambition, indignation, pugnacity.

Human beings realise themselves fully as human beings when the rational element of human nature controls the instinctive element (Bk iv 1987:149/55). Individuals are easily manipulated and managed at the level of desire and appetite and are too prone to identify their liberty at this level of immediacy. The result is that human beings limit their liberty well within its full potential. Plato’s argument points to the need for an ethico-institutional framework that enables human beings to access their rational faculty, demonstrating a greater capacity for reflective action, conscious determination and moral choice. This enables individuals to attain a richer freedom by realising the full range of human capacities, well beyond desire and appetite.

 Justice in the individual is the counterpart of justice in the state. The individual is wise on account of reason, courageous on account of spirit and disciplined in subordinating ‘spirit’ and appetite to reason. The individual is just on account of the harmony that results when all the three elements of the mind are fulfilled in performing their proper function. Since ‘the state was just when the three elements within it each minded their own business’, ‘each of us will be just and perform his proper function only if each part of him is performing its proper function’ (Bk iv 1987:159). 

The principles of the good city identified by Plato are scale, balance, form and proportion. Self-control or discipline in a city or in an individual results ‘when all these three elements are in friendly and harmonious agreement, when reason and its subordinates are all agreed that reason should rule and there is no civil war among them’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:160).

‘So the reason ought to rule, having the wisdom and foresight to act for the whole, and the spirit ought to obey and support it’.

When these two elements have been so brought up, and trained and educated to their proper function, they must be put in charge of appetite, which forms the greater part of each man’s make up and is naturally insatiable. They must prevent its taking its fill of the so-called physical pleasures, for otherwise it will get too large and strong to mind its own business and will try to subject and control the other elements, which it has no right to do, and so wreck the life of all of them.

Plato Bk iv 1987:159

This results in justice in the city and in the individual. Justice prevents the three elements from trespassing upon each other, keeping all three in tune, binding these elements ‘into a disciplined and harmonious whole, and so become fully one instead of many’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:161). Once reason is in control and just rule ‘looks after the common interests of all by reconciling them with each other’, human beings can realise their potentiality for the good.

Plato therefore defines justice in reciprocal terms, uniting the freedom, good and happiness of each with all and the freedom, good and happiness of all with each. Justice possesses an ineliminable social component that acknowledges that individuals live in relation with each other. Some pursuing private interest at the expense of others harms the common good of all, including that of those pursuing their private interests. The private self-seekers harm their own good when they harm the good of all. Each individual is part of the society of all. The moral is clear: reason must control desire.

Then on this reckoning .. can it possibly pay anyone to make money by doing wrong, if the result of his so doing is to enslave the best part of himself to the worst? .. if one ruthlessly enslaves the divinest part of oneself to the most godless and abominable, is it not a miserable piece of bribery?

Plato Bk ix 1987:355

Each individual should be under the control of wisdom. ‘That wisdom and control should, if possible, come from within; failing that it must be imposed from without, in order that, being under the same guidance, we may all be friends and equals’ (Bk ix 1987:356). The argument is important and concerns whether the ‘rational freedom’ that secures the good of each and all is imposed externally by legal-institutional compulsion or whether human beings, as rational natural beings, can internalise reason and supply the internal moral coordination of common affairs. The latter is the ideal; the former a self-educative process that leads human beings to reason. The ‘intention of the law’ is to have educated the best element within citizens so that they may be given their freedom (Bk ix 1987:356). This view envisages legal-institutional coercion giving way to rational self-regulation practised by each in reciprocal relation to all. The rational, ‘humaner’ part is to be set free so that individuals make the best of their natural gifts (Bk ix 1987:356/7). It cannot pay to be unjust if by acquiring more money and power the individual becomes a worse human being (Bk ix 1987:356/7).

Plato’s innovations in educational theory mark his proposed ideal city-state as unique. For Plato, the citizen was produced by proper education and activity. Plato took education out of the hands of the family and made it a public activity. The function of this education is ‘that training in virtue from childhood which makes a man eager to become the perfect citizen, knowing both how to rule justly and how to obey’. No cultural form evaded this training in virtue: music, dance, athletics were all scrutinized with a view to providing moral benefit. Plato was concerned to eliminate overexcitement of the passions and the exacerbation of individualism. The accent was upon group effort and harmony, all pulling together for the common good, involved a training of the will and the inculcation of self-discipline. In the long run, public life would benefit through the citizen learning to restrain his ego and regulate his life to harmonize with the needs and desire of all other citizens.

Plato identifies the inherent tendency of personal liberty to degenerate into personal license and selfishness. He also condemns democracy for its inherent tendency to mob rule, demagoguery, and anarchy. ‘A very good description of one who believes in liberty and equality’ is the comment on the definition of ‘democratic man’ as one who has ‘no order and restraint in his life’ and who ‘reckons his way of living  .. pleasant, free and happy’ (9-49).


The absence of compulsion to exercise or submit to authority in democracy undermines the ‘good environment’ that trains individuals in ‘good habits’. Democracy ‘doesn’t mind what the habits and background of its politicians are; provided they profess themselves the people’s friends, they are duly honoured’ (Bk viii 1987:314/5).

In Book viii, Plato identifies the chief characteristic of democracy as liberty, the idea that ‘every individual is free to do as he likes’ (Plato 1987:314). Though this gives society a variety and diversity, its effects can be diremptive. There is a weakening of the bonds of political and moral authority so that ‘the minds of the citizens become so sensitive that the least vestige of restraint is resented as intolerable’ (Plato 1987:322). Without this restraint, freedom ceases to be a common purpose and instead fractures into dissension. Society is no longer capable of generating the principle of cohesion from within itself. The struggle between the rich and the poor in a democracy issues in tyranny: ‘an excessive desire for liberty at the expense of everything else is what undermines democracy and leads to the demand for tyranny’ (Bk viii 1987:321). As liberty becomes licence ‘all discipline is swept away and madness usurps its place’ (Bk viii 1987:332).

Plato’s criticisms of democracy are heavily focused upon the lack of critical reflection upon the general and long term good that the democracy of an atomized mass of individuals implies, and which an extension of greater mediation by representative bodies could check. Popular control involved ‘committing the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude’ (Plato B ii). Against this, Plato affirms that politics is the ‘art of navigation’ requiring a captain (B vi 1987:222/3).

Plato’s criticisms of democracy refer to the need for sound judgement and leadership in navigating the ship of state. For Plato, the people are bad judges on many important political matters, lacking the necessary experience or expert knowledge concerning such vital issues as finance and foreign policy. Describing the demos as ‘a large and powerful animal’, Plato states that philosophy is ‘quite impossible’ among ‘the common people’ (Bk vi 1987:228). The people will make judgements based on impulse, sentiment and prejudice rather than reason. The popular leader is dependent upon the ability to please the crowd, selling the people a package that conforms to their prejudices but which does not necessarily imply good policy (Plato 1987:222 228). This results in popular leaders who are as bereft of true knowledge as the people whom they lead.

For Plato, the only hope for realising the rule of reason is for philosophers to become rulers exercising political power.





It is easy, and wrong, to accuse Plato of an authoritarian-elitist purpose here. The educative process that Plato proposes has the end of extending reason to all so that the educative apparatus would no longer be required. The key word in the above passage is ‘humanity’, more correctly translated as the human race or the human species. Which means that the point Plato makes with regard to the rule of reason applies to all human beings, regardless of whatever or whoever they are. To argue that all human beings are capable of realising the best of their human nature is a lofty ideal and stands as a much more democratic notion than those who reduce democracy to monadic wants, desires and opinions. Plato sought to assert reason over instinct and desire, ranking physical pleasures low and seeking to restrain potentially unruly appetites and instincts. In this respect, Plato’s philosopher-ruler may be interpreted not as an institution or person presiding over the ruled than the fusion of politics and philosophy through the self-rule of all as rational beings. Politics is to become philosophical and express ideals of truth and good. Philosophy is to become political, worldly, and lose its abstract nature. Reason is to rule the world for the common good of each and all. 

Plato introduces his theory of forms, ideals or patterns that have a real existence independent of human minds. These yield knowledge by referring to a realm of reality beyond the sensible world of which full knowledge was not possible (Bk v 1987:206/220). ‘The good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but is beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power’ (Bk vi 1987:248). Plato makes use of the simile of the cave to portray a society of individuals who mistake appearance for reality. The prisoners of the cave, their necks fastened so that they cannot move their heads, see only the shadows that the fire throws onto the wall. They naturally believe these shadows to be real (Bk vii 1987:256/61). The moral is that truth is the result of reflection, insight and experience that is beyond the immediacy of most people living in ordinary life. Much of what most people accept as truth as given by their everyday experience is in fact false, mere illusion (Bk vii 1987:263).

It would be easy to convict Plato of elitism in this argument, since the claim is that there is a deeper reality which, at first, is accessible only by a few (Popper Open Society). It should be emphasised, however, that the end that Plato has in view is that truth is to be made available to all so that all can see reality as it is. Popper convicts Plato of the very thing that Plato is concerned to challenge, the idea that truth is the preserve of the few who cast shadows on the world to keep the many chained to illusion, their ability to project images via control of the fire giving them the power to rule over the many. And above all, Plato’s explicit purpose is to challenge the exploitative and manipulative approaches to politics. Truth rather than power and wealth is the end that Plato pursues.





The philosopher-ruler is the culmination of Plato’s central theme, the integration of politics and philosophy. The aim of education is to produce the philosopher-ruler. They are identified as possessing the highest talent, receive the highest training and are put in the service of the state. They are fitted to rule by their education. They have been trained to be a dedicated elite committed to governing in the interests of all.

9 ARISTOTLE AND THE GOOD LIFE

The picture of the sane and healthy ‘flourishing’ personality comes from Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia. Indeed, the idea that there is a goal of life and that a human being can have a function is at the heart of most ancient ethical theories. The idea is that the best kind of life for human beings involves functioning properly. The task is to identify what that function was in the sense of the activity that people are suited to. The most famous exponent of this theory is Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argues that happiness is like health in that it is a matter of correct functioning. The person who lives the kind of life for which human beings are most suited will be the happiest in fully realizing his or her potential. Aristotle's ethical philosophy is called 'eudaimonistic', from the Greek word for 'happiness' - eudaimonia  ‘good’ (eu) and god or spirit or demon (daimon). The term is broader and more dynamic than this, best captured by the idea of 'flourishing' or 'enjoying a good (successful, fortunate) life'. 

ARISTOTLE AND LIBERTY
The way that the word ‘authoritarian’ is banded around points to loose thinking with a very political motivation. The neo-liberalism of the past three decades is obsessed with unravelling all manner of social ties and unions and allegiances as evidence of a ‘collectivism’ which equates with socialism and hence with the big, centralised state. Popper’s condemnation of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx as 'totalitarian' thinkers is instructive in that it points to the distinction between the 'rational’ position - with its positive conception of government - and the individualist liberal position - with its negative conception of politics. One side claims to represent true freedom as against the limited freedom or unfreedom of the other side, and vice versa.

Barnes criticises Aristotle's 'state' for being 'highly authoritarian' in its concern to 'regulate' and 'determine’ individual lives in the most intricate detail (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:23). Barnes objects to Aristotle's argument that 'in matters that belong to the public, training must be the public concern’, all citizens being regarded 'as belonging to the state, for each is a part of the state'  (Aristotle P VIII.i 1981:452). For Barnes, Aristotle's view that individuals are political animals comes with the corollary that private interests may be subordinated to the public good (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:23/4). Barnes identifies Aristotle's error as lying in assigning 'a positive function to the State, supposing that its goal is the promotion of the good life' whereas 'lovers of liberty will prefer to assign a negative function to the State and to regard it rather as a defence and a protection against Evil' (Barnes 1982:82/3).

Against Barnes' individualist and neutralist liberalism, Aristotle affirmed a positive conception of politics as creative self-realisation. Certainly, the 'rational’ argument does imply public life as an educative process which, as Aristotle puts it, 'trains' individuals to a good they do not naturally or spontaneously see. This can have repressive implications as an educational dictatorship. But this is not inherent in the Greek idea of Padaia or the German notion of Bildung at all, which are concerned with public education to bring individuals out of private interest to experience a greater freedom in public association.

Relating the individual to supra-individual organisms may seem dangerous but, properly understood, Aristotle's theory is neither as 'abhorrent' nor as 'bizarre' as Barnes suggests (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:24). Indeed, Barnes is accusing Aristotle of the very criticism that Aristotle, wrongly, made of Plato. In defending 'the democratic ideal' of 'doing whatever you want', Barnes asserts the individualist liberal position against Aristotle's identification of this individualism with the universal constraint  of  licence  (P  1981:59/60  332  373/5). Aristotle's view recognises the contextual and communal basis of individual freedom, the very things that one does not find in individualist liberalism (Clark 1975:103/4). Barnes’s criticisms of Aristotle’s ‘highly authoritarian’ politics presupposes a separation of the state from civil society which simply does not apply in Aristotle. Liberal critics fail to properly distinguish the 'polis' from the 'state'. Unlike the modern concept of the state, Aristotle's concept of the polis is not identical to political organisation but denotes the organised community in all its aspects, comprising the smaller associations as necessary to human well-being. Aristotle's 'state’ is no abstract entity like the modern liberal state but the supreme natural association rooted in the smaller natural associations, each formed 'with a view to some good purpose’. Aristotle’s 'state', therefore, is the supreme association of all associations and 'will aim the highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods' (P I.i 1981:54; Edel 1982:319). [8]

Ironically, the liberal criticisms of Aristotle savour a great deal of the criticisms that Aristotle himself made of Plato. Aristotle and Plato both reject an individualism which fails to acknowledge the primary role played by the polis in securing the good life. But in explicitly repudiating any idea of society as a super-individual organic unit, Aristotle accuses Plato of ignoring the necessary role played by the various particular social groupings in human well-being. Criticising what he saw as Plato's 'extreme unity', Aristotle argues that there must be diversity in membership and functions (P 1981:103/126).

 Aristotle's account of how individuals group together in different kinds of association within the polis, from household to village to city or state, is concerned to demonstrate how smaller groupings promote the natural aims of the participating individuals and generate an appreciation of wider relations within the polis as a whole (P 1981 I.ii; Evans 1987:157/8; Edel 1982:319/20). The privileging of the individual against social units, the autonomous liberal self distinct from the larger social units, is incomprehensible in Aristotle's account of freedom. The criticisms of individualist liberalism can be turned back on the critics. Deprived of social context and connection, individual freedom is necessarily of a limited kind. 









Aristotle association of friends
For Aristotle restricts citizenship to the virtuous minority of the population, even though the egalitarianism that Aristotle defines in terms of civic friendship is something that carries over into Marx's notion of a classless society (Miller 1989:203 204). For Aristotle, citizenship, as active participation in the state, should be restricted to those who are superior in goodness and wealth (P IV.xii 1981:270/2).

First and foremost, the Greeks gave the world philosophy. The classical Greeks were a people who, although not very numerous, not very powerful, not very well organised, ‘had a totally new conception of what human life was for, and showed for the first time what the human mind was for’ (Kitto 1951:1). The Greek philosophers asked an apparently but deceptively simple question that has proved of enduring significance and which the world stops asking at its peril: ‘What is the proper way for human beings to live?’ How that question is answered – indeed whether the question is even asked at all – determines the kind of society in which one lives.

Both Plato and Aristotle identify politics with a concern with the good life for human beings. Before going into the specific philosophical conceptions, this section examines the polis as an historical institution with a view to defining a public life that is constituted by a plurality of communities and identities and is empowered from below. 

Politics and philosophy were born in the agora, the citizen assembly and market place in Athens (Heller 1984; Doyle 1963:ch 2). ‘Most modern political ideals – such … as justice, liberty, constitutional government and respect for the law – or at least the definitions of them, began with the reflection of Greek thinkers about the institutions of the city state’ (Sabine 1937:3). Finley presents the Athenian polis offers an historical example of an expansive public life that may serve as a model for emancipatory urban governance in the modern world. The polis was founded upon a ‘sovereign assembly .. open to every citizen’ and convened at least 40 times a year. The polis made a virtue of its amateurish principle. The fact that it was managed by a rotating council of 500, with the chair selected by lot and sitting for just one day, checked the bureaucratic principle. The extensive use of selection of lot throughout the institutions of governance indicated the high value placed upon self hood as something obtained through participation. Free individuals possess politike techne, the skill and techniques of the statesman, the ‘art of political judgement’ (Finley 1973:18). 

These political arrangements reflect a philosophical anthropology. The classical conception defines humanity as a social and cooperative species, possessed of philia (friendship) and dike (justice). This points to public life as a solidaristic conception in which each and all unite for purposes of individuation. Human beings are by nature inclined to live in a polis. These characteristics of citizenships imply a controlled self-hood, a ‘self-control’ that makes community life possible (Finley 1973:29/30).

Importantly, the polis made justice integral to its mode of life. ‘It was the common assumption of the Greeks that the polis took its origin in the desire for justice. Individuals are lawless, but the polis will see to it that wrongs are redressed. But not only by an elaborate machinery of state-justice, for such a machine could not be operated except by individuals, who may be as unjust as the original wrongdoer. The injured party will be sure of obtaining justice only if he can declare his wrongs to the whole polis. The word therefore now means ‘people’ in actual distinction from the ‘state’ (Kitto 1957:72). 

The pursuit of justice becomes a question of making available a social identity that connects public and private interest. This social identity was available in the city-state. The city-state is a quite distinct institution from the modern state and is crucial in envisaging a smaller scale public sphere located in everyday social activities. The all-important political unit in classical Greece, the polis was more on the scale of a modern medium sized town than the modern nation state or metropolis (Jones 1964; Davies 1978; Mayo 1960: ch 2). The size of the city-state was kept in check in numbers and in area deliberately so that citizens could meet within its centre and engage in meaningful political activity (Doyle 1963:25).

In Aristotle’s conception, the original polis was a self-sufficient and self-governing group of villages, in a narrow and closed region lying around an urban centre. The poleis were mostly very small. When Aristotle wrote there was probably no town in the classical world with a population of more than about 150,000. In all likelihood, there were not more than half a dozen with a population of more than – 50,000 (Hall 1998:35).

If the polis was less than a state in the modern sense of the term, it was also something more than a city. The polis had an urban centre but also embraced the surrounding agricultural land. It consisted of farmers, craftsmen and sailors, and many individuals would combine a couple or more of these roles (Bowra 1957:9; Chamoux 1965:291). When Marx speculated that in the future communist society the individual could assume a number of roles rather be restricted to one specialised task imposed by the division of labour, he was adopting the position of the Greek polis.

The obvious question is that, if Athens really was so successful and really did achieve so much in all areas, why did it not presume to conquer and lead the city-states in a unified Greek state. The question would have struck the Athenian – and other Greeks – as illogical. The polis is what was integral to the identity of each individual and nothing beyond the polis, no amount of riches or power, could have the remotest significance with respect to that sense of self-identity. As Kitto put it, ‘if the Greek was not within a day’s walk of his political centre, then his life was something less than the life of a real man’ (Kitto 1951:121).

Every Greek knew the polis: ‘there it was, complete, before his eyes. He could see the fields which gave it sustenance .. he could see how agriculture, trade and industry dovetailed into one another.. The entire life of the polis, and the relation between the parts, were much easier to grasp, because of the small scale of things’ (Kitto 1951:73).

Kitto defines the polis as a ‘community’ since ‘its affairs are the affairs of all’ (Kitto 1957:71). In the polis, every Greek understood the functions of other Greeks: ‘he could see how agriculture, trade and industry dovetailed into one another; he knew the frontiers, where they were strong and where weak .. The entire life of the polis, and the relation between its parts, were much easier to grasp, because of the small scale of things’ (Kitto 1957:73).

The polis conception of scale is rational in that it is premised upon self-consciousness as the distinctive attribute of the human species. Human beings engage in rational action, are teleological and reflexive beings, projecting ends and reflecting upon their actualisation. Reflexivity is built into human action. Praxis is rational. The human habitat is to be evaluated according to whether it promotes the good life, realising human potentialities, expanding rather than inhibiting the growth of human capacities.

A human habitus is premised upon human scale and is, on that account, a public life in the classical conception. A habitat that is beyond human comprehension and control is unjust according to these premises. For reason of size and quantity, its centralisation and concentration modern society is overscale and hence inhuman. The exclusivity of its political and economic functions denies citizens the opportunity to participate in the determination of the forces and decisions affecting collective life. Denied the opportunity to participate in public life, individuals lose not only their citizenship but also their sense of self-identity.
The physical form of the polis emphasised public space with temples, stadia, the agora (combined market place and public forum) and theatres. This everyday public life made possible an everyday public life in which all could participate. The accent was upon association and interaction. Appropriate scale facilitates public comprehension. The question is not, however, settled by establishing human proportions. Beyond scale, there remains the ethical question of the just and the good. A mode of life qualifies as ‘good’ to the extent that it achieves material sufficiency and reflexivity in an ethical community founded on justice, participation and mutual justice. This emphasises the importance of the polis.

The polis embraces much more than the institutional make up and is both the community of citizens and their collective sense of community. There is no equivalent word for polis in the modern world. For Kitto, the usual translation ‘city-state’ may be the nearest we can get but is still a bad translation since the polis was not much like a city and was much more than a state (Kitto 1957:64). The Athenian would not have understood the difficulty of translating polis and how inadequate the term city-state is. To the Athenian, city and state are inextricably linked as one and the same. And to complicate the issue even further, the Athenians did not conceive the city-state in institutional or geographical terms, as a set of institutions or as a definite territory. The polis was the people, it is as simple and as complex as that. There is an important distinction to be drawn between the polis and the state. This distinction makes it possible to separate public life from the institutional machinery of the state and locate it in an autonomous self-governing urban realm. Kitto uses the term polis rather than city-state so as to describe the reality of a self-governing community. 

The polis establishes the social context within which individuals fully realise their spiritual, moral and intellectual capacities (Kitto 1957:78). They realise these essential capacities only in relation to each other. The polis is therefore a holistic and moral framework. The polis ‘is so much more than a form of political organisation. The polis was a living community, based on kinship, real or assumed – a kind extended family, turning as much as possible of life into family life..’ (Kitto 1957:78). The Athenians conceived the polis as a mode of life fostering a sense of community, as a communal modus vivendi. The polis is an integral part of the realisation of the good life, is a dimension of it. ‘The Greeks thought of the polis as an active, formative thing, training the minds and characters of the citizens; we think of it as a piece of machinery for the production of safety and convenience. The training in virtue, which the medieval state left to the Church, and the polis made its own concern, the modern state leaves to God knows what’ (Kitto 1957:75).

At the heart of the polis was a moral purpose based upon a philosophical anthropology. The polis was a physical place, true, but more than geography and space it was a collectivity composed of citizens (Chamoux 1965:309; Hansen 1991:62).. ‘it is the men that are the Polis’ (Ehrenberg 1965:88 quoting Thucydides). The Athenian city-state was not the republic of Athens in its institutional form but the Athenians as a people: the Athenians as citizens were the city-state; the city-state had no independent significance but was embodied in the person and idea of demos, the people.

Aristotle restricts citizenship to the virtuous minority, the ‘middle people’ who are superior in goodness and in wealth (P 1981:181 180/3 267 270/2).. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s conception of citizenship entails a notion of civic friendship that implies an egalitarianism which can carry over into the radical idea of a classless society of equals (Miller 1989:203 204). Aristotle’s argument offers a principle that, radicalised as a universal principle, demands an inclusive, participatory public based on the continuous and active involvement of all as citizens.









Aristotle argues that whilst ‘property should up to a point be held in common, the general principle should be that of private ownership. Responsibility for looking after property, if distributed over many individuals, will not lead to mutual recriminations; on the contrary, with every man busy with his own, there will be increased effort all round. 'All things in common among friends' the saying goes, and it is the personal virtue of individuals that ensure their common use’. 

 Aristotle is arguing for a system of private ownership and common use. It is a view which presupposes a society of virtuous citizens whose close ties and relations enable them to see and work for the common good. ‘Each man has his own possessions, part of which he makes available for his friends' use, part he uses in common with others…. Clearly then it is better for property to remain in private hands; but we should make the use of it communal. It is a particular duty of a lawgiver to see that citizens are disposed to do this’ (Politics II v). 

Aristotle asks what is the ‘best constitution’ and what is the 'best life’ for individuals: ‘a way of living in which as many as possible can join and, second, a constitution within the compass of the greatest number of states’. Arguing that ‘virtue is a mean, and that the happy life is a life without hindrance in its accordance with virtue, then the best life must be the middle life, consisting in a mean which is open to men of every kind to attain. And the same principles must be applicable to the virtue or badness of constitutions and states. For the constitution of a state is in a sense the way it lives’. Aristotle advocates ‘moderation and a middle position’ as the best. Concerned to avoid extremes of riches and poverty, Aristotle argues that the middling condition ‘is most easily obedient to reason, and following reason is just what is difficult both for the exceedingly rich, handsome, strong and well-born, and for their opposites, the extremely poor, the weak, and those grossly deprived  of honour. The former incline more to arrogance and crime on a large scale, the latter are more than averagely prone to wicked ways and petty crime’.

 It follows that no viable state can be built upon extremes of riches and poverty. Those who have a ‘superabundance of good fortune, strength, riches, friends, and so forth, neither wish to submit to rule nor understand how to do so’. Those who are greatly deficient in these qualities are ‘too subservient’. Aristotle is concerned with his definition of a citizen as one who is capable of ruling and of being ruled in turn. Those with excessive riches do not how to be ruled in any way and will not accept being ruled; at the other extreme the poor not only ‘do not know how to rule, but only how to be ruled as a slave’. ‘The result is a state not of free men but of slaves and masters, the former full of envy, the latter of contempt. Nothing could be farther removed from friendship or from partnership in a state’. ‘The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal, a condition found chiefly among the middle people… It is the middle citizens in a state who are the most secure: they neither covet, like the poor, the possessions of others, nor do others covet theirs as the poor covet those of the rich’. (Politics IV).

ARISTOTLE LICENCE AND LIBERTY
Liberty they say when they mean licence, castigated Aristotle.
Where individuals ‘live intemperately, enjoying every licence and indulging in every luxury’ the inevitable result ‘is that esteem is given to wealth’ .. ‘a common state of affairs in military and warlike races’ (Bk 2)

“The final association, formed of several villages, is the state. For all practical purposes the process is now complete; self-sufficiency has been reached, and while the state came about as a means of securing life itself, it continues in being to secure the good life. Therefore every state exists by nature, as the earlier associations too were natural. This association is the end of those others, and nature is itself an end; for whatever is the end-product of the coming into existence of any object, that is what we call its nature - of a man, for instance, or a horse or a household. Moreover the aim and the end is perfection; and self-sufficiency is both end and perfection."

“It follows that the state belongs to the class of objects which exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. Any one who by his nature and not simply by ill-luck has no state is either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman — he is like the war-mad man condemned in Homer's words as 'having no family, no law, no home'; for he who is such by nature is mad on war: he is a non-cooperator like an isolated piece in a game of draughts”.

Autarkcia means 'political and/or economic independence'. Aristotle uses the word in a more expansive sense, embracing opportunities to live the 'good' life according to the human virtues.

Aristotle is concerned to properly define liberty so that it is distinguished from licence. In reconciling the freedom of each and all so as to enhance overall freedom, Aristotle rejects the two definitions of democracy - the 'sovereignty of the majority’ and 'liberty' as 'doing what one wants' - as 'bad'. 'Just' is equated with what is equal, and the decision of the majority as to what is equal is regarded as sovereign; and liberty is seen in terms of doing what one wants. So in such a democracy each lives as he likes and for his 'fancy of the moment', as Euripides says’. Aristotle defends ‘living according to the constitution’ as ‘self-preservation’ or ‘salvation’ rather than, as it is for those who mistake liberty for licence, 'slavery' (P V.ix 1981:332; Politics trans Barker 1958:1310a). Aristotle follows Plato in identifying excessive personal liberty with license, claiming that such liberty ensures a large body of support for demagogues (1981:373/5).

Personal freedom as the freedom of the individual against the state - the 'negative' liberal conception - is not the peculiar product of the modern world. Aristotle explicitly acknowledges the existence of such a conception - 'to live as you like' - and argues against it: 'from it has come the ideal of 'not being ruled', not by anyone at all if possible, or at least only in alternation. This [to be ruled by alternation]  is a contribution towards that liberty which is based on equality' (VI.ii 1981:362/3).

The same people who mistake licence for liberty will no doubt see this democratisation of decadence as an extension of freedom. It isn’t. It is its narrowing, a constraining of human possibilities to the lowest rungs of wants and desires. And it progressively eats away at its own basis. Such an economic system rests on fragile foundations.
This is a ‘failure properly to define liberty’. Aristotle's concept of the polis as 'expressing the needs of the individual on a high plane' (Edel 1982:319) leads him to a view of the polis as rationally constraining self-seeking individuals so as to secure the common good. Aristotle thus rejects democratic freedom as leading to the licence of individualism 'divorced from law and justice' (I.ii 1981:59/60). Aristotle’s 'positive’ conception of politics implies an associative framework which expand rather than inhibits individual freedom. Aristotle argues that ‘there is a natural impulse towards this kind of association; and the first man to construct a state deserves credit for conferring very great benefits. For as man is the best of all animals when he has reached his full development, so he is worst of all when divorced from law and justice’ (1.ii). Arguing that ‘injustice armed is hardest to deal’, Aristotle concludes that ‘man without virtue is the most savage, the most unrighteous, and the worst in regard to sexual licence and gluttony’. Hence Alasdair MacIntyre’s pessimism in After Virtue, a book title which defines the modern predicament. For Aristotle, ethics and politics are one and the same question implied by the social nature of human beings. ‘The virtue of justice is a feature of a state; for justice is the arrangement of the political association, and a sense of justice decides what is just’ (1.ii).
Aristotle argues for a functional conception of citizenship in the manner of Plato: ‘we say a citizen is a member of an association, just as a sailor is; and each member of the crew has his different function and a name to fit it - rower, helmsman, look-out, and the rest. Clearly the most exact description of each individual will be a special description of his virtue; but equally there will also be a general description that will fit them all, because there is a task in which they all play a part - the safe conduct of the voyage; for each member of the crew aims at securing that. Similarly the task of all the citizens, however different they may be, is the stability of the association, that is, the constitution. Therefore the virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution’ (P 179).

10 THE ARTIFICIAL PEOPLE OF HOBBES

In Leviathan Thomas Hobbes identifies the as amongst the most salient characteristics of human nature competition, pride and the desire for glory. From these assumptions of individuals in the state of nature, Hobbes builds his model of human society as a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism, an endless conflict over resources: "If any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies." Egoistic desire, competition and the enmity that ensues can be reigned in only by the existence of a "Power to keep them all in awe." The state is therefore a Leviathan, a collective power more capable and bigger than any individual's natural inclinations. Without this power,

there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war which can be prevented by the Leviathan, the state that would restrain the antisocial behaviour of individuals so as to make civilised life possible. By using their reason to join together and agree to create an artificial person, the state, human beings could impose upon themselves the virtues of restraint and cooperation that, as egoistic individuals, they lack in a state of nature.


Hobbes’ justification for a powerful state resting on a social contract has been criticised for its anachronism. Hobbes has read back into the state of nature the egoism, conflict and enmity of the emerging bourgeois society of his day. The state of nature is therefore market society as the domain of homo economicus. The basic point remains, however, that in the absence of a common interest and in the inability of egoistic individuals to supply themselves with this common interest, an artificial external force, the state, has to intervene and impose the common peace upon warring individuals. This begs the question as to what happens when the bigger beasts in the state of war encroach upon government and capture it for its own private purposes. It implies that once the state of war has invaded the sphere of government and assumed the power of the Leviathan, the state monster, life may well become nasty, brutish and short.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was also concerned with the implications of Hobbes’ view that individuals were unsociable, restless and insatiable beings subject to infinite want. Rousseau was much more impressed with sociality as an educative process in which individuals could learn the value of "enough." If individuals could learn to use their reason and come to control their instincts and impulses, they would realise their higher selves. Once reason is in control, human beings would be truly free, no longer driven by their desires and wants. This process of realising reason in association is the foundation of freedom, precisely the opposite of those who argue that the competition of individual egos issues in the general good. Rousseau proceeded to point out that the "artificial" individuals of modern bourgeois society possessed precisely those key traits which Hobbes thought characterised individuals in the state of nature, particularly a restless desire to expand power. Hobbes’ argument that in a competitive society, the individual had to keep expanding power or risk losing power meant that ‘artificial’ individuals could never have enough. Capitalist relations turned individuals into insatiable ‘artificial’ creatures cut off from the humanising ties of various institutions that situated the individual within a society.


Institutions, organizations and associations and not least governments setting the overall moral and political framework are essential features of a civilised society since they help to socialize individuals, creating common goals and a shared ethos. The connection between reason and freedom is based on the notion of human beings as social and rational animals. Human beings achieve more when acting in concert than when acting as solitary individuals. The value of teamworking is known to any business leader and manager and yet the ideologues of the free market are concerned to search and destroy any social form or practice that hint at collectivism, and hence the slippery slop to socialism, the state and serfdom. Lawlessness begins at the top and these ideologues, with their fundamental premise of the ‘anarchy’ of the market are lacking the moral and political responsibility that comes with government and public policy. The kinds of citizenship available depends on the institutional and social fabric. Once these have been overrun or destroyed by those who conceive unrestrained appetites as individual liberty, civilised society does not last long.

This leaves us unanchored and adrift. Plato and Aristotle offer timeless truths concerning human nature as social and rational and this philosophical anthropology is a solid foundation on which to build. But politics itself can only ever proceed from the here and the now, not from human nature as some ahistorical ideal but as manifested in existing institutions. A social movement to contest the self-regulating market with a vision of internal social self-regulation proceeds from existing society.  

This means looking at what markets are and what their proper functions are and where they are properly located. The modern market economy emerged hand in hand with the modern centralised state, the pair of them suppressing other forms of social control, governance and economic activity. There are always alternative ways of controlling, valuing and using the basic materials required first to give and sustain life, and to enable life to flourish – to live well. Many of these alternatives can be found in the history books. Capitalism is no more ‘natural’ than any of the other transitory, social forms in the past. Whatever these forms may be in the future, one thing can be certain, those do manage to thrive will have worked out how to manage planetary resources and utilize nature’s "free" capital in ways that are sustainable, just and equitable. To the extent that this is achieved, future generations will owe a debt of gratitude to political philosophers who outlined the contours of the politics of the public realm, politicians and activists who resisted capital’s attempts to encroach on the natural and the human world, and to ecologists who advocated more balanced and harmonious ways of valuing and sharing the world. As a result, we may yet once more be able to refer to the ‘common weal’ in the social world and "the commons" in the natural world.
The common good is, slowly but surely, coming to be remembered as a more equitable, just and peaceful way to govern the world. 

11 THE JOY OF SPINOZA

Aristotle’s notion of ‘flourishing’ savours a little of Spinoza’s conatus. A conatus is a mode's essence (or degree of power) once the mode has begun to exist. Spinoza's account of the conative aspect of human beings rests on two important propositions of Part Three. 'Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours (conatus) to persevere in its being’. Our most fundamental desire, and indeed our essence, is the endeavour (conatus) or power to persist in existence. Spinoza's theory of conatus is of universal application; all things, and not just human beings, manifest this endeavour.' 

Thus conatus is the affirmation of essence in a mode's existence. The notion implies that freedom, flourishing, the assertion of power or energy involves activity in relation to circumstances as against passivity. 

The vision of a healthy, sane sense of self and personhood is rooted in a philosophical anthropology which originates in the ancient Greeks, particularly Aristotle, but which reappears as the autonomous, active, creative and productive human being in the works of Vico, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Marx. 

For Spinoza, freedom depends upon adhering to clear and distinct ideas. Human beings are free in so far as they have a clear and distinct idea of the causes of their own physical and mental states. 

The origins of human unfreedom are emotions of desire, hate and love with respect to particular things, being attached to and affected by particular things and persons. These desires, loves and hates arise by the association of ideas through inadequate ideas of the true causes of our pleasures and pains. Spinoza therefore affirms knowledge over ignorance as the key to human freedom. Adequate ideas giving adequate knowledge of causes necessarily involves a more complete knowledge of Nature as a whole. In acquiring more adequate knowledge of Nature, human beings conceive themselves as parts of Nature, in the process coming to cease to desire, love and hate particular things, hence ceasing to be attached to and affected by the particular things and persons around us. 

The free and wise human being therefore feels morally and emotionally neutral towards the particular things and persons around him. The free and the wise understanding that they are what they are and understands why they cannot be otherwise, and hence does not ignorantly see them as the causes of personal pleasures and pains. The free and wise person is the true origin of his or her own pleasures; these are generated spontaneously, as the consciousness of his or her own free activity and are not the effects of external causes. Mind and body are interconnected. The greater the real activity and vitality of the body, the greater the real activity and vitality of the mind and vice versa. Since pleasure is the reflexion of the activity and vitality of the whole person, a person who is functioning freely and is uninhibited by external causes is necessarily in a state of pleasure (laetitia). Hence, for Spinoza, the aim of the free and wise person will be 'bene agere ac laetari — 'to act well and to rejoice.' Repudiating ascetic virtues of self-sacrifice and self-denial as unnatural, Spinoza focuses upon activity and vitality of mind and body to argue that 'there cannot be too much joy: it is always good: but melancholy is always bad" (Ethics Pt. IV. Prop. XLII). 

 Pain and the emotions associated with pain (hatred, envy, fear etc.) indicate weakness and lack of freedom; they are evidence of some inhibition of activity and vitality by external causes. For Spinoza, particular pleasures in the narrow sense (titillatio) may be excessive in that they upset the balance and well-being of the whole organism. Spinoza defines the true pleasure of the free and intelligent person in terms of conscious well-being and enjoyed activity. To act well is fully to enjoy oneself, and fully to enjoy oneself is to act well.

Spinoza reworks the old notions of vice and virtue in physiological and psychological sense. Virtue is health and sanity whereas the old religious standbys of suffering, guilt, and remorse are revealed to be morbid symptoms of inadequate ideas and ignorance. It follows that anything which furthers knowledge and intelligence expands power and freedom is necessarily good for the individual and is to be pursued in the interests of self-preservation. The converse is also true. Anything which inhibits obstructs the development of knowledge and intelligence is self-destructive and is bad in inhibiting the freedom and vitality of the individual. 

The free individual is the active, productive being conscious of being the creator of circumstances. The world of necessity is a self-made social world and hence for that reason can be consciously governed as a human product. Spinoza distinguished between active and passive emotions. The active emotions (fortitude and generosity) originate in the individual, and they are accompanied by adequate ideas. Passive emotions rule over human beings; the passive human being is the slave of passions, and these are connected with inadequate ideas.

The argument employs the opposition between activity and passivity as the central concepts for the understanding of freedom. And the activity vs passivity opposition also pertains to the Platonic distinction between knowledge (nous) and opinion (doxa). Passivity is associated with inadequate ideas, ideas which fall short of reason and knowledge. In a passive state, human beings are slaves of circumstances and are capable only of opinion. Politics currently practised is a world of opinion. Activity is associated with adequate ideas, the world of knowledge, human beings understanding themselves as the self-conscious creators of the social world. 

This connection between  knowledge and freedom and flourishing is something that presupposes an active relation to the world, but an open rather than an aggressive relation, one which bases true knowledge on the relatedness of all things. Goethe wrote well here: 'Man knows himself only inasmuch as he knows the world. He knows the world only within himself, and he is aware of himself only within the world. Each new object, truly recognized, opens up a new organ within ourselves.' 

Spinoza’s conatus means ‘striving’. It is a striving proportionate to a being’s essence. Only that striving, that active relation, satisfies the essential human need to make sense of existence. The active human being is free and productive, united to others and at peace with the world.

This philosophy has political implications. The personal rivalries and polarities concerning belief and opinion foster social and political instability and impinge upon the independence and detachment which the free and wise person requires for the development of knowledge and intelligence. The free and wise person therefore has an interest in the creation and maintenance of a peaceful social order. By overcoming desires, loves and hates attached to particular things and persons, human beings are able to avoid the conflicts which obstruct the pursuit of knowledge and intelligence. The happiness of the free and wise person is achieved by the free exercise understanding and is essentially cooperative rather than competitive; it requires only mutual peacefulness and respect for law and order on the part of each and all. Far from being competitive, the free individual has a positive interest in promoting the happiness and intellectual emancipation of all other individuals. To the extent that the individuals composing society are governed by passive emotions, conflicts of interest between individuals arise and these must obstruct the free person in his or her pursuit of self-preservation in life and self-advancement in knowledge. It follows that ‘Whatever helps to maintain the common society of men, whatever brings it about that men live together in peace and agreement, is useful, and, on the other hand, what produces discord in the state, is bad' (Ethics Pt. IV. Prop. XL). The free and wise person will also be the ‘happy’ person, in Spinoza’s sense of ‘joy’ and Aristotle’s sense of ‘flourishing’. The free and wise person comes to appreciate the meaning of Plato’s argument that 'virtue is its own reward'.

12 ROUSSEAU AND FREEDOM IN ASSOCIATION

For Rousseau, the legitimacy of political authority depends upon individuals preserving and expanding their liberty by joining with others in association. In moving from the primitive state to the social state, individuals must associate so as to organise their supra-individual forces through an arrangement which secures both the self-interest and the freedom of each individual. Individuals:





Rousseau's view of individual freedom is associative and social, connecting the 'rational’ nature of human beings with common control securing individual freedom. Rousseau is concerned that political association should 'defend   and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate', so that 'each, while uniting himself  with  all,   may  still  obey himself alone,  and remain as  free  as before' (I.VI  1973:174). 

Such a view commits Rousseau to a democratic community of active citizens (Thomson 1969:98; Plamenatz 1963:433/7; Broome 1963:56/60; Colletti 1972:183/5), affirming a developmental and educative conception of politics in which the individual learns to take into account the public concerns of others (Rousseau II.iv 1973:186; Pateman 1970:24/5).

Critics nevertheless highlight the totalitarian and homogenising potential of Rousseau's politics of THE common good based upon the universal identity of citizens under the state (Taylor 1992:6). What is required, therefore, is an approach that integrates  the  claims  of  both  universality  and particularity,  an approach that recognises that human identity is created reciprocally or dialogically through relations with others (Taylor 1992:7).

Rousseau makes great progress towards this ideal. Sovereignty, as the exercise of the general will, 'can never be alienated', and the sovereign, as collective being, 'cannot be represented' by anything other than itself (II.i 1973:182 III.xv 1973:239/242). To alienate liberty is to renounce moral and human status (I. IV 1973:170; Jennings 1994:119). Rousseau reaches his conclusion from premises which respect the freedom of each individual member of the 'great association' (Broome 1963:64/5). The citizen and the sovereign are not abstracted from each other: 'the Sovereign .. cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it even wish to do so; for no more by the law of reason than by the law of nature can anything occur without a cause' (Il.iv 1973:186). Political obligation is secured through the reciprocal act and relation upon which political society is based. Rousseau makes decisive progress towards the integral conception by resting collective authority upon the emancipatory interaction and reciprocity of individuals. Rousseau thus unites each with all and all with each in arguing that 'the undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves'. As a result, 'there is not a man who does not think of "each" as meaning him, and consider him in voting for all' (Il.iv 1973:187).





The problem is that Rousseau's associationalism fits the contours of the public-private dualism characterising liberal modernity. The principle of reciprocity uniting the freedom of each and all is asserted at the level of the political community of the state, vitiating Rousseau's attempt to realise an associative freedom which embeds a genuine reciprocity in practical life. In Rousseau’s social contract, individuals interact within the sphere of the common good only at the level of the state.

13 KANT AND RATIONAL FREEDOM

REASON AS THE REALISATION OF NATURE
In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that ‘It is precisely in knowing its limits that philosophy exists ‘ This notion of limits is important. ‘I had to deny knowledge in order to make way for faith’. For Kant, human beings do not see the world as it is, but as it appears to be. This is a critical point. Certain aspects of reality are internal rather than external, that is, they are present in the conceptual apparatus of the human mind rather than in the world outside. A table appears to be a particular colour on account of the particular constitution of  human being’s visual apparatus. A species with a different visual apparatus, that could, for instance, process a wider range of light waves (infrared, ultraviolet) would see the colour of that particular table differently. 

And what applies to colour applies also to other aspects of reality which Kant called ‘categories’ of experience, such as space, time, cause and effect. These categories are innate, part of the conceptual apparatus of human beings, and determine how human beings experience the world. Without these innate categories, human experience would be an inchoate jumble. The world human beings experience is a human world constituted by innate categories.

But whilst this philosophy emphasises the creative constitutive human power full of reality making possibilities, Kant is careful to emphasise limits. The innate categories impose order on chaos but also impose limits on experience, determining what human beings can know. Human beings can seek causal explanations regarding everyday experience - Who put that table there? What made that noise? But there are questions to which causal explanations cannot be applied, human free will, the origin of the universe, and so on. The answers to such questions can often result in antinomy, possibilities which, though equally rational and plausible are nevertheless mutually exclusive. For instance, it seems equally plausible that human beings possess free choice and that every human act has a determined cause. Similarly, the views that the universe at one time didn't exist or that it has always existed and always will exist (Aristotle’s eternalism) seem equally implausible.
For Kant, such antinomies suggest there are limits to reason which prevent us from ever fully understanding certain things. This is the basis of Kant's transcendental idealism. Whilst human beings can only ever experience their own innate perceptions through categories of experience (idealism), there is a reality that exists beyond (transcends) these categories.
Although his philosophy is difficult, Kant repays serious study. Kant shows how human beings are creators of their own reality, and therefore possess a creative, constitutive power, a demiurge, that is independent of some external source. At the same time, Kant firmly establishes the power and possibilities of reason upon the limits of reason. Kant is clear that it is only in knowing the limits of reason that one can appreciate its possibilities. Those intoxicated with power are prone to ignore those limits, realising not the freedom pursued but its opposite. 

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant negotiates a path beyond the conflict of knowledge and belief, reason and empiricism and achieves an intellectually sublime synthesis of ethical and cognitive perspectives. For Kant, the knowledge of the external world of 'phenomena' comes from the experience of the senses as made intelligible and organised by the categories of human reason. The world of ‘things-in-themselves’ is beyond human experience and is inaccessible to human reason. There can therefore be no transcendence here. The world of 'practical reason' or morality, however, is radically different. Human beings are co-creators and co-legislators of this moral world, the world of ‘noumena’, and partake of a real world as distinct from a merely 'phenomenal' world. 

Whereas once either revelation (religion) and nature (science) had been the fountain-head of morality, Kant makes human reason the source of being able to understand good and evil, to prescribe right conduct through the ‘categorical imperative’ and to author the universal. The moral law of reason enjoins human beings to live in accordance with the ‘categorical imperative’. The categorical imperative affirms the fundamental equality of rational moral agents, arguing that human beings be treated as 'ends in themselves'. True freedom is achieved if, in moral conduct, human beings follow the law of reason only, in contradistinction to natural inclinations and without regard to practical consequences. This is the moral and rational foundation which enables culture and civilization to flourish and enables human beings to forward to a future of 'perpetual peace'. 

Kant’s philosophy transfigures the ideals of transcendence into the ethico-rational freedom of citizens who live as co-legislators in a moral world of their own making. Without any recourse to supernaturalism, Kant’s ethico-rational freedom transcends the world of empirical reality through the power of human reason, rising above the limitations of a world beset by antagonism, desire and natural inclinations. 

Kant’s ethico-rational freedom encompasses Plato’s sublime morality, the righteous, the poor in spirit, the Gospel love thy neighbour as thyself, the Protestant emphasis on good works, and it does so without any need to have recourse to such elitist or selective notions as Platonic guardians, the ‘chosen people’, the elect, or, reaching into the century after Kant, ‘the party’. Kant achieves this by emphasising the creative power of human reason within each and all, conceiving human beings as co-authors of their moral existence and co-legislators in a universal kingdom of ends. In impressing its sign upon empirical reality, reason expands the sphere of human freedom. In establishing the limits of reality within the confines of reason and nature, Kant actually opened up the possibility of the most expansive moral and rational freedom, a 'kingdom of ends' which is realised in the three dimensions of nature, society and the mind. Kant’s normative philosophy presents an ideal of human association as a realm of ends composed of autonomous individuals who are co-legislators of their freedom as rational natural beings.

At the heart of Kant’s normative philosophy is the moral requirement to transform society in order to realise the summum bonum, the highest good: 'The moral law .. determines for us ..a final purpose toward which it obliges us to strive, and this purpose is the highest good in the world possible through freedom' (CJ 1951:30). Human beings, therefore, have a duty to promote the highest good: 'We are a priori determined by reason to promote with all our powers the summum bonum, which consists in the combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the highest condition of the good itself, i.e., in universal happiness conjoined with morality most accordant to law' (CJ 1951:304).


The way that the end of the highest good as a moral society enjoins individuals to promote the happiness of each other implies a social ethics. Rather than confine moral efforts to the private realm, Kant's view expresses a social demand oriented towards realising an ideal, the ideal of the perfect state and of international peace (Van Der Linden 1985:4 5). This social ethics concerned with promoting the highest good is also expressed in the way that the categorical imperative entails ideal co-legislative institutions in which human beings treat each other as ends. The end of the categorical imperative is the harmony of free and rational wills.





This idea establishes Kant's ethics as concerned with the public life of human beings who, as social and rational beings, realise their nature in association with each other. The moral law, as defined in the categorical imperative, grounds the pursuit of the perfect civil constitution and perpetual peace, leading to the highest good of the moral community, as a social duty. 

For Kant, the central aspect of the human predicament concerns how human beings are able to transcend their natural inclinations that keep them chained to natural necessity by ascending to their higher rational nature. Resolving this question entails humanity moving beyond the limitations of egoism and individual self-interest to realise the greater good that is attained from acting in common. Kant’s philosophy therefore involves a distinction between culture, as constituted in the sphere of reason, and nature. Reason is transcendentally constituted and legislates to the empirical world from which it is separated (Rumdell 1989:14). Morality remains outside the empirical limitations of the temporal sphere as a point towards which human beings aspire. Kant's morality is formal or transcendental in the sense that it seeks a ground for right not by means of an extrapolation from the empirical properties of human beings but in the critique of the rational mind (1965 B.473-480). Universality requires that freedom be grounded in something that transcends empirically limited inclinations, the will. Moral values cannot be drawn from nature and must inhabit some supersensible, 'ideal', realm. Only in relation to this 'noumenal' realm could individuals become moral beings (1965 B.334/6 498ff 1956 50ff).

Freedom is the capacity to act independently of natural causality and against natural 'inclinations', the desires and impulses elicited in the human psyche through objects (1965 B.561f; cf. 1956:72 118f 161). Kant’s rational will is thus free from any ground of determination in nature (Taylor 1975:368/9). A free act is morally significant in being exempt from 'blind causality' in both physical and psychological senses (1965 B.826f; 1956:95).

Moral principles which are logically independent of experience can be justified only if human beings are understood to be not merely phenomenal beings, subject to causal necessity, but also noumenal beings who are free. Morality is possible only if the will is free to act. The concept of freedom is wholly a priori and forms part of a coherent system of 'ideas of reason' (1965 B.390-396), a rationally constructed standard not found in experience but according to which empirical actions can be judged (1965 B.370ff). This system of ideas is constructed by the systematic application of reason through a faculty shared 'by all human beings itself and is 'objective’ in that human beings can agree about its nature and resolve disputes by reference to it.

Freedom is the capacity of reason to initiate action, lawfully, apart from inclination and hence independently of ‘blind’ natural causality (1965 B.46 50 B.566ff). With the moral law as a 'fact of reason' (e.g. FMM), Kantian autonomy is thus defined as the idea of freedom as the causality of reason in accordance with the moral law, a 'necessary' concept which human beings must construct on account of knowledge of the moral law (1965 B.476 585f; 1956:21-29 32).

The general moral law is the 'categorical imperative', the objective principle of morality, categorically enjoining individuals to act in accordance with morality. As distinct from an hypothetical imperative, which indicates the means which must be willed or employed relative to the realisation of some further end (GMM 1991:79), an imperative is categorical when expressed as an unconditional demand that possesses its own validity. This yields a universal principle for all rational beings, and valid and necessary principles for every volition.

 Hence the categorical imperative in The Formula of Universal Law: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' (GMM 1991:84). This formulation applies to all so that everyone acts only on maxims that can be willed to become universal laws (Van Der Linden 1985:20). Once maxims are submitted to the test of universality, the pursuit of private ends no longer issues in conflict but in harmony, the individual agent respecting the categorical imperative through respect for the moral law in abstraction from objects. Kant's harmony of free and rational wills is, therefore, more than a framework for the individual pursuit of private ends, in which any claim to achieving universal happiness can only be realised indirectly. The end of the moral community affirms that individual members directly contribute to the happiness of each other, so long as this meets the test of universality (DV). Not the individual alone but all individuals together make the ends of others their own end so that universal happiness is directly promoted. In submitting their maxims to the test of universality, individual agents create a moral community. It follows that in the moral world each person is reciprocally end and means (CJ 1951:222).

 The ethic of ends puts 'flesh on the bones’ of the first formulation by indicating what kind of maxims could be willed as universal laws; human beings not using themselves or others as means to subjective ends implies a view of what right actions are. The view that the individual ought not be subject to another will implies that the individual should be considered as his/her own law-giver. Thus, whilst the: realm of means is equated with the world of natural things, the realm of ends is equated with that of pure, self-determined intelligences. The rational being legislates universally by all maxims of its will so as to judge itself and its actions from this perspective. This concept leads directly to the Formula of the End in Itself: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' (GMM 1991:91). It is significant that Kant refers not to 'persons' in particular but to 'humanity’ as a whole. In addressing the universal humanity in each individual, how humanity can and ought to be, Kant's ethics are social. This ‘humanity’ is the final end of the individual, the highest good as the conception of the moral community applied in order to transform the human condition. The duties to oneself are at the same time duties to all: 'To destroy the subject of morality in one’s person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world, so far as this is in one's power; and yet morality is an end in itself. Consequently, to dispose of oneself as a mere means to an arbitrary end is to abase humanity in one's own person (homo noumenon), which was yet entrusted to man (homo phaenomenon) for its preservation (DV 1964:85).

Treating humanity in oneself and in others as an end in itself is to act according to only those maxims which can become universal laws or laws of nature. The Formula of Autonomy establishes that 'the will is .. not merely subject to the law but is so subject that it must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)’ (GMM 1991:93). In acting out of respect for the moral law, the moral agent wills himself/herself and others as legislative selves (noumenal selves) and as co-legislators in a moral order of universal cooperation. (GMM 1991:98/9; Van Der Linden 1985:30). To treat people as ends in themselves respects the demand that individual agents should create a society of legislators concerned to promote each other's ends. Thus the formulation demands that the moral agent act always so that each will through its maxims could regard itself at the same time as 'making universal law' (GMM 1991:94). 

This is a conception of a community of rational beings under law, constituting their selfhood in relation with the moral individuality of all others. The fundamental worth individuals seek for themselves from other subjects they also acknowledge in other subjects (Cassirer 1981:248/9). This concept of every rational being 'as one who must regard himself as making universal law by all the maxims of his will' leads to the 'closely connected' concept of the realm of ends (GMM 1991:95): 'every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxims always a lawmaking member in the universal kingdom of ends' (GMM 1991:100). This realm is defined as 'a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws .... Since these laws are directed precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends and means, this kingdom can be called a kingdom of ends (which is admittedly only an Ideal)' (GMM 1991:95). This establishes an ideal of humanity as it ought to be, a realm in which moral agents respect each other as legislators and as ends in themselves: 'A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he makes its universal laws, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as its head [sovereign], when as the maker of laws he is himself subject to the will of no other' (GMM 1991:95).

In the realm of ends each individual upholds and promotes the conditions of autonomy. By making the moral law their own and, individual agents also make their end the moral community in which each furthers the ends of the other, thus realising the highest good (Van Der Linden 1985:32/3 38). This community, then, is composed not of monadic legislators lacking relation and interaction, but of colegislators.
Kant's ethics are democratic in affirming every person as competent to make universally legislative decisions. Each member treating all others as moral beings requires liberty (every individual is able to decide for themselves); equality (every individual equally has the power to make choices and decisions); and fraternity (every individual is a member of a moral community) (Raphael 1981:57; Norman 1983:102/3).
Kant's main concern is to argue that only actions which are done 'from duty' possess moral worth and exhibit a good will (GMM 1991:62/5 1956:84 87/8 DV 1964:50 52/3 R 1960:25). To act 'from duty' is to act out of respect for the moral law, rather than from inclination or from expectation of desirable consequences (GMM 1991:66). The view that the moral worth of an action resides in its consequences reduces the good will to being an efficient cause of good action rather than as an end in itself.

It is morally significant whether an act is done from duty or from inclination since for Kant it is only in actions done from duty that individuals exercise their freedom, their capacity to act as autonomous beings independent of and superior to the natural or sensible world (1956:89/90). It is not enough that action should accord with duty, it must be done for 'the sake of duty'. Otherwise the accordance is merely contingent and spurious because, though the unmoral ground may indeed now and then produce lawful actions, more often it brings forth unlawful ones (GMM 1991:63ff).

For Hegel, Kant’s pure motive of duty can never produce the good since it is abstracted from everything that comprises a real life, from desires, interests, and needs. The good needs to be made an integral part of everyday life in connection with the empirical desires and self-satisfaction of individuals. Hegel's conception follows Aristotle's conception of a virtue as an intelligent disposition to behave in certain ways and act for certain reasons, to feel pleasure or pain at certain things (PR parao150R Aristotle NE 1065al2 1106bl5-30). Hegel considers Aristotelian virtue to transcend Kant's dualism of duty and inclination. ‘Aristotle determines the concept of virtue more precisely by distinguishing a rational aspect of the soul from an irrational one; in the latter nous [reason] is only dynamei [potentially] - sensations, inclinations, passions, emotions apply to it. In the rational side, understanding, wisdom, reflectiveness, cognizance all have their place. But they do not constitute virtue, which consists only in the unity of the rational with the irrational side. We call it virtue when the passions (inclinations) are so related to reason that they do what reason commands' (HP 2 1968:204).

Whereas for Aristotle reason had to persuade desire as to what it should want, for Kant, a truly moral act is performed out of respect for the moral law, without regard to inclinations. For Kant, reason is immanent in the mind of the autonomous moral agent and is unrelated to external objects. The problem is that if reason is noumenally structured, the empirical realm is left free from moral significance. Whereas Aristotle could make the polis crucial to individual self-realisation as the essential field of human interaction, Kant's approach assumes a set of rational ideas inherent in the human mind from which the state as the prime political object derives. Hegel thus charges Kantian ethics with being an 'empty formalism' which is incapable of generating an 'immanent doctrine of duties' (PR para 135R). Kant's pure motive of duty becomes a 'preaching' of 'duty for duty's sake' providing no content or direction of action (PR para 135R). 

Hegel's criticism is valid only if attention remains fixed upon the Formula of Universal Law, focusing upon the categorical imperative's universality in terms of its form. Kant's morality is indeed formal, but it is not empty in the sense of sheer consistency and noncontradiction. Kant is not indifferent to ends. Kant's standard of universalisation is tied to the ethic of ends which imposes the duty upon each to treat all others with the respect they expect to receive in return. This ethic has practical implications, ruling out institutions and practices which treat human beings as means to external ends and leading to the 'realm of ends' composed of free and equal members, a moral community of autonomous, self-legislating agents. The imperative to treat humanity as an end and never as a means therefore puts some 'nonheteronomous teleological flesh' upon 'the bare bones of universality' (Riley 1982:49).
Set alongside Aristotelian notions of the richly endowed happy individual, the Kantian self may appear to be socially, culturally and historically deracinated, 'thin as a needle' (Murdoch 1985:53). But it is simply not true to argue that the Kantian self lacks moral and affective ties to others and is subjected to the empty ethic of duty for duty's sake. Kant was as interested as Aristotle was in developing the right kind of moral personality. The difference is that Kant's good character possesses a democratic character in being open to anyone, regardless of gifts of intelligence, beauty, wealth or good luck. Kant realises that universal principle alone, at a formal level, cannot ensure morality and therefore ties it to an ethic of ends which treats all individuals as beings endowed with dignity by virtue of their humanity, their capacity for moral action. Kant's ethic taught respect for the rational moral element in each individual and is 'built to preserve its own self-respect and that of others, neither demanding nor enduring servility' (Shklar 1984:233).

Kant does possess an intersubjective dimension. For Kant, the capacity to universalise the principles of actions is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the morality of these actions. Principles are only moral when tied to objective ends, specifically the injunction to treat human beings as ends rather than means. The conception of rational agency in the universal Formula is thin when considered in itself, which is why Kant connected it to an ethic of objective ends and a moral community. Without this teleology, Kant states, morality would be 'destroyed'.

Kant departs from the classical conception of happiness as an intrinsic component of the highest good. Kant recognises the extent to which the modern principle of subjectivity has subverted the overarching ethical framework of the good, severing the necessary connection between individual happiness and the universal good in the classical conception. As a result, the notion of the good is subjectivised, becoming the product of individual desire and preference, in opposition to the individual good of others and the common good of all. To deal with this situation, Kant's ethics demote happiness from being the first principle of practical philosophy: 'it is the moral disposition which conditions and makes possible the participation in happiness, and not conversely the prospect of happiness that makes possible the moral disposition' (1965 B.841). Happiness and the good are no longer directly connected but require the mediation of moral virtue. The rational value of happiness - the 'complete good' - now depends upon the possession of moral virtue and is made the condition of the worthiness to be happy through moral conduct or goodwill (GMM 1991:59 1965 3.G37-S38 B.341).

In the first instance, Kant identifies happiness with the well being of a finite rational being (GMM 1959:61), its total and lasting advantage through the satisfaction of natural desires or inclinations. Kant goes further in arguing that happiness is an 'idea' in which 'all inclinations are combined into a sum total’ (GMM 1991:64), an 'absolute whole or maximum of well-being' (FMM 1959:35). 'Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires' (1965: B.834). Kant subordinates the hedonistic view that objects of desire are willed for the pleasure they may bring (Prac 1956:20) to 'contentment in fulfilling a purpose .. determined by reason alone, acknowledging the 'highest practical function' of reason to be the establishment of a good will (GMM 1991:62). 'Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of the rational beings who are thereby rendered worthy of it, alone constitutes the supreme good of that world wherein, in accordance with the command of a pure but practical reason, we are under obligation to place ourselves' (1965 B.342).

The reality of this systematic unity of ends occurs in the intelligible - hence moral - world rather than in the sensible world (1965 B.842). This 'leads inevitably also to the purposive unity of all things, which constitute this great whole, in accordance with universal laws of nature (just as the former unity is in accordance with universal and necessary laws of morality), and thus unites the practical with the speculative reason' (1965 B.843). The world must be in harmony with that moral employment of reason founded on the idea of the supreme good (1955 B.844).

Kant thus develops a concept of happiness as the harmony of ends. Happiness, as free and rational activity, is more than self-preservation, instinctual gratification, and pleasure, but consists of knowledge, insight and creativity (Van Der Linden 1985:70/1). The actions of a being having will must be determined by reason rather than instinct (GMM 1991:60/111). To this end, natural inclinations are to be 'tamed': 'instead of clashing with one another they can be brought into a harmony in a wholeness which is called happiness' (R 1960:51). Happiness is the unification of 'all the ends which are prescribed by our desires' (1965:632).

The basis of the conflict between Kant and Hegel lies in their different conceptions of objective ends. Hegel's more Aristotelian teleology makes the ends of moral action a condition in the world, making actions instrumental to some good yet to be achieved. For Kant, this denies the moral status of action since the end is not extrinsic to action but is part of the 'rational nature’ of human beings, as ends capable of shaping and pursuing ends (Kant DV 1971:45/6 51). Whereas Kant considered the moral will to be part of the 'rational nature' of human beings, hence prior to actions, Hegel made it part of historical development, attached to  commitments in the objective world  of political and legal institutions (PR para 75A).

Which isn’t to argue that Kant lacks an ideal that is yet to be achieved, far from it. The realm of ends is a vision of a possible world in which all individuals really are the pure moral agents following the moral law which reason asserts they ought to be (GMM 1991:95/6). The question is how the ideal can be realised through human action. The problem is that if freedom remains the unsituated concept it is in Kant's conception, it cannot be pursued let alone realised in the empirical or sensible realm. Freedom is confined in an impotent noumenal sphere. 

Kant's moral law, as self-legislated, asserts the rationality, freedom and equality of all and is applicable to each and all as noumenal persons. Kant offers an ideal aiming to emancipate individuals from the phenomenal world of causal laws. In contradistinction to legislation in the actual world, members always heed moral legislation in the realm of ends. Since each member is both legislator and the subject of the laws, giving the moral law and obeying it, all are equal.

The realm of ends is thus an ideal human community composed of free and equal members (Kant 1965: B.372), a goal of future society, a concept of future life (1965: B.836f). Kant offers the realm of ends as an idea of reason which is practically necessary if there is to be moral action (1965o8.372). In the sensible realm, its counterpart is progress towards communal autonomy, the 'real object of our willing' (Kant 1956:121f).

As an ideal, the realm of ends exists as a criterion by which to critically evaluate the existing political order. This has radical, future oriented possibilities as an ideal civil constitution in which coercion has been replaced by moral reason. 
Discussing Plato's idea of the perfect city, Kant envisages:





Kant affirms a conception of human flourishing and potentiality in repudiating the thesis that makes corrupt human nature responsible for imperfect political institutions. Identifying the cause of imperfection with 'the neglect of the pure ideas in the making of the laws' (Pure 1965:312), Kant explains corrupt human nature by imperfect institutions which ought, therefore, to be transformed and placed on a moral basis.

This means realising the perfect constitution as part of the duty to realise the highest good. Kant describes this ideal constitution as 'a necessary idea which must be taken as fundamental not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws'. The 'the rightfulness of the Idea’ brings ‘the legal organisation of mankind ever nearer to its greatest possible perfection, advances this maximum as an archetype' (1965 B.373-374).

Happiness deriving from the moral perfection of humanity does not imply an unmediated existence proceeding through 'inner' conviction but is set within the collective framework of a perfect civil constitution and its laws. Kant's 'concept of freedom' is the essential core of Kant's ethics concerning the possibility of the categorical imperative, the 'keystone of the whole edifice of pure reason' (1965 B.7 394n; 1956:3). 
The implications are radical. Political and social institutions which deny the lawmaking autonomy of individuals may be criticised and transformed from the perspective of the ideal. Since heteronomy, determination by external laws, whether one’s natural inclinations or the arbitrary will of others, is the norm in existing society, autonomy, being governed rationally by self-legislated laws, is a goal still to be achieved (Van Der Linden 1985:32). Marx's critique exposes the heteronomous character of capitalist society in order to realise the autonomous moral community. Within capitalism, the ends of some are preferred or downgraded to those of others. Marx's conception of communism as 'an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all' (CM 1973:87) is in a direct line of descent from the ideal constitution as promising a self-regulating society.
However, whilst the concept of the republic of ends can critically expose the failings of actual society, there is a need to show how this society can be brought into accordance with the ideal. Blocking Kant's ideal is the gap between the realm of ends and the empirical world. Kant states that the ideal constitution has been formulated in abstraction from certain 'hindrances' (1965 B.374). What Kant is referring to here becomes clear in the second Critique. Firstly, sensory nature is external to the individual so that even the legislation of reason, the determination of human will by the moral law, may not alter its course (Kant 1956:15 21). Knowledge of the course of nature is crucial in overcoming this hindrance. Secondly, there is internal nature, the inclinations individuals possess through natural causality (1956:20ff).
The problem lies in the way that Kant sets reason over nature. A more material account of the ideal is available. The fact that the actual purposiveness and inclinations of individuals within the empirical world are present within any meaningful interaction makes it possible to conceive reason as truly interactive, situated and social.
Marx saw Kant's highest good as the province of religious hope rather than practical politics: 'Kant was satisfied with "good will" alone, even if it remained entirely without result, and he transferred the realisation of this good will, the harmony between it and the needs and impulses of individuals, to the world beyond' (GI 1999:97). This implies that Kant's highest good exists only in abstraction, like Plato’s World of Being. But Kant's moral law projects an abstract and 'empty' ideal only by detaching this desirable end from the moral community of co-legislators who seek to enhance one another's ends. Kant's highest good rests upon 'a moral kingdom of purposes., viz., the existence of rational beings under moral laws' (CJ 1951:295). 
Kant's highest good is an empty ideal or religious only to the extent that it is not grounded in the categorical imperative as a social ethics and moral praxis (Van Der Linden 1985:78/9). The categorical imperative demands that individuals seek the moral kingdom in which each enhances the ends of all. All obey the moral law and cooperate in the promotion of universal happiness. Marx himself is vulnerable to the criticism that he has not only underestimated the power of morality and culture in realising the highest good, with the participation of all as rational beings, not just those with material futurity and structural power, he has also denigrated the transcendental perspective which has inspired human beings to constantly raise their sights above the temporal or empirical realm for a world better than that immediately given. The creative power that is assigned to ideals, morality and culture is a strength that Kantian transcendental idealism has over perspectives which narrow praxis down to things, tools, instruments, interests.
Marx has identified the crucial question as being how to relate the ‘good will’ in the ideal noumenal realm to the needs and impulses of individuals in the empirical world. The task that the ideal of the realm of ends sets for each individual, as a member of a group of rational beings, is to establish society according to the moral law. This is the idea of the 'moral world', the world as it 'ought to be', as revealed by the 'necessary laws of morality' (B.836). This is 'so .. far thought .. as a mere idea' since an account of its conditions in the sensible world of experience is lacking. Nevertheless, it is at the same time 'a practical idea, which really can have, as it also ought to have, an influence upon the sensible world, to bring that world, so far as may be possible, into conformity with the idea' (1965 B.836). The idea of a moral world, therefore, has 'objective reality', not as referring to an object of an intelligible intuition 'but as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment' (B.836). This achieves the idea of a 'corpus mysticum of rational beings' 'so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every other' (B.836). The ethical state is thus based on the moral law and the moral purpose that that law engenders. This association uniting rational individuals would be possible if pure morality was expanded so that it were freely accepted by all. 
PEACE AND FREEDOM UNDER LAW
Kant is not silent on the institutional, political and practical requirements of realising the good in the real world. Kant identifies the perfect constitution as the republican state, realising the social as against unsocial character of human beings through the rule of law, and guaranteeing the greatest possible freedom for each consistent with all. Government facilitates the development of the moral disposition to a direct respect for the law by placing a barrier against the outbreak of unlawful inclinations (PP Reiss 1991:121n). In assuring each individual that all individuals will follow the concept of law, government represents a 'great step' 'towards morality ..towards a state where the concept of duty is recognised for its own sake, irrespective of any possible gain in return’ (PP Reiss 1991:121n). Here, Kant emphasises again that true morality is built on a duty that is emphatically distinguished from interest, gain, from class or sectional implication. 
 By guaranteeing equal external freedom for each individual, the rule of law fosters a climate favourable to moral autonomy and is preparatory for the final end of creation, the moral community in which the command of law is internalised as the product of moral motives rather than of self-interest and coercion, gain and power. Internal discipline replaces external discipline. At this stage, political peace is freely and spontaneously affirmed by human agents as morally autonomous beings. In this community, agents do not merely leave each other free to pursue private ends but come actively to promote each other's ends (Van Der Linden 1985:188).
The principal aim of Kant's political philosophy is to establish 'the way to peace', converting class, difference and diversity into order, identity and unity (Saner 1973:3 4). With the realisation of the republican constitution within each nation, the dream of 'perpetual peace' becomes a realistic possibility (PP 1991:99/100 114).
Kant argues that 'the sovereignty of the good principle is attainable, as far as men can work toward it, only through the establishment and spread of a society in accordance with and for the sake of the laws of virtue, a society whose task and duty it is rationally to impress these laws in all their scope upon the entire human race' (R 1949:404). It follows from this that 'the species of rational beings is objectively, through the idea of reason, destined for a social goal, namely, the promotion of the highest good as a social good' (1949:407).

The central problem in Kant's politics is to discover the principles upon which unity is founded to ensure the greatest possible freedom of each and all (Saner 1973:215). The law transforms the license in which the freedom of all individuals cancels itself out in mutual conflict into a freedom of each coexisting with the freedom of all. This image of freedom achieved through legal process pervades the Critique of Pure Reason and is central to Kant's 'architectonic' (1965 B.860).

This collectively universal will is a collective force for the regulation of supra-individual forces, public law under a sovereign authority (Reiss 1991:26). This is an expansion rather than an infringement of individual liberty since individuals obey only that law to which they have agreed (Reiss 1991:11). Kant's conception of the moral life is based upon the capacity of individuals to universalise and hence give their moral principles the force of law. Freedom and lawfulness, far from being antithetical as in an individualist liberal conception of liberty, are integral to each other. Freedom is not the absence of necessity but the moral recognition of necessity in the shape of relationships of obligation with others. Since human beings do not just obey law but make it, necessity is put on a moral basis.

In the absence of this legal process, reason is in the state of nature and asserts its claims only through war, disputes ending only in a temporary armistice. In contrast, a legal order ensures an eternal peace through the recognised methods of legal action. This limits individual freedom so that it may be consistent with the freedom of all and hence with the common good of all (1965 B.779/80). Kant unites the freedom of each individual and all individuals through the reciprocity of legal obligations. All individuals are equal before and subject to the one universal law. The rules of the lawful state are reciprocal in being equally and mutually obligatory for all individuals (Saner 1973:30/1).

In the Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784), Kant seeks to ground hope for moral progress in the historical process, seeking to inspire moral action to bring about the realisation of progressive political ends, the perfect state and peace. In the Idea, human culture evolves out of the chaotic state of nature. From within the chaotic appearance of the human world, Kant discerns a slow but steady evolution of culture (KGS 8:17).

It is the purpose of Nature that human natural capacities be fully developed, not in any individual alone but in the human race as a whole. It is Nature’s intention that human beings use their natural capacities to work out their independent way of securing human well-being. The cunning of nature suffices for this task, operating through mechanisms of self-interest to compel human beings to institute 'a law-governed social order' (UH 1991:44). 

Kant endows the individual with an 'unsocial sociability' in which drives towards associationalism - the inclination to 'live in society' - and individualisation - the tendency to 'live as an individual' - conflict (UH 1991:44). The political problem is to recognise and reconcile the legitimate claims of both facts. 'Unsocial sociability’ compels human beings to prepare for the replacement of a natural order of conflicting particular wills by the universal will of a legal order: 'a beginning is made towards establishing a way of thinking which can with time transform the primitive natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles' (UH 1991:44/5). Identifying the 'highest purpose of nature’ as 'the development of all natural capacities', Kant predicates human growth and development upon the interplay of the natural inclinations of asociability and the moral inclinations of sociability (UH 1991:45). Out of this clash of antagonistic forces, the individual seeks a form of association which has 'the greatest freedom' which has specific limits so that 'it can coexist with the freedom of others' (UH 1991:45).


The development of human capacities to the full requires the creation of a social order with the greatest possible freedom. The social order which enables the greatest possible freedom is a perfectly just constitution in which mutual opposition between its members is made consistent with freedom and justice. The highest problem that nature assigns to the human race is to design a just civic constitution. This civic constitution establishes a commonwealth in which the destructive passions of natural freedom are tamed for the good by civic union. 

However, this commonwealth of individuals can only be achieved by securing peace and harmony among all the nations. For the same antagonism that sets individuals against each other in society also establishes hostile relations between the nations. The ultimate purpose of Nature is to lead humankind from the state of individual rivalry to the state of social harmony, and from the state of national rivalry to the state of international harmony. Peace and harmony reigns between individuals in society and between sovereign states in the international domain. 

The development of the pragmatic capacity for social control involves a high human cost but nevertheless makes it possible to replace discord with concord, leading to a 'civil society which can administer justice universally' (UH 1991:45). To guarantee 'freedom under external laws' requires an 'irresistible force' since members of this 'perfectly just civil constitution' are related to each other in antagonistic fashion (UH 1991:46).

Kant expands on this theme in Perpetual Peace (1795). Here he argues Nature has used the device of war for the evolution of humankind. The state of nature is a state of war. Humankind begins in this condition and scatters itself to the ends of the Earth by ceaseless war. In turn, this war produces the legal order on three levels: civil law, the law of nations, and the law of world citizenship (KGS 8:365). Kant claims that these legal orders are the work of Nature. By placing different groups of people close to each other in antagonistic relations, Nature compels them to form states for their defence, to submit to public laws, to create political order. The political order which is most fitting for the rights of individuals is the republican constitution. The creation of this republican constitution as a universal power overcoming selfish inclinations 'is both the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human race' (UH 1991:46). Whilst many claim that a republic would have to be a race of angels, Kant comments, Nature makes it possible for humankind to organize the state in such a way that the selfish inclinations of a ‘race of devils’ is contained by their mutual opposition (KGS 8:366). 

An unconscious natural teleology is at work in this. Human beings, as children of Nature, are born with the natural instinct for selfishness, and this leads them into the state of war. However, this war drives human beings to develop the intelligence that Nature has also endowed them with. Eventually, human beings become sufficiently intelligent to leave the state of war by building a civil society to enable the orderly exercise of their freedom, thus creating the foundation for the flowering of culture. However, a civil peace and freedom that is established within  the confines of a single state is vulnerable to the predation of competing states in a condition of international war. Therefore, according to Kant’s natural teleology, humankind will extend the peaceful union of warring individuals in the social sphere to a peaceful union of warring states in the international sphere. This development is initiated by Nature and Nature’s endowment. Human history is therefore the work of Nature. Humankind is a product of nature, and is endowed with the power to realize the highest good.

This republican or civil constitution acknowledges freedom as a collective project which connects the individual with essential universal powers and potentialities beyond an immediate, individual, direct response to circumstances. Kant proceeds from Rousseau’s distinction between liberty and license. For Kant, although the individual, as a rational being, 'desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all', 'he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law where he can' and 'abuses his freedom in relation to others' and therefore 'requires a master to break his self will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free'. But since this 'master' can be found only the human species, and hence 'will also be an animal who needs a master' (JH 1991:46), the realisation of the perfect constitution will be the last problem to be solved. Its solution requires 'a correct conception of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience tested in many affairs of the world, and above all else a good will prepared to accept the findings of this experience’ (UH Reiss 1991:47). This makes it clear that Kant's 'master' is not an external agency but the rational nature within human beings themselves. Mastery is a self-mastery achieved through the moral law, through the autonomous citizen living under the perfect constitution obeying a law that is self-made and self-imposed.

The greater liberty of 'rational freedom' achieved through an inner mastery and not just an institutional constraint is suggested by Kant's reference to the realisation in the historical process of a 'hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally - and for this purpose also externally - perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely' (UH 1991:50). To this end, nature guides human inclinations over time to the rational end of a 'just civil constitution' as the final condition for the self-development of the natural faculties of human beings (UH 1991:45). Kant, having separated the individual and the species, with reason capable of being fully realised only in the latter (Kant UH 1991:42), comes to recognise that nature is moral after all. Kant’s target is not nature as such but natural inclinations and impulses which chain rational human beings to the empirical world of necessity and immediacy. But reason too is a natural endowment which human beings can use to realise moral freedom as a rational natural end. In achieving this end, the 'pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole' (UH 1991:44/5). The pathologically enforced coordination of society is superseded by an internal moral coordination through the process of culture.


In bringing the hidden plan of nature to light, the philosopher grounds the hope of progress in the perfect  state  and  peace, thus stimulating the moral  action concerned  to  realise these ends. The role of the philosopher is to 'formulate in terms of a definite plan of nature a history of creatures who act without a plan of their own'  (UH 1991:42). In other words, reason inspires the moral impulse and informs practice leading to the perfect constitution and perpetual peace. This hope is not Utopian since nature pushes humanity towards the good; through the plan of nature, philosophy can have its belief in a millennium (UH 1991:50). The intelligent action of human beings thus hastens the fulfilment of human destiny on earth (UH 1991:52/3). Thus a philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civic union of mankind, must be regarded as possible and even as capable of furthering the purpose of nature itself (UH 1991:51).

Though Kant argues that the union of states is the 'halfway mark’ in human development (UH 1991:49), it is only in the Critique of Judgment that he argues that culture, comprising the legal order and peace between states (highest political good), is the ultimate end of nature and prepares the ground for the moral community of co-legislators (highest moral good) as the final and of creation. Whilst the mechanisms of self-interest are sufficient to achieve the highest political good as a preparatory step toward the highest moral good, the latter can only be achieved by moral praxis under the good will (Van Der Linden 1985:134). 

NATURALTELEOLOGY AND HUMAN PRAXIS
In the Appendix to the Critique of Teleological Judgement, Kant seeks to identify the ultimate purpose of nature as a whole. He finds this ultimate purpose in the realization of the highest good as presented in his moral theory. Human beings have a special role in realising this highest good by virtue of their rationality and morality. The highest good can only be realized by human beings as rational and moral beings, which means that humankind is the ultimate purpose of nature as a whole (C3 427). In the second Critique, Kant argued that the highest good could be fully realized only in the eternal world of noumena. In the Appendix, he is now arguing that the realisation of the highest good is the ultimate purpose of nature. Kant thus conceives humankind as Nature’s children developing under the guidance and protection of nature’s providence.

Kant's view that the moral society is something that humanity ought to realise makes his philosophy both praxis- and future-oriented. Kant's primacy of pure practical reason affirms the view that the world is created by human praxis (Goldmann 1971:57). Van Der Linden thus states that Kant's social ethics affirms that '(empirical) humanity, in order to express its humanity (rational/moral nature), must produce humanity (the moral order)' (Van Der Linden 1985:13).
Of particular importance is Kant's appraisal of moral enthusiasm and the capacity for social learning and control within humanity. The end of the perfect state and the union of all such states in perpetual peace is rooted in the full development of the rational predispositions of the human species. The 'technological predisposition' for manipulating things entails the increasing mastery of nature to satisfy human needs. The 'pragmatic predisposition' involves the increasing social, political and cultural power to organize and employ human beings to realize specific purposes and accustom human beings to rule-governed behaviour. The 'moral predisposition' to treat oneself and others according to 'the principle of freedom under laws' affirms that human beings come to obey juridical laws on account of autonomous motives and a concern to promote the ends of others, so long as these ends are consistent with the universal law. Progress is the moral disposition implies that human agents fulfil the duty to promote the highest good, earning to pursue just institutions in greater numbers (A 1974:183).
According to Kant, humanity is a link like other animals in the chain of natural desires for happiness. What makes human beings unique is the ability and will to set their own goals. By virtue of this ability and will, human beings hold the title of lord of nature. As such, human beings must transcend subjection to nature's purposes, and pursue their own independent purpose. This purpose enjoins humanity to create and sustain culture above and beyond nature (C3 431).

Culture has two elements, through which the capacity to determine ends evolves in history. The ‘culture of discipline’ increases the tendency for human beings to submit to the demands of the moral law, coming to consult the voice of duty more and more. In the first Critique, Kant defined practical freedom as 'the will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses' (A534/B562). The culture of discipline realises this practical freedom. Kant is developing Rousseau's argument that only by subjugating natural instincts and appetites, thus transcending the domain of nature, do human beings become truly human. This process implies the 'ethicisation of human nature' in which duty comes to lose its compulsory character arid instead be guided by moral feelings like indignation, enthusiasm, solidarity, dignity (Van Der Linden 1985:173). 

Kant’s 'culture of discipline' is akin to Plato’s ‘culture of virtue’ as laid out in the Republic. For Plato, human beings become divine by transforming their beastly passions into virtues. The idea of establishing the domain of culture over the domain of nature therefore takes up Plato’s concern with the means of establishing the ideal city or state. The culture of discipline concerns the liberation of the will from the tyranny of desires and other natural chains, which shackle human beings to natural inclinations and prevent them from pursuing independent goals. For Kant, the ‘culture of discipline’ will enable humanity to establish their sovereignty over natural impulses and appetites and create a culture which makes it possible to institute a civil society for the liberty and equality of all citizens. This civil society takes human beings out of the state of nature, transcending the despotism of natural inclinations in which the unconstrained freedom of each individual to pursue natural appetites and impulses serves to destroy the freedom of all individuals. For Kant, the final purpose of creation is civil society, established by the force of reason, coming to extend throughout and rule the whole world (C3 435).


It follows that the ultimate purpose of nature for humanity is to develop the culture of discipline. However, this is not a case of asserting culture against nature, since the culture of discipline is the development of natural endowment enabling humanity to transcend Nature in the same manner as children reach maturity in becoming independent of their mothers. This is Kant’s natural teleology, humanity as the grown up children of Mother Nature.

The ‘culture of skill’ refers to the increasing capacity to manipulate the natural and social environment and involves conflict associated with material factors such as class, exploitation and division of labour (Van Der Linden 1985:137/138). The majority of human beings have had to submit to 'hard work' in order to produce 'the necessities of life .. for the convenience and leisure of others who work at the less necessary elements of culture, science and art' (CJ 1951:282). For Kant, the progress of culture overcomes class conflict through a 'civil community' guaranteeing freedom and equality for all as citizens. Only in this, the perfect state, 'can the greatest development of natural capacities take place' (CJ 1951:282). Kant’s conception of praxis highlights the potential of the increasing rational capacity to control the natural and social environment in order to overcome conflict rooted in material scarcity and the autonomy of social mechanisms and institutions from human control.

For Kant, the purpose of the mastery of nature is culture, and the purpose of culture, in turn, is to realise the highest political good as a preparatory stage leading to the moral community. (Van Der Linden 1985:141). The external freedom guaranteed by political peace in and between perfect states creates conditions for autonomous action and diminishes the forces which encourage immoral acts. 

Kant's moral praxis rests not on a religious hope but on the rational hope for progress, affirming that the future is something open, to be created by rational human agents. 





The very things which define human beings as rational beings - knowledge, insight, happiness, virtue - are given by nature as endowments and potentialities for human beings to live up to (Van Der Linden 1985:102/3). Kant, therefore, conceives history as a process of human self-creation. Culture, as 'what nature can supply to prepare [the human agent] for what he must do himself in order to be a final purpose' (CJ 1951:281), prepares the way for the moral society.
Kant's highest good as projecting an ideal community of colegislators shows the extent to which Kant's philosophy is future oriented and affirms a moral praxis. Human beings have a duty to change the world to realise a moral ideal. Kant advocated caution in politics, believing it  'foolhardy'  and  even 'punishable'  to  oppose  an existing  constitution with 'political constitutions which meet the requirements of reason’ (CF Reiss ed. 1991:188). The perfect constitution and perpetual peace will be attained and maintained by rational moral action, not physical and material force. Kant nevertheless praised the French Revolution for arousing moral enthusiasm within 'all spectators' deriving from 'a moral disposition within the human race' (CF Reiss ed 1991:182). Humanity has the 'disposition and capacity' to effect  social  change autonomously, 'to be' the cause of its own advance toward the better' (1963:142). The prospect of the evolution of a condition  of  natural  right  in  the  relation  of  the individual to the state and of individual states to each other is founded upon this moral disposition, 'the right of every people to give itself a civil constitution of the kind that it sees fit', the 'enthusiasm with which men embrace the cause of goodness'. The enthusiasm of the spectators shows that 'true enthusiasm is always directed exclusively towards the ideal, particularly towards that which is purely moral (such as the concept of right), and it cannot be coupled with selfish interests' (CF Reiss ad 1991:183). As the enthusiasm of the spectators rather than of the Revolutionaries, it was an objective rather than a subjective concern with advancing humanity toward the highest good embodied in political institutions (Van Der Linden 1985:60).

The moral enthusiasm of spectators show that voluntary cooperation and reciprocity is more than a philosophical dream (Van Der Linden 1985:61 64). Kant affirms here the power of example and association in motivating and sustaining moral action. The 'moral disposition’ within the people possesses a tendency towards the moral society and for humanity as it ought to be, stimulating action toward the realisation of this ideal. Indicating that a moral cause is operative in humanity, events like the French Revolution reveal a capacity far the better in human nature and society which no philosopher or politician could discern from the course of things and which alone unites nature and freedom in accordance with the inner principles of right in humankind (Cassirer 1981:407). In the same manner, political events, campaigns, grassroots movements and organisations reveal the contours of a possible ideal future, give hope and inspire efforts leading to its attainment. Prefiguration in this sense is a Kantian view of the innate moral disposition of human beings.

REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION
For Kant, the philosophical problem of politics is how to convert lawless conflict into a moral ideal of peace (Saner 1973:310 313). The struggle for the rule of law persists until the realisation of the ideal of the republican state ensuring the greatest possible freedom for all. The chaos that conflict between the freedom of the individual and all others produces can be avoided only with the imposition of a lawful framework regulating individuals in a universally binding manner. This ensures that the free actions of one individual 'can be reconciled with the freedom of the other in accordance with a universal law', individuals remaining free to pursue private ends within the constraint of external freedom as defined by the 'Universal Principle of Right': 'Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to coexist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right' (MM 1991:133).

This is an application of Kant's universal principle of morality to politics. In Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that political  philosophy  must  begin  from  the  a  priori awareness of the moral law as opposed to principles of (empirical) advantage, which would  issue  in  the rationalisation of unjust acts (PP 1991:93ff). The 'First Definitive Article'  restates  two  formulations  of  the Categorical Imperative to produce an a priori starting point. The 'objective' formulation, that human beings act in accordance with practical laws valid for all, is given political form in the principle that all members of society are equally subject to a 'common legislation' (PP 1991:99). The 'subjective' formulation, that human beings treat each other as ends and never as means, respecting everyone's capacity to legislate for themselves, takes political form in the principle of the 'freedom of all members of a society' (PP Reiss 1991:99). These principles lead to the idea of the moral agent as 'citizen of a transcendental world' (PP 1991:99), employing the moral law to establish a possible 'republican' constitution in the empirical world, structuring a 'civil society'. In this context, the realm of ends is a 'respublica noumenon' (CF 1991:187), appropriate to a 'race of angels' (PP 1991:112); civil society 'is a 'respublica phenomenon' which applies not to a moral idea of human beings but to a world of experience, to, in the worst possible case, a 'nation of devils' (PP 1991:112).

In so far as individuals live in two spheres (the intelligible and the natural), they are torn between freedom under the moral law and the ethical arbitrariness of natural inclinations. The problem with this is that the principle of society and its laws cannot be freedom, which can never be empirically realised, but coercion, its legality forcing individuals prudentially what they ought to do morally (PP 1991:112/3 117). Coercion is inherent in the constitutional framework of civil society, nature compelling individuals to enter into a social contract to satisfy their inclination and protect their persons (PP 1991:97n 98n 99n). This coercive legality is necessary since individuals are inclined to pursue individual advantage at the expense of the moral law. However, this necessity of coercion  to  subordinate  natural inclinations to legally instituted motives, voiding them (PP 1991:108/114 120/ln), diverges markedly from the ideal community promised by the realm of ends and the civil constitution. Freedom as the capacity to legislate for oneself remains a predicate of the individual as noumenon. 

There is a strain in Kant's political thought which is sceptical of democracy, restricting the right to vote to individuals who qualify as active citizens, self-employed males i.e. the individual who is 'his own master' through owning 'same sort of property .. that supports him' (Saw 1974:63/4; CJ 1951:79). The argument has radical implications which Kant did not pursue. In being dependent on another's will through not owning the instruments and products of labour, the labourer cannot have the right to participate (CJ 1951:79). If the labourer is to acquire the attribute of citizenship fitting to a rational being, it follows that the economic structure of society must be transformed so as to abolish social dependence. Kant, however, himself limits his comments to the possibility that the passive citizen may rise to become an active citizen through 'talent, industry and luck’ (Saw 1974:60). Further, Kant repudiates the directly democratic implications of the social contract in favour of a republican state in which popular sovereignty is exercised through representatives chosen in free elections (Saw 1974:64). Yet, as Marx's critique of abstract political representation shows, representatives of the people are not independent of particular interests and do not necessarily legislate in the universal interest, even though legislative activity proceeds within a constitutional framework that embodies the universal principle. Kant's republican ideal could not serve the universal interest without an actively democratic input, an active as well as a passive suffrage, a commission or a recall system uniting electors and deputies. What Marx's critique would show most of all is the impossibility of a public realm under capitalism. Capitalism privatises and depoliticises the public realm by making common affairs the province of the private realm (Levine 1984:133/4). The realisation of the political ideal of Kant's republican state and Hegel's ethical state requires the abolition of the state-civil society dualism so that the public sphere is invested with democratic and material content, ensuring that the universal interest legislated through the public sphere reflects the will of all.
The most that Kant will concede to this radical project is a formal or legal equality which 'is quite consistent with the greatest inequality' in social life. Kant accepts the corollary that whilst persons are 'equal subjects before the law', if 'the welfare of one person is greatly dependent on the will of another (the poor depending on the rich), one must obey .. when the other commands' (Saw 1974:59/60). Such dependence contradicts the principle of active citizenship and, hence, blocks the full realisation of the republican ideal. 

Marx was to demand the transformation of the mechanisms generating the socio-economic inequality which prevented civic independence, thus making political  participation available to all as active citizens. Kant's claims that the republican state guarantees the most extensive liberty for each and all, establishes the conditions of autonomy, and prepares the grounds for the moral community can only be made good with the abolition of capitalism (Van Der Linden 1985:201 202).

Kant's 'rational freedom' is a lawful freedom that restrains individual appetite and inclination in order to reach the higher good for all. In this conception, 'right is the restriction of each individual's freedom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else' and law is the general coercive rule which achieves this general union (TP 1991:73). Kant's thought compares and contrasts with Rousseau, particularly the principle of self-assumed obligation and the idea of law as an educative process that forces people to be free. Though what Kant calls 'lawful freedom' is based on the right of the individual 'to obey no law other than that to which he has given his consent' (MM 1991:139), this 'state of lawful dependence' created by the legislative will of its members does not imply democracy. Individuals must demonstrate a 'fitness to vote’ by being an independent and active member of the commonwealth (MM 1991:139). Since all 'are not equally qualified within this constitution to possess the right to vote', not all 'have a right to influence or organise the state itself as active members, or to co-operate in introducing particular laws' (MM 1991:140). In insisting that positive laws not be at variance with the natural laws of freedom, Kant does at least allow the equality of all 'to work their way up from their passive condition to an active one' (MM 1991:140). This would equip the individual to influence and organise the state as an active member. 

The notion of ‘fitness to vote’ is of a piece with Kant’s attempt to transcend natural inclinations for a higher good. Those who are unfitted are in a condition of material dependence and would tend to vote according to self-interest as given within the necessity of the empirical world. The votes of individuals pursuing their own interests and desires would reflect a passive condition of material dependency, not an active consideration of moral good in the commonwealth. The translation of the popular will into public policy would therefore reflect not a rational and moral will concerned with the common good of all but a congeries of individual inclinations, interests and desires.
Kant, however, argues for a superior authority 'to rule autocratically' so as to control individual passions and improve the ethical disposition of humanity (CF 1991:184 187). Kant refers to his ideal of a self-legislating sovereign people as a 'Platonic ideal', existing as an 'eternal norm but for which there is no object adequately existent in experience (CF 1991:187). He offers the 'republican constitution' as the only means by which the respublica noumenon could be applied, according to the laws of freedom through an example in experience (respublica phenomenon) (CF 1991:187). The 'republican constitution' represents Kant's attempt to combine the ideal of the self-legislating sovereign people with the existent sovereign ruler. 
For Kant, however, justice as universal can only be realised through a legal coercion exercised according to universal principle. Kant's political order is, therefore, a 'coercive order’ (Ladd 1965:xviii) in which legality is 'the decisive principle' (Reiss in Reiss ed 1991:21/22). 
Nevertheless, Kant's morality of duty, institutionalised as a 'lawful freedom', does not provide a solution to the problem of order. Rather, in conceding the phenomenal world of natural inclination to self-interest, Kant's ethics degenerate into a formalistic morality designed not to overcome self-interest but constrain it within the capitalist structures of private property and the minimal state.

Of all the 'rational' thinkers, Kant expresses most clearly the dualistic character of law as rational and law as positive (Norrie ed 1991:ch3; Wood 1990:70/1), of law as embodying the rational will of individuals and of law as controlling the egoistic will of individuals. Law involves both a concept of right and a concept of regulation, split between a possible freedom and an actual necessity. Hegel would come to attempt a synthesis by the rational elucidation of the universal within the particular. Law thus emerges in Hegel as a moment in the movement of the rational within the social (Norrie 1991:ch4).

As the application of principles of right to experience, Kant's principles of politics are normative. Indeed, he argues that politics should be normative. Right .. 'ought never to be adapted to politics, but politics ought always to be adapted to right' (Reiss ed 1991:21). Thus Kant affirms that there can be no conflict of politics, as a practical doctrine of right, with ethics, as a theoretical doctrine of right: 'all politics must bend the knee before right' (PP 1991:125).







The success of Kant’s project depends upon the extent to which culture and nature can be integrated through reason. Without this integration it is not possible to establish the basis of freedom in the empirical world, a world of bondage subjecting individuals to alien forms. In so far as the ideal is locked up in a normative realm abstracted from the real world, the real state will be unable to proceed beyond Kant's minimal assumption of intelligent devils, an assumption which corresponds to a market society based upon antagonism and egoism in human relations (Lukacs 1991:72 73). The empirical facts of class division and the autonomy-denying universal antagonism of the ‘war of all against all’ means that the coercion that Kant wrote of in the 'respublica phenomenon’ is necessarily the basis of legality, against which the reconciling power of reason is impotent (Marx OJQ EW 1975:221). Marx showed that Kant's vision of the harmonious community of noumenal beings - the 'respublica noumenon' - is a material and historical possibility only through the abolition of class and the alienating division of labour which generate coercion in human relationships. 

By placing all empirical phenomena outside the bounds of reason, Kant's framework is dualistic. As the product of pure reason, emancipating individuals from natural inclinations, Kant's freedom under law possesses an external character apart from individuals in their real lives. Kant separates moral society from the world of experience, treating individuals as rational beings as distinct from natural beings (Krieger 1972:101/2). This comes at a price. As Hegel argued, 'although practical reason postulates the identity of idea and reality, the latter remains strictly opposed and external to reason' (NL 1975:59/60 72).  Since the 'true' moral nature of human beings is identified by Kant with a self distinct  from  the  empirical  self, individuals have to value the rational aspect of identity whilst denying that the natural world of needs, wants, and desires could possess any rationality.  For Kant,  the individual is moral only in being able to abstract from the  contingent  influences  and  determinations  of  the natural and social world, coming to act according to a moral law established by pure practical reason in a noumenal realm. 'Empirical principles are always unfitted to serve as a ground for moral laws. The universality with which these laws should hold for all rational beings without exception - the unconditioned practical necessity which they thus impose - falls away if their basis is taken from the special constitution of human nature or from the accidental circumstances in which it is placed (GMM 1991:103). Kant delivers an impressive list of charges to prove that personal happiness is the 'most objectionable' principle, singling out the fact that it 'bases morality on sensuous motives' as the greatest vice (GMM 1991:103).

Kant praises Plato for demonstrating that ideas originate in reason rather than in the empirical world: 'nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done, or to impose upon them the limits by which the latter is circumscribed' (Pure 1965:313). The human being as a 'creature' can never attain such a level of moral disposition as holiness since 'he can never be wholly free from desires and inclinations which, because they rest on physical causes, do not of themselves agree with the moral law, which has an entirely different source' (Prac 1956:86).

In the Groundwork, Kant turned morality and Nature against each other. The categorical imperative is conceived as a stern command for the triumph of morality over the forces of natural inclination. There is nothing absolutely good other than the morally good will. (GMM 394). Human beings, as moral agents, are the maltreated stepchildren of a heartless Nature. The absolute value of morality thus received protection by being enclosed in the innermost sanctuary of rational beings. In the Groundwork, the natural world is at best coldly indifferent and at worst cruelly hostile to the supersensible moral ideals. Material forces are governed by mechanical laws and are therefore blind and indifferent to moral values. In constituting human nature, they produce natural inclinations that have the perpetual propensity to flout moral laws. The natural world thus works to prevent human beings realizing their transcendent aspirations. The fact that human beings have such aspirations makes the human species a misfit pitted against nature. Kant contemplated this troubled condition of humanity in the natural world in terms of the gap between the sensible and the supersensible worlds. This was the gap that also filled Kant with awe and wonder, the starry skies above and the moral law within.

Since the possibility of morality depends upon abstraction from the empirical world, the noumenal realm beyond the phenomenal world 'is certainly only an ideal'. Individuals enter this realm only to the extent to which they abstract from their social situation. The categorical imperative can enjoin that individuals act as though they are legislating members of a 'kingdom of ends' only 'if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends' (GMM 1991:95). 

It is difficult to understand how the moral legislation produced in this noumenal realm could apply in the phenomenal realm. Kant himself realises that by denying the situational character of the world of experience he reduces the force of his argument. A kingdom of ends could exist if the maxims which the categorical imperative prescribes for all rational beings were universally followed. The problem is that 'if a rational being were himself to follow such a maxim strictly, he cannot count on everybody else being faithful to it on this ground' (Kant GMM 1991:100). Because a realm of ends, in which every individual acts as a rational being, cannot be guaranteed, legal force must intervene. Kant's view imposes a dualism between the independence of the individual as a rational subject and the subordination of the individual as an empirical being to an external authority (Reiss in Reiss ed 1991:20; Norman 1983:96 98). Individuals must learn to identify happiness with the subordination of their lower nature to the necessity of the moral law in order to realise their higher nature. For the workings of the Categorical Imperative enables individuals to discover 'right' and 'wrong' independently of their inclinations, impulses and desires.


Kant's morality of self-denial, instituting the obedience of the 'lower', i.e. empirical, to the 'higher', i.e.  rational  self,  is  based  upon  the  categorical distinction  between  reason  and  nature. This division of the individual between the phenomenal natural world as a determined order of natural necessity and the noumenal world of moral freedom risks fragmenting human experience and subjecting the individual to a ceaseless struggle  between  the  command  of  duty  and  natural inclinations. The failure to bridge this gap  between  the  noumenal  and the phenomenal (Maclntyre 1967:197/8; Wolff 1973:ch2) results in the autonomy of law, morality and politics within liberal society (Murphy  1970; Arendt 1982). This has implications which turn against both reason and nature. As Weber's rationalisation thesis  shows,  the  distinction between reason and nature fits a capitalist modernity in which individuals have been made instrumental to purposes and processes which are external to them. The  'rational' project of substituting morality for coercion in human affairs thus ends in a lawful state administering a coercive civil society which inhibits the human ontology and subjects external nature to an instrumental rationality detached from ends.

The basis of Kant’s predicament is the separation of reason from nature and the ensuing primacy of reason over nature. On Kant's premises, certain aspects of the internal nature of human beings are in external relation to the moral law. It can, however, be overcome by human beings transcending their natural inclinations for their rational and moral will which is not only just as natural but, in line of descent from Plato, the better part of human nature. In the recent surge of interest in ‘the body’, Kant has been criticised for his heavy emphasis upon individuals freeing themselves from the sensuous human desires which are considered to be an integral part of human nature. (see Seidler). This misses Kant’s point that these ‘sensuous desires’ serve to shackle human beings to natural necessity within and without, chaining them to an empirical world of wants, impulses and inclinations. In Verdi’s Brindisi from La Traviata, all the guests sing of their love of ‘passionate hedonism’ with the line ‘all that is not pleasure is senseless’. The point is that the rational tradition to which Kant belongs affirms a greater freedom beyond the senses in terms of the fulfilment and flourishing of the whole nature of human being. His point is that freedom will only be achieved through the realisation of the human capacity for autonomy and independence as given by rational and moral will. The capacity of the market economy to manacle individuals to necessity in their empirical existence by manipulating their ‘sensuous desires’ is one of the most striking features of the modern world. It is this shackling of human beings by their own natural inclinations that Kant sought to overcome.

But if ‘sensuous desires’ are essential aspects of human nature, then a more promising strategy may be to acknowledge this fact and see them as socially and historically mediated, thus attempting to unite inclinations and moral reason. Hegel's success in conceiving the possibility of moralising human nature becomes in Marx a project of moralising the whole socio-relational fabric of society, resolving Kant's antithesis between inclinations and the moral law. We are back here to Aristotle’s reason educating desire.

Kant's Moralitat as an inner or private dimension, posed in and of itself, has to be contextualised in connection to the public world. Whereas Kant emphasised categorical duty over against human inclination, Hegel sought to bridge the gap between finite phenomenal and infinite noumenal realms so that duty was integral to the empirical lives of individuals (Dallmayr 1993:32 33).

Kant's thought, nevertheless, contains radical possibilities which serve to test Hegel's claim that Sittlichkeit embodies the 'ought' within the 'is'. Kant's motto of enlightenment - 'have the courage to use your own understanding!’ (WE 1991:54) - celebrates the departure of human beings from all forms of tutelage, affirming a conception of autonomy which delegitimizes all social and political institutions that are not the product of free will. Such a notion justifies liberation from all contexts or situations which are oppressive of human freedom (Yack 1986:89/133; cf Rose 1984; Lukacs 1971:108/9). This is not a repudiation of institutional mediation as such. On the contrary, Kant sought to realise freedom within the constraint of law, not against it as in Fichte's 'self-sufficiency and independence outside of everything' (Fichte 1982:15). It simply emphasises that Kant’s morality repudiates all dehumanising, alienating and oppressive conditions and institutions as the denial of the essential humanity, and dignity of human beings. In which case, Marx himself emerges as a Kantian in affirming the 'categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and contemptible being' (CHPR:I 1975:251). 

This begs the question of how reflective judgement mediates between the worlds of phenomena and noumena. The question involves the two-way transition, the upward transition from phenomena to noumena, which concerns the recognition of moral law; and the downward transition from noumena to phenomena, which concerns the realization of moral law. In answering the question of how aesthetic judgement makes these two transitions one has to recognise that Kant had two aesthetic theories, aesthetic formalism and aesthetic Platonism. In aesthetic formalism, reflective judgements are made by the subjective feeling that the free interplay of imagination and understanding provoke. Since this free interplay involves no supersensible world, there is no need for mediation. In Kant’s aesthetic Platonism, there is a need for mediation since the ultimate foundation of all aesthetic judgements is the Idea of Beauty, and this belongs to the noumenal world. The Idea of Beauty is transcendent and abstract and is not therefore readily applicable to the phenomenal world, leaving a gap between phenomena and noumena. Bridging this gap requires aesthetic Ideas constructed by imagination and understanding, thus articulating the transcendent Idea of Beauty in terms of sensible imagery. This is what artistic genius and its inspiration does. In Platonic terms, this is the descent of Ideas from Heaven to the natural world. In Kantian terms, immanent aesthetic Ideas perform the mediation between phenomena and noumena. With natural beauty as the expression of aesthetic Ideas, this mediatory transition is made by both human beings and nature.


 The two-way mediation in teleological judgements works thus. For Kant, natural purpose is a supersensible Idea that cannot be found in the blind mechanism of nature (C3 377). Human beings make the upward transition for recognizing the Idea and the downward transition for realizing the Idea in the natural world. But this mediation is made by both human beings and natural teleology. On the highest level, there may be only one Idea of natural purpose. For Plato, there is only one Idea of Life (Timaeus (39e). However, every species has its own Idea of natural purpose and is governed in accordance with it. On this level, the multiplicity of teleological Ideas corresponds to the multiplicity of aesthetic Ideas. The various particular Ideas of natural purpose are generated by the articulation and specification of the one transcendent Idea of Life. In naming the objects of natural beauty, Kant often refers to living beings such as flowers, birds, and crustaceans. This implies the conclusion that the power of life includes the power of beauty. Thus Nature conjoins the Ideas of Life and Beauty and brings them from the supersensible to the sensible world. This descent of Ideas is engineered by the technique of Nature. Nature working like an artist (C3 390). Nature’s two-way mediation between phenomena and noumema proceeds thus: Nature creates living beings in the phenomenal world by bringing down the supersensible Ideas, and one species amongst those living beings have the intelligence to apprehend the noumenal world. The moral and aesthetic life of human beings is a link in the creative cycle of natural teleology which Kant calls the Providence of Mother Nature in his Idea of a Universal History.

For Kant, Newton was the master of natural world and Rousseau was the master of the moral world. But neither could bridge the vast chasm between phenomena and noumena. Kant locates the solution for this, the key problem in his philosophy, in Nature. Nature is the original matrix for realizing the supersensible Ideas in the sensible world, even before the birth of humanity; the moral and political development of humanity is shaped under the auspices of Nature’s eternal providence. His acceptance of the mechanistic conception of nature had prevented Kant from grasping this cosmic truth. By acknowledging Nature as the living force, resolves his ultimate philosophical problem and bridges the chasm between noumena and phenomena. Kant’s solution savours a great deal of Plato's conception of the natural world in the Timaeus, where the Demiurge, the spirit of the natural world (the World-Soul), creates all things in accordance with the eternal Ideas.

Moral and political philosophy began with Socrates and the stand he took against the overweening claims to knowledge on the part of natural philosophers who studied nature with no regard to human beings. Plato continued thus spiritual quest, connecting the fight against the amoral forces of nature with the fight against the immoral forces of human beings. In the Gorgias, Callicles, the avowed champion of amoral naturalism and immoral humanism, is confronted by Socrates’ argument that that one could be virtuous even in a totally immoral world and that one's soul could never be harmed by the immoral acts of others. In the Phaedo and the Symposium Plato finds a safe haven for the virtuous soul in the intelligible world of Ideas. In this world, the soul was safe from the immorality of the phenomenal world. However, the safe haven of the intelligible world could never provide a living community for moral individuals. In the Republic, Plato set out the principles of the ideal state as a moral community which provides for the moral life of individuals. Recognising the difficulty of realising a just society in an amoral and irrational world, Plato laid out his conception of a rational and orderly universe in the Timaeus – which Plato presents as the cosmological foundation for his ideal state of the Republic and for the city of Magnesia proposed in the Laws.

Kant reaffirms the Platonic conception of the rational order of Nature in his Ideological conception of natural order. Kant is continuing Plato's quest for a suitable natural order for the realization of eternal ideals. In this quest, Kant revitalises the Platonic conception of Nature as the mother of all creation. If Kant’s conception of the noumena and the categorical imperative retained the Christian legacy, then this conception of Mother Nature taps into the old nature religions and looks forward to the attempts to locate the place of human beings within Nature. Certainly, the conception was a key figure in Goethe’s Faust, where Nature manifests her inexhaustible creative power as the Earth Spirit, the Eternal Mothers, and the Eternal Feminine. The idea inspired the supernatural naturalism of Romantic philosophers and poets. Along with the conception of immanent Ideas, this natural teleology is one of Kant's most enduring achievements and is likely to become even more relevant in the coming years as human beings deal with the task of making their peace with Nature.








14 HEGEL AND THE ETHICAL LIFE

This section examines Hegel’s conception of Sittlichkeit as an organised intermediation which affirms a communal, reciprocal and associative form of public life. With Sittlichkeit, Hegel discovered a form in which reason could be actualised in the empirical realm of politics in both its normal and cognitive aspects. Hegel thus furnished the institutional basis of the 'rational’ alternative to liberal individualist conceptions of freedom. 

The notion of the green polity as a civil public based on a federation of groups and a welter of intermediary associations is informed by Hegel’s political philosophy. Hegel formulates the state as the universal interest of all, the embodiment of right and the institutional expression of the connection between reason and freedom. The state is  'the power of reason actualising itself as will' (PR 1942:279). In the state, 'the rational  freedom of the will explicates itself’ (FA 1975:1:137). 

Hegel avoids the abstract individualism which afflicts rights-based liberal institutions by locating the individual within the 'objective ethical order' (PR para 144), the 'ethical substance' which relates particular individuals to each other (PR para 145). Ethical life incorporates the principle of subjectivity contained in liberal notions of individual freedom but is more concrete in situating the self within a living social order of related selves.

Hegel’s state serves to canalise the legitimate particular interests of individuals to the attainment of the universal good of all, overcoming self-interest in its immediacy for a greater good in the longer range. For Hegel, 'the essence of the modern state is that the universal be bound up with the complete freedom of its particular members and with private well-being' (PR 1942:280): 'its strength lies in the unity of its own universal end and aim with the particular interest of individuals' (PR 1942:161). Hegel therefore establishes the relation between the particular and the universal by connecting the individual and the state through a whole range of intermediary bodies. The unity between each and all is a mediated relationship which takes the individual beyond immediate self-interest to a greater, richer set of goods in common with other individuals. The ‘particular groups’ of the family and civil society are crucial institutions since membership of and participation in such groups allows the individual to enter into the universal realm of the state in an 'objective way' (PR paras 308R 158 166 182 207 209/229 242). Hegel exposes the isolated individual of liberalism as an empty abstraction apart from ethical life. The individual only acquires 'a content and a living actuality’ when 'filled with particularity', and only attains universality in becoming 'a member of a corporation, a society etc' (PR para 308). The Anglo-American liberal tradition continually misreads Hegel by reading any authority above the individual as an infringement on individual liberty. In this, the liberal tradition is constrained by its own state-civil society separation, with the state merely as a neutral instrument which leaves individuals to pursue freedom as they see fit. This principle of subjectivity is a limited freedom for Hegel. By connecting the state and civil society via intermediary associations, Hegel finds a way of connecting the particular and the general interest without denying the legitimate claims of either. Citizens 'know the state as their substance' in maintaining the 'title, authority and welfare' of 'their particular spheres of interest' (PR para 289R). The participation of the individual in affairs of common concern in civil society, as a member of corporations, associations etc., offers an ethical integration and practical education (Bildung) which goes beyond the 'selfish' interests of isolated individuals (PR para 253R). In such a way, the particular interests of individuals pass naturally into the universal life of the state (PR paras 197 201 256). Far from Hegel’s state possessing interests of its own which are asserted over against real individuals, the state is constituted by the particular interests of individuals acting in concert as a common body politic.
These social institutions are 'the pillars of public freedom since in them particular freedom is realised and rational'; they furnish the foundations of 'the citizens trust in .. and sentiment towards’ the state (PR 1942:281 163). The state therefore embodies and expresses the universal interest through an organised interaction between individual freedom and valid authority through collective bodies.

Hegel's state establishes an organic unity of the individual and collective so that no part and no member is an end or a means superior or subordinate to another part or member (WH 1975:112/95). As against normative constructions of the ideal society which haunt political philosophy and radical politics – in writing Utopia Thomas More wrote the last word first – Hegel's ethical  state is an actual institution. The view of this paper is that Hegel’s Sittlichkeit is the most cogent and intellectually structured theory of the political architectonics of individual freedom and a powerful resource for anyone who is serious about building political institutions that work in the real world. Hegel’s unity of the universal and the subjective will in the 'actually existing realised moral life' (PH 1956:38) and is the  highest  actualisation  of individual  freedom  (PR  para  257). 
Much of the attention in discussions of Hegel fall on the state, as though Hegel's state can be detached from the system of the ethical life, Sittlichkeit. Of critical importance are the intermediary associations which give individuals a form of public life and which invest the state with social content. 
In Hegel, patterns of social interaction between individuals obtain moral significance through a structured system of social roles and civil associations (Avineri 1972:84). In an atomistic society of market relations, individuals have only an egoistic identity and are confined within the sphere of self-interest. One can propose a moral good and make an appeal to altruism, but there is no good reason for these individuals to choose altruism over egoism. The social identity connecting the good of the individual with the good of all is simply not available. Hegel makes that social identity available in the way that individuals are socially integrated in an organised dynamic, expanding individual freedom by making the ethical life available to all (Hegel PS 1979:256/212; Wood 1990:25/30 200 201/2 219; Houlgate 1991:100/5 116/22). A genuine individuality offers a greater and richer range of human fulfilment beyond self-interest. This is achieved when the individual possesses a genuine social identity (PR paras 207 253) and fulfils a determinate social function (PR para 252R). And this individuality is possible only when it is socially structured within a functioning social order (PR para 253R).
Hegel’s Sittlichkeit raises individuals out of their private life of egoistic need by connecting them to politics via their functional purpose in the operation of the rational social order. The individual becomes an active part of society through his/her own industry, skill, a notion which suggests the possibility for an associative democratic public.
Hegel's recognition of the need for mediating institutions against atomistic conceptions of individual liberty offers an alternative to the undifferentiated and unmediated democracy of the modern representative state (Avineri in Miller ed 1991:199/200), Hegel proposes an organised intermediation as a genuine mode of participation as against the abstract and passive systems of representation offered by the liberal state (Kainz 1996:148). Hegel abolishes the split between the state and civil society, a split which is reproduced and reinforced by elections and proposes instead the mediation of corporate blocs.

The circles of association in civil society are already communities. To picture these communities as once more breaking up into a mere conglomeration of individuals as soon as they enter the field of politics, i.e. the field of the highest concrete universality, is eo ipso to hold civil and political life apart from one another and as it were to hang the latter in the air, because its basis could then only be the abstract individuality of caprice and opinion, and hence it would be grounded on chance, and not what is .. stable and justified.

PR paras 258 303

Hegel's state as 'an organism’ transcends the particularistic, self-seeking interests of individuals confined within the sphere of the private economy, what Hegel calls the system of needs (PR 1942:282). Through membership of and participation in the various intermediary bodies of civil society, the individual develops interests beyond the immediate level to finally proceed to the universal level. This entails a conception of representation that is actively and directly democratic. In contrast to the passive and indirect system of representation within the abstract (individualist liberal) state, Hegel proposes an organised pattern of interaction between individuals in society operating through a system of functional representation. Deputies are chosen not by an agglomeration 'dispersed into atomic units' as is the case with the passive suffrage of the liberal state but through an 'articulated system' comprising civil associations. The right to choose deputies is not 'a single, recurrent action for the electors' but is entrusted to 'local communities .. and other duly constituted associations'. Hegel thus replaces the passive electorate of the modern representative state with the active and organised citizen body. The close connection between the estates and the constitution of the whole means that a 'free attitude' on the part of both electors and deputies is only possible if the rights of individuals and particular local communities and interests are 'safeguarded by the free establishment of civic authorities and self-administering bodies' (NL para 153-PR para 308).
Hegel's critique of representative democracy is, therefore, a critique of the undifferentiated suffrage as feeding the divorce between private and public life, separating individuals from government, universal interest and the common good of all (Avineri 1972:162; Dallmayr 1993:152). To such isolated individuals, government as such is the problem. But rather than collapse into the world of immediacy and spontaneity, a world of pure egoism, true freedom as the freedom of each and all requires the reconstruction of public life so as to overcome the dualism of government and governed. The 'atomistic spirit' of the modern representative state’s undifferentiated suffrage divides politics between an active elite of professional politicians on the one hand and a passive mass concerned only with private interests in civil society on the other (NL para 121). In seeking reciprocity between rulers and ruled, Hegel firmly repudiated the idea that the representative body should represent individuals as individuals (PR 308R; Smith 1991:129). Hegel argued in favour of the estates and their legislative role. He condemns the 'prevalent idea' that members of society participate in this function 'as individuals, either by electing representatives or delegates or else by directly casting their vote' (Hegel in Dallmayr 1993:152) as an 'atomistic and abstract point of view' which disappears at the level of the family and civil society in which individuals are members of general groups. Since the state is also a general group, 'no one of its elements should appear as an unorganised multitude', as a 'formless mass' (PR 1942:198; Dallmayr 1993:152).

The rejection of the conception of the demos as an undifferentiated, amorphous and atomised mass of individuals makes it possible to envisage democracy as an active, organised mode of life exercised through a welter of intermediary powers (Dallmayr 1993:253; Meister 1990:120  177;  Kedourie  1995:142/3). What most concerned Hegel about representative democracy was the idea of an amorphous or atomized mass of individuals lacking connection to each other and lacking integration within a well-balanced constitutional structure. Hegel’s ethical relations or bonds of Sittlichkeit organised on various levels of society are sustained by a richly layered fabric of intermediary institutions, associations and offices with a variety of powers and competences relating particular and universal, centre and periphery, individuals and representatives. Crisscrossed by multiple identities, Hegel’s system of functional representation is a public regimen, an associative mode of life and experience for individuals that is irreducible, quite above the ‘anarchistic’ power struggles of particularist interests and impulses. Hegel therefore offers a way of revaluing public bonds and reversing the encroachment of private economic interests upon public life. 

What has been called the ‘corporatisation of public business’ (McDermott 1992), the private appropriation of collective concerns of health, education, utilities etc by big business, has been underway for more than a couple of decades. Against this, Hegel offers a genuine ‘corporatisation’, with corporations organised in the service of the public good within the state.

Benjamin Barber has coined the term "thin democracy" to describe the way that the contemporary state is subservient to individual rights and privileges and is held together only by a minimal set of abstractly formal rules. Against this, Barber proposes ‘strong democracy’, a way of strengthening democratic engagement through a broad range of local and regional institutions - neighborhood assemblies, social organisations, town meetings, civic unions, community trusts, cooperatives, and such like – whilst still guaranteeing the protection of individual rights. ‘My argument is that strong democracy is the only fully legitimate form of politics; as such, it constitutes the condition for the survival of all that is most dear to us in the Western liberal tradition." (Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), xvi. Regarding the decline and colonization of the public sphere cf. also Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man (New York: Random House, 1978); Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), and Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 332-373.)

Barber’s ‘strong democracy’ savours more than a little of Hegel’s political philosophy in seeking to locate the individual within a shared public life. Hegel’s point is that individual freedom is a public responsibility that requires more than egoistic interests and impulses and wants, that implies organised intermediation between civil society and the state.
One of the most important features of Hegel's mediated suffrage is the recognition of problems of scale and quantity in the modern world. Old notions of polis democracy, face-to-face meetings, are nowhere near adequate given the size of modern states and communities and organisations (Avineri  1972:105  107/8  161  162/3  164/8;  Dallmayr 1993:133). But, articulated through  the internal communities constituting the state, Hegel can still break down complexity into comprehensible and controllable units to envisage an active democratic mobilisation from below. In rejecting an organisation 'directed  from  above’ Hegel argues that: 'it is extremely important that the masses should be organised, because only then do they constitute a power or a force; otherwise they are merely an aggregate, a collection of scattered atoms. Legitimate power is to be found only when the particular spheres are organised' (PR para 290A).
The achievement of Hegel's differentiated suffrage is to have extended the rights of civil liberty in civil society which individuals exercise and assert against each other as competitors for scarce resources to citizen rights of public participation which individuals exercise in concert. In this manner, Hegel achieves a balance between direct and representative democracy. 

Hegel’s conception of the 'democratic corporation' comprises churches, municipal and regional governments, and other civil institutions which mediate between the citizen and the state (MacGregor 1998:132). Hegel's state does not impose an abstract universality from the outside but is internally related to civil society. Universality or communitas thus grows organically from within civil society itself (Avineri  1988:171). 

Hegel's  concern  to  integrate  the intermediate  institutions of civil  society  within a comprehensive  legal  framework embodying the universal offers the basis of an expansive public sphere which challenges the monopoly of public life within the abstract liberal state.
More than most modern political philosophers, Hegel appreciated the democratic nature of the medieval institutions that ushered in modern civilisation. 'Representation is so deeply interwoven with the essence of the feudal constitution . . . that we may call it the silliest of notions to suppose it an invention of the most recent times.' Hegel's corporation bears comparison with the feudal guild, an organization which expressed the democratic ethos of 'mutuality and solidarity'. and which embodied ‘common will and consent' - i.e. the notions of exchange and contract.  

Hegel's conception of the democratic corporation develops an associative conception of politics.

Politics is the art of associating . . . persons with a view to establish​ing, nourishing and preserving social life together. Hence they are called sumbiotike (cohabiters). The first proposition of politics, therefore, is consociatio; in this the cohabiters ... by an explicit or tacit pact, undertake mutual obligation to one another to communicate to each other those things that are useful and necessary for the maintenance and sharing of social life . . . These [cohabiters] are, therefore, mutual helpers who, joined and associated together by a contractual bond, shared those of their resources which are helpful for the commodious conduct of the life of the spirit and body; they are sharers, participants in a communion.

Hegel considers the guild structure of the late feudal era to be 'the high tide of civil life; enjoyment lay in what was communal and people did not amuse themselves for themselves but in the community'. In contemporary market society, the process of atomization has rendered the communal spirit of the feudal age redundant. 'Now this [communal] spirit is undermined, so that people are ashamed of their class, are unwilling to be seen as members of it, and take pride in themselves alone.'86 That said, given that human beings are, as Aristotle argued, social animals, the associative impulse and communal spirit will live on beyond the particular forms of time and place. Atomisation and individualism operate against the grain of human life. Every contemporary society can show a welter of co-operatives, trade unions, business groupings, learned societies, professional associations and not-for-profit organizations. 

Hegel's vision of the structured relationship between the state and the corporation implies an institutional arrangement in which corporate organizations mediate between the individual and the administrative bodies of government.

In Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought, Antony Black argues that Hegel's organic concept of the corporation sought 'to give guild values and aspirations a central place in political theory'. Hegel is rare among modern political philosophers to have 'acknowledged that solidarity and exchange - the poles around which the values of guild and civil society, respectively, rotate - are not antithetical but complement each other. Hegel’s achievement is to have proposed an institutional framework which could weave solidarity and exchange together in a thickly textured and complex structure. 
Black criticises the way that the work-group ethic has been replaced by 'the values of market exchange' in contemporary market society. 'The problem is that today all those groups which in real life bind people together in so many ways are regarded as optional, based on taste or convenience.' 

In the manner of Hegel, Black affirms the virtues of a community of labour. 

Working together or sharing a craft creates a specific type of relationship. It forges bonds of a unique kind, less intense and pervasive than those of personal love or friendship, but truly human bonds none the less. It is an end in itself. Its merits may be sung but not listed. This does not mean that the work group is an absolute, any more than the nation-state: it can go wrong. But as a category of social life, it has its own unique and irreplaceable place in human affairs. (Black, Guilds and Civil Society, pp.202, 237, 241.)

In the neo-liberal assault upon government intervention and regulation in the name of liberated the ‘free market’ from the ‘dead hand’ of the state, vast swathes of mutual solidarity, communal networks, solidaristic ties have been swept away. The intention is plain. To leave the individual as nothing more than an atom on the competitive market. Neo-liberals 'are committed to the view that political life, like economic life, is (or ought to be) a matter of individual freedom and initiative . . . Accordingly, a laissez-faire or free-market society is the key objective along with a "minimal state".' (David Held, Models of Democracy, 2nd edn. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1996), pp.253-4.) The talk of the ‘free market’ is, of course, nonsense. The main beneficiaries of this destruction of public life are the transnational corporations as they proceed to 'privatize' as much of public business as they can - health, transportation, communications, and education. Genuine public space is diminishing and the whole notion of public interest is being reconfigured into a private spatial dimension where individuals are conceived simply as mobile, circulating consumers. (Joe Hermer, 'Keeping Oshawa beautiful: policing the loiterer in public nuisance by-law 72-94', in Canadian Journal of Law and Society, vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring 1997), p.192.) The situation is not dissimilar to the destruction of feudal society with the rise of industrialism, protested by conservatives like Carlyle and socialists like Marx. All of which makes Hegel's diagnoses and prognoses concerning the individualistic economic model curiously timely (MacGregor 1998 ch 6). 

The atomistic principle - that each individual fends merely for himself and does not bother about a communal [end], the principle of leaving it to each and every one whether one wishes to join a certain class, not examining a person's suitability from a political point of view since after all (as we are told by those who favor this principle) someone whose work fails to find any favor will shift to another line of business - such a principle abandons the individual to contingency.
Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science, §121, p.218.

For Hegel, community and the common good, as constituted by social classes, estates and corporations, offers a richer freedom, more expansive of human capacities, than that yielded by individual self-interest. In joining a particular group and participating as a member, the individual recognises a communal purpose and spirit greater than the self. (MacGregor 1998 ch 6). 

Houlgate echoes Hegel in arguing 'that an economy based entirely on self-interested pursuit of profit will end up preventing large numbers of people from enjoying such freedom and welfare'.

The social nature of human beings, the need for the society of others as a moral and psychological imperative, will ultimately cause a human revolution against the isolating principle of individualism. The ugly inhumanism of the neo-liberal assault on all that connects human beings together is certain to generate a reaction. But to be more than a ‘rabble’, the people need structure and organisation. That is precisely what Hegel’s democratic corporation rooted in the associational space of civil society offers. 

Allen W. Wood writes that ‘Hegel's conception of the corporation in civil society can be seen as quite radical. Perhaps it is even Utopian, unworkable in the context of a market economy. No doubt in actual market economies some of the functions Hegel assigns to corporations do sometimes get fulfilled for some people - by professional associations, corporate firms, or labor unions. But no institution fulfills them in the combined and systematic way a Hegelian corporation is supposed to. (Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought, p.242).

The advantage of Hegel’s corporation is that it forms the basis of a working, functional polity. In an age when radical politics lacks constructive models of the alternative society, Hegel is as good a place to start as anywhere.
 Hegel envisages a work environment in which an esprit de corps develops. Sharing 'the same vocation, [the same] concerns and interests', members develop a communal point of view. Hegel describes the corporation as a 'second family' which provides stable resources and employment for its members. Workers are protected against poverty and the instability of work relations. Membership of the corporation brings social recognition and respect, diminishing the need for individuals to make a public display of wealth: 'wealth in fulfilling the duty it owes to association, loses the ability to provoke arrogance in its possessor and envy in others; rectitude also receives the true recognition and honour which are due it'. (Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §252, p.271.)

Presenting Hegel as 'the representative theorist of civil society' (Arato  1991:301), Arato  argues  that  Hegel offers a conception of the public sphere which transcends its classical republican origins. Hegel’s public sphere is not confined to a single level but is multilayered: 'a series of levels have key roles to play, including the public rights of private persons, the publicity of legal processes, the public life of the corporation, and finally the interaction between public opinion  and  the  public deliberation  of  the  legislature'  (Arato  1991:318). The way that Hegel locates public life in the associational space of civil society is broad conception capable of embracing social movements in an 'open ended public  space'  forged  by  a  'democratic  social  bond' (Dallmayr 1991).


15 POLITICAL AND ETHICAL THEORY

Such an ethics is inevitably involved in politics. In a definite sense, all political action involves a vision of the good society. When aiming at preservation, political action maintains the present order to be the best and aims to prevent a change to the worse. When aiming at change, political action is intended to bring about a future order better than the present. Notions of better or worse imply some standard by which to evaluate courses of action and results and that standard is ‘the good’. 

The awareness of the good which guides all our actions has the character of opinion: it is no longer questioned but, on reflection, it proves to be questionable. The very fact that we can question it directs us towards such a thought of the good as is no longer questionable—towards a thought which is no longer opinion but knowledge. All political action has then in itself a directedness towards knowledge of the good: of the good. life, or of the good society. For the good society is the complete political good.

Leo Strauss What is Political Philosophy)

Ethics as outlined above with respect to Aristotle and Spinoza is the royal road to happiness through truth and knowledge. Reason is the highest and the best part of human nature and ethics entails a good life guided by reason. In the strict sense that the best life is necessarily the happiest life, the intrinsic satisfactions of the free mind are the most lasting and secure. Happiness is achieved when human beings realise their highest and best part, and it is the good life alone that which provides the context (John Jacques Plato’s Republic). 

Green politics fosters personal development by publicising the real impact that local and community action can make, showing the extent to which individual efforts can have transformative social and political consequences. People like to see tangible results and are motivated to make further efforts and commit more time and resources when a real result is visible. Nothing succeeds like success and here activity feeds itself. Green political praxis can embody a real sense of conatus in Spinoza’s sense, expressing ‘joy’, unfolding people's creative essence and giving it permanent form in the work of transforming society. Respecting unity-in-diversity and interactive cooperation within an integrated whole, the ecological movement fully values and validates the contributions of all individuals in all fields of endeavour and in all forms of expression.

All over the world, the basis for a new earth-centred culture is being created by the practical efforts of a variety of groups. Artists and poets are turning back to the earth as a source of inspiration. Scientists like Rupert Sheldrake and philosophers like Arne Naess have brought a renewed reverence for the natural world into their work. Through a variety of practical efforts, human beings are engendering new forms of personal and community rituals to express their bond to the earth, viewed once again as Gaia, the nurturing goddess of all life. The term Gaia has entered the public consciousness through the work of scientist James Lovelock, indicating the extent to which even the natural sciences are regaining a renewed sense of the ancient view of the earth as a living organism, generating new insights into the origins of life, the regulation of the atmosphere, and the role of cooperation and consciousness in biological evolution.

The most remarkable thing is the stark contrast between this broadening and opening of outlook and vision in the scientific world and the narrowing of horizons in politics. The globalisation of economic relations has been used to buttress a political agenda of liberalisation which has involved the rolling back of any number of governmental and institutional regulations and controls upon business and finance. In terms of the levels of cognition outlined earlier, the politics of the neo-liberal reaction has focused firmly upon the selfish and the stupid, using the command over public policy to deliberately cultivate changes in people's attitudes towards the private, the individualistic and the materialistic. Although coated in words like ‘aspirational’, this represents a stifling narrowing of aspirations down to the most obvious and the most immediate satisfaction of desires and impulses in relation to material objects. Neo-liberal politics has served to raise to the surface, indeed elevate to the level of highest principle and purpose, the lowest and basest aspects of the human psyche – desire, impulse, fear, hatred, acquisitiveness, aggression. In other words, all those passive emotions attached to particulars that Spinoza identified with inadequate ideas which inhibit knowledge and freedom. Within a deliberately engineered ecology of fear and insecurity, many people withdrew from public life and society to protect whatever resources they could claim for themselves as individuals.

16 HABERMAS – SYSTEM WORLD AND LIFEWORLD

The basis of a viable, functioning social order is the lifeworld. 'Lifeworld' (Lebenswelt) is the key methodological term defining the substratum in which social and economic structures interpenetrate with human action and consciousness. The lifeworld is the 'background consensus of everyday life', the store of knowledge that is passed from one generation to the next. The lifeworld is the context-forming horizon for the interaction between social action through culture, ethics and consciousness on the one hand and social structures on the other (Pusey 1993:59). For Jurgen Habermas, the lifeworld 'stands behind the back of each participant in communication' and is 'so unproblematic that we are simply incapable of making ourselves conscious of this or that part of it at will' (Habermas 1981:4/31).

Habermas draws a distinction between 'socially integrated action contexts' and ‘system integrated contexts’. 'Socially integrated action contexts' refer to self-organising public spheres in the lifeworld in which actions are coordinated through an intersubjective consensus about norms, values and ends. In 'system integrated contexts' actions are coordinated through the functional interlacing of the steering 'media' of money and power (TCA 2 1989:189/92 202 338/40; Giddens 1987:232/3).

Habermas seeks to maintain this distinction and identifies the problems of the modern world with the tendency of the system world to encroach on the lifeworld. Habermas’ concern is to confine instrumental rationality to its proper sphere in the system world. Rather than build an integral public world through absorbing steering media of money and administrative power into the lifeworld, Habermas seeks to balance discursive and non-discursive modes of coordination. Habermas argues for the necessity of a system world in which the steering media of money and administrative power coordinate human action on non-discursive grounds. For Habermas, a substantively rational society is achieved by strengthening the lifeworld so that the communicative interaction of free and equal individuals may generate a rational consensus (TCA 1 1991:69f 339; 2 1989:126/7 187 352/3). These structures are grounded in the lifeworld, 'as part of a cooperative process of interpretation aiming at situation definitions that are intersubjectively recognised' (TCA 1 1991:69/70).






Certain liberal theorists have perceived the inadequacies of the individualist conception of freedom by and have sought to make explicit  'the  full theory of the good latent within liberal  practice’  (Galston 1982:627). The liberal communitarian position develops  a  richer,  more  historically and  socially sensitive form of liberalism than that which is based upon individual liberty ‘free’ from constitutive ties. The conditions of individual liberty require more than the protection of the individual against the interference of others. Further, liberty amounts to much more than the individual being free to pursue the good as s/he sees  fit. Rather liberty as autonomy involves  a  certain  quality  of  life  for  a  whole community. Rights, therefore, cease to be legal entitlements that the individual holds against others and instead beome 'fundamental components in the way of life of a community' committed to certain  forms  of  human  flourishing  for  all  (Finnis 1980:222). This implies a conception of the good life.





For Finnis, the primary bond of society is a 'shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that community' (Finnis 1980:220). The character of these goods is not open to historical contingency but are defined according to a set of characteristics which distinguish the human species. In this conception, ends are not open but are determined in relation to the nature of being. Essential human potentialities and their realisation point in the direction of a certain mode of life. This universal human nature gives the world a certain moral order so that the plurality of goods pursued by individuals may be compatible. Communitarians therefore affirm a conception of the good which establishes the unity of the freedom of each individual with all individuals. Thus Raz's argument is predicated on:





The point is that the core liberal value of individual autonomy cannot be realised with a liberal framework but only within a communal context. Autonomy presupposes constitutive ties with others in a social context. This requires that universality is invested not in a false institutional community, the state, raised above the real lives and relations of individuals but in a public life as a normative democratic community based on a genuine plurality of identities. Given that the modern process of differentiation results in individuals adopting different, even contradictory modes of reasoning in different contexts, the identities and loyalties of individuals are multiplied through membership of different groups. In the context of the public-private divide, such a situation means that no overarching ethical code can integrate human life, in all its diversity, into one scheme of values. 
Raz acknowledges that autonomy presupposes a competitive pluralism which issues in a number of difficult, conflicting, choices: "whatever a person does he would irreparably damage one of the projects or relationships which he pursued or which shape his life' (Raz 1986:366). For Raz, the morally good person tolerates the existence of such a dilemma in society as crucial to autonomy. 

Raz’s attempt to conceive a pluralistic conception of autonomy within the good involves a distinction between 'personal well-being’ and 'self-interest'. Raz identifies moral goals attaining 'worthwhile' options integral to human well-being as generally compatible, in a way that merely self-interested goals are not. The 'self-interest' of natural inclination can be subordinated to a more 'worthwhile' goal leading to happiness. Raz identifies self-interest with insatiable and non-diminishing biological requirements. In contrast, personal well being is satiable and diminishing in being oriented towards the achievement of goals independent of biological requirements. This orientation is capable of achieving happiness (Raz 1986:ch 9 295/9). 

The conception of ‘rational freedom’ affirms the greater freedom available to individuals as a result of identifying their individual goals with a broader moral and social framework. An individualist freedom is abstract and subjective, cut off from the more expansive range of possibilities available to a genuine community of individuals practising a reciprocal freedom. The notion of a 'higher' good does not devalue the broad range of material activities integral to human self-realisation but recognises ascending levels of human possibility contained in the nature of being, from the basic level of instinct, desire, impulse and inclination up to knowledge, reason and wisdom at the highest level of excellence or virtue. What Maslow called self-actualisation can be connected to the Aristotelian notion of flourishing. By filling the empirical world with moral content through the realisation of the creative human essence, the split between egoism and altruism is overcome, reconciling rational good and natural inclinations, personal well-being and self-interest, thus avoiding an overly moralistic assertion of 'higher', more 'worthwhile', notions  over against 'lower' inclinations and impulses. The concern is with the realisation of the human ontology not to continue fighting the war within the divided self.

Raz, in rejecting neutralist and individualist liberalism, certainly has an important part of the truth. Autonomy is not a subjective creation but requires a community within which it may flourish in relation to others. The activities individuals pursue in defining themselves as individuals are shaped by interrelationships with others within a particular social context. Community supplies the social forms making the conditions for autonomy and its exercise - inseparable from each other - possible.

From the perspective of individualist liberalism, such a view inhibits the choice which is a key characteristic of individual freedom. Raz concludes that 'for those who live in an autonomy-supporting environment there is no choice but to be autonomous: there is no other way to prosper in such a society' (Raz 1986:391). In other words, a society of individual choice produces not freedom but a mutual cancellation in which the freedom of each cancels the freedom of others, so a greater social coordination creates the conditions that enhance freedom, even if there is less actual choosing on the part of individuals. Combining public and private identity to make the good society possible, the community of ends is realised by putting human relationships on a 'rational' as against an instrumental basis.

As Raz puts the point, once social forms 'enshrine sound moral conceptions'





Reciprocity is built into social relationships so that, in acting in pursuit of a private good, the individual also achieves the public good directly rather than coincidentally. Finnis sums up the communitarian position by arguing that the primary bond of society is a 'shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that community' (1980:154).

Michael Walzer attempts to delineate a nonabsolutist approach to morality through the character and purpose of society: 'Human society is a distributive community ... We come together to share, divide and exchange’. It follows that distributive justice is the moral problem that human societies must face (Walzer 1983:3). On this premise, Walzer defines his central thesis concerning the pluralistic nature of principles of justice - different social goods are to be distributed according to different principles and by different procedures (1983:6). Whether distributions are to be considered just or unjust is determined relative to the socially created meanings of the goods at stake (1983:9). Societies are characterised by different spheres of justice which must be kept separate from one another: 'Good fences make just societies' (1983:319).

Crucial to Walzer's argument is the notion of justice as 'rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts that constitute a shared way of life’ (1983:314). [11] Walzer's view corresponds with that of Finnis concerning the shared understanding of individual and communal good. Walzer defines philosophy in terms of the attempt 'to interpret to one's fellow citizens the world of meanings we share', arguing that the meaning we share to be an egalitarian society. Such a notion is implicit in our concepts and categories (Walzer 1983:xiv 320). The aim of this political egalitarianism is to achieve 'a society free from domination' (1983:xiii). Thus Walzer advocates a 'complex equality' that renders domination impossible; spheres are autonomous, with no one sphere dominant (1983:19/20).

Walzer's attempt to reconcile individualism and communitarianism within a conception of a common but pluralistic culture argues that the plural spheres of society can be united by common meanings even though, as he points out, conditions of domination render the sharing of a common life impossible (1983:250n). In dealing with this problem, Walzer betrays the ethical liberal tendency to resort to the state in order to impose its impossible moralised community upon recalcitrant individuals (Bellamy 1992:35 39 46/7 155/6): 'the political community is probably the closest we can come to a world of common meanings' (Walzer 1983:28). This appeal to the political community reveals Walzer's inability to proceed beyond the dualism of liberal modernity, identifying the abstract public as the realm of equality. Walzer's plural spheres ultimately derive from liberalism's abstract political community under the state. His scheme fits the contours of the 'rational' dualisms - public-private and reason-nature - which constitute the political and social lives of individuals in the modern world.

18 GREEN POLITICAL THEORY







Many green thinkers have recognised the potential conflict between green values and green politics and have sought to modify their position. Stillman acknowledges the implications for the notions of consent:





Boris Frankel claims that Rudolf Bahro’s vision of an ecological society is 'anti-democratic' since politics as conflict disappears in a sea of 'givens' (Frankel 1987: 230). The problem is the old one addressed by Plato of whether and how philosophy can rule. Is ecology a science or a politics? How to reconcile the world of knowledge and the world of opinion? If the science clearly points to certain policies and practices as ecologically sound or ecologically unsound, how does this not become an imperative or a ‘given’ regardless of popular opinion?

Science and ethics will point to certain things as being desirable in an ultimate sense –  the very principles that makes one a green, or a socialist etc. - but attachment to democracy implies equal weight be given to alternative platforms, a plurality of values, divergent opinion (Frankel 1987: 158). The dilemma can be posed from the other direction. If popular opinion to a large extent contradicts or rejects green principles based on science and ethics, to what extent does green politics abandon the principles for reasons of electoral appeal and government by consent of the governed?

The solution will lie in the final realisation of Plato’s Philosopher Ruler. Ophuls is right to call for a ‘completely new political philosophy and set of institutions' (Ophuls 1977a: 3). This ‘new’ politics will resolve the conflict between knowledge and opinion by making political society a learning process in which the individuals composing the demos can ascend the levels of cognition to reach higher, richer, more expansive possibilities. This is to change the conception of democracy to mean something not merely more direct but more active and more functional with respect to people’s contribution to public life.

Ophuls defines the predicament: 'Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? . . . how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives' (Ophuls 1977a: 7-8).

To recognise ‘ecological imperatives’ as the basis of a green politics is to oppose knowledge (nous) to opinion (doxa) and is to this extent anti-democratic in the way that democracy is conceived to function today. But is it democracy? Or is it mass manipulation and manipulation of passive individuals at the level of individual desires, wants, impulses (often manufactured from the outside).

Failure to develop a new political philosophy and a new institutional framework keeps resting on an internal fracture between an authoritarian vision based on fundamental green values and a democratic vision which, within an unchanged parliamentary and electoral politics, which is based on people’s own opinions. Without a transformation of political institutions, green politics is extremely vulnerable, either to diluting its principles to widen electoral appeal, to accommodation and absorption within the existing system, or even supplying the rationale to justify authoritarian government when the impact of ecological crisis starts to be felt.

The solution is ecological praxis, the idea that the practical transformation leading to the ecological society is also at the same time a political transformation in which the individuals composing the demos come to be capable of participating within communitarian direct democracy. As a goal abstracted from the constitutive praxis that brings it about, communitarian direct democracy is utopian, cannot be achieved and will lack electoral appeal. The same applies to all other ecological values. To accept the horizons of the existing political system is to limit aims to incremental tinkering within the system, green politics as administering ecological crisis and disaster.

Ophuls is accused of ‘authoritarian tendencies’ by Dobson and Lucardie for suggesting that with a return to scarcity we must 'question whether democracy as we know it can survive' (Ophuls 1974). Note that Ophuls is questioning rather than repudiating, and note also that he refers to ‘democracy as we know it’ and not democracy as such. Given the extent to which western ‘liberal democracy’ has effectively removed substantive political questions from serious debate, has systematically favoured money and influence, not just through lobbying but simply through the dependence of politics on the process of private accumulation (a point which the pluralists like Dahl and Lindblom came to recognise) and serious argument has been replaced by brand names and soundbites, what perhaps is most in need of explanation is why ‘democracy’ as currently practised has been fetishised to such an extent as to be identified with the particular institutions of a particular time and place – institutions which on many other definitions count as extremely anti-democratic in themselves.
Ophuls is to be credited for addressing the knowledge-opinion divide, reaching back to Plato as the basis of western political philosophy:





What Ophuls calls a return to 'competence', Dahl presents as 'guardianship' (Dahl 1989). A reprise of Popper’s The Open Society on the totalitarian implications of dividing society between the wise few and the ignorant mass is not required. That may be one possible outcome but it is not the serious point. The idea that the more human beings are guided by reason, the more they are free originates with Plato but pervades the western tradition – Stoics, Aquinas, Spinoza, Descartes, Leibniz, Russell et al. The serious question concerns how reason is to rule so that human beings are actually free. Plato, it is often overlooked, was not writing a blueprint in The Republic but establishing the central principles of the best polity. The question of who guards the guardians is one that Plato would accept. The ultimate guardian is an active, informed citizenship capable of participating in public life. Nothing in Plato denied the rational faculty on the part of each and all as a condition of their humanity and that is the key to turning the Philosopher Ruler into the notion that philosophy should rule through homo sapiens as rational man.

One can simply rule the question out, dismiss Ophuls as the ‘clearest credible example of the authoritarian tendency in green political theory’ (Dobson and Lucardie). But only at the price of reducing values and principles to just one more brand in the political marketplace, with the electorate subject to the institutional-systemic constraints of market relations having no good reason to choose one brand over another. Socialism wasted away in parliament waiting for the proletarian transformation of politics that never came. Greens may do the same, ecological disaster as a self-administered doom.

 The alternative is to take seriously the ‘new’ in the ‘new politics’ promised by the Greens’. 

Where green thinkers have outlined the contours of green democracy, they have invoked visions of direct democracy in small communities based on face-to-face relations and characterized by labour-intensive production, self-reliance if not self-sufficiency, and a minimum of trade and travel. Decision-making is by face-to-face assemblies along the lines of the Athenian assembly or New England township democracy. The emphasis is upon extensive public spaces for citizen interaction and discourse, decentralized units breaking down the distinction between government and governed and affirming the need for passive voters to become citizens through participation and involvement, exercising power rather than delegating it, ceasing to be individual agents by engaging in collective action.

 The German Greens began by making direct democracy the foundation of their political structure. They discovered the difficulty of conducting politics according to the principles of a future polity within the context of an existing political framework that denies them (Spretnak and Capra 1985: 38-9). To be politically successful within this representative framework of electoral politics requires policies and practices which actually negate the end of the green polity. Greens win more votes and seats at the expense of green principles. ‘On account of life, to lose the reasons for living’ (Terence).

Much of what greens and ecologists write about politics are variants of direct democracy in decentralized communities.  Sale writes of the 'bioregional' organization of communities, Bookchin of confederal municipalism. The specific forms matter little without the popular support, activity and consent to make them work.

The biggest question is not whether the green vision of direct democracy is possible – it is, if the individuals composing the demos want to live as active citizens in conscious control of their practical existence in relation to others – but is it desirable. If it isn’t desirable, it will never be desired in sufficient numbers to make it possible.
As an ideal, green direct democracy can be presented in a desirable form: small scale decentralized communities, face-to-face assemblies and proximate forms of participation and accountability, rotation of representatives and an equal valuing of contributions from all members of the community. All within strong constitutive ties that connect each with all others.

Is it desirable? Not everyone, probably not most people, would like face-to-face participation and deliberation. How about the danger of the political becoming personal and divisions coming to poison everyday relations in a close knit community? Power, charisma, influence may even be more iniquitously used when relations between individuals are direct rather than subject to some form of institutional check and restraint. Breaking down divisions between government and governed turns politics into administration and leads to problems of encroachment and incompetence. In fine, this isn’t politics; it is the end of politics. It assumes away the basic nature and challenge of politics and courts disaster on a gamble (Frankel gives a number of other deficiencies 1987: 175-6). 

Lacking an institutional structure that is formalised and public, the vision of direct democracy invites the emergence of informal leaders who are able to impose their will on others. And these are problems within communities. The problems of relations between communities are even more serious, with all manners of inequalities and conflicts opening up. With trade and travel minimised this may seem not to be a problem, but that withdrawal from the world, opting for an inner regarding parochialism, is itself an undesirable feature that runs against the grain of globalisation, with all its potentialities for broadening and deepening connections between people and realising the ultimate in extended sociality. It all depends on where the balance between inner and outer regarding relations lies: ‘the more self-sufficient and numerically limited a community is, the smaller the range of activities and choices it can offer to its members. If it has no opening to an area of exogenous activity, knowledge and production, the community becomes a prison’ (Dobson 1990: 124)

In sum, green visions of communitarian direct democracy are to be evaluated according to whether they enhance existing potentials for an extended human sociality, locating the local within the global and vice versa. It is difficult to see how informal, small scale, face-to-face, self-reliant communities fit this expansive conception and even more difficult to see how it would appeal to any but those seeking to opt out of civilisation building. John Lennon’s Imagine is frequently quoted: ‘you may say I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one; I hope some day you will join me, and the world will live as one’. Well, the world is well on the way to living as one. With the globalisation of economic relations and digital connections, the world is technically more integrated than it has ever been. The challenge is to catch up at the level of morals and politics so that the world and the people in it really do live as one. 

The principles of a green political theory that sets political institutions and practices along a continuum from the local to the global is possible. This sets direct and participatory notions of democracy within functioning political institutions so as to (a) enhance citizen interaction and discourse within extensive public spaces, (b) be feasible in the sense of proposing an institutional framework capable of translating principles into policies that are practicable and programmatic in the here and now, and (c) works for and achieves the consent of the governed through nurturing green values in the praxis of the citizen body. 

There are five key areas to this ‘politically feasible ecologism’: the possibility of digital community and participation; the vision of eco-cities as an urban public realm based on sustainable living; the pragmatic combination of direct and representative forms of democracy; the acceptance of confederal institutions which are based upon power being invested at its most appropriate level, stretching from local to supranational institutions; finally, philosophy as praxis.
The idea that the revolution in information and communication technology contains the potential for new forms of direct political participation is not new. ICT has possibilities for interactive forms of voting, consultation, conferencing, and so on, removing the mediation between power and the people. ‘Public opinion will become the law of the land’ (Arterton 1987: 18). There are problems of access, agenda-setting and citizen apathy (Arterton 1987). 

New interactive technologies contain the potential to improve communications in politics, strengthening both vertical communications between rulers and ruled from the 'bottom-up’ and 'horizontal' communications between citizens, overcoming individual isolation to bring people closer together (von Alemann and Tonnesmann 1990). Technology can be used to encourage and enhance the impact and quality of citizen participation (Arterton 1987). Barber’s ‘strong democracy’ seeks to revitalize local participation and local political power through new technologies. Proposing the creation of 'neighbourhood assemblies' as an integral part of an ambitious programme of reform, Barber advocates 'a national civic communications cooperative to regulate and oversee the civic use of new communications technology and to supervise debate and discussion of referendum issues' (Barber 1984: 307).

Many Greens’ have been, at least, sceptical of technology. As Bramwell writes: 'Technophiles and technophobes have always warred within ecologism' (Bramwell 1989: 7). One can accept Bookchin’s point that: 'we could expect that . . . members of the communities would be disposed to deal with one another in face-to-face relationships rather than by electronic means' (Bookchin 1982: 345). But this applies only where face-to-face relations are possible for spatial reasons. Wider connections using technologies are possible and are being utilised by millions of people. A modest claim is that some new communications technologies could help to stimulate and enhance the direct forms of democracy which are part of the green vision. Face-to-face proximity can be supplemented by 'virtual proximity", teleconferencing, for instance.

The second component of green democracy is the urban public realm, eco-cities as a form of urban governance and sustainable living. The rural vision of local villages and communes is increasingly outdated in an increasingly urbanised world. The connection between cities, citizenship and civilisation have long been known. We can have garden cities, green cities but there will never be a world without cities. Green writing demonstrates a pronounced antipathy, even hostility, to cities. For Sale: 'The contemporary high rise city ... is an ecological parasite as it extracts its lifeblood from elsewhere and an ecological pathogen as it sends back its wastes' (Sale 1985: 65). But the contemporary city of this character is what Lewis Mumford called the ‘anti-city’. The way forward is to stress the cultural, political and ecological advantages of urbanism as a way of living. These are many, particularly high-density urban living: city homes which are in close proximity use less energy; a greater use of energy-efficient public transport; reduced travel distances; pedestrian pockets and cycling routes can replace cars; recycling, re-use and repair cost less; problems of acid rain and greenhouse gases are not caused by cities and will not be solved by a return to the country; hazardous waste treatment facilities with greater coverage can be used; greater diversity of activities and increased contact between more people. Further, the opportunities of ICT mechanisms boosting direct democracy increase with urban concentration. 
The third component of a new green political theory refuses to oppose direct and representative forms as mutually exclusive but instead seeks to combine both on a continuum in which each complements the other in a greater range of possibilities (Weale 1983; Bobbio 1987). Poulantzas's approach is valuable, seeking to transform the state so that 'the extension and deepening of political freedoms and the institutions of representative democracy' comes to be 'combined with the unfurling of forms of direct democracy and the mushrooming of self-management bodies' (Poulantzas 1978:256). The 'democratic road to socialism' is a 'long process' involving the creation of 'diffuse centres of resistance which  the  masses  always  possess  within  the  state networks', establishing 'real centres of power on the strategic terrain of the state'  (Poulantzas 1978:258). This idea suggests an urban public sphere grounded in the associational space of 'pluralist  civil  society'  (Jean  Cohen 1983:184; Laclau and Mouffe 1985:140; Mouffe 1988:32/4). Granted, there is a need to distinguish clearly between the less than pluralist contemporary civil society, structured around asymmetrical relations of power, and the ideal of democratic civil society (Marx CHDS 1975:191; Schecter 1994:20 184; Parekh 1982:32;  Lane 1995:144).
It follows that direct democracy is not an alternative to but a complement to representative institutions. The format of public enquiry and consultation along with interactive technologies can enhance participation of groups and individuals and make decision-making procedures more accessible (Arterton 1987: 97ff). 
This links to a fourth plank of green political theory, confederal political structures connecting the local and the global. The slogan ‘act locally, think globally’ also applies in reverse. Sometimes global actors need to think of the local impact of global imperatives. Sometimes, the issues are of such scale that local campaigners need to support global action. In a world in which employment, investment and production along with ICTs, networks etc are vast international processes, coordinated global action is inevitable and desirable. This inevitability of a supranational institutional framework implies the inevitability of supracommunal structures. Here is where Schumacher’s ‘small is beautiful’ can mislead. The issue is not one of size but of scale. Small isn’t beautiful when it renders power incompetent and ineffective. The ecological problems facing the planet require effective political institutions and the appropriate distribution of power, knowledge and competence. It is best to appreciate the confederal principle for what it has to offer an effective politics that is both ecological and democratic:
As Frankel argues:

a new democratic public sphere of empowered, decentralized and diverse local communities needs a set of national and regional state structures to facilitate legal, economic, educational and cultural values and practices, to support those local citizens lacking in material and cultural resources, and to settle the many disputes and conflicts which will continue to be a part of any foreseeable social formation. A combination of local, direct democracy and new semi-direct democratic structures at the national level will make life for traditional political parties very difficult if not impossible. This development is to be applauded because too many citizens in contemporary societies have an impoverished notion of die possibilities of democratic participation and often equate democracy with voting rituals.
Frankel 1987: 230-1

These four principles pertain to technical and institutional questions. The final principle is the most important in that it deals with philosophy, people, politics and change. The idea of philosophy as a practice, ethos as a way of life not only takes philosophy back to its Socratic origins as a popular, lived, quest for wisdom, it offers a way of mediating the split between knowledge and opinion. Green political theory and practice is extremely vulnerable on this point. Ecology as a science clearly comes with certain implications regarding policy, policy formation and political appeal. Scientifically compelling evidence and research clearly translates into ecological imperatives and overriding principles that prejudge popular debate and deliberation and assert green values as political and moral or imperatives over and above popular choice. Not only is such a position electorally unappealing and political enervating, it does nothing to extend and deepen green values and principles where they are most needed, in the body politic. Taking a cue from Vico’s ‘New Science’, the principle of verum ipsum factum holds that the truth of something is a condition of having made it. The possibility of knowing the world lies in having made it. We come to Hegel: ‘I am at home in the world when I know it, still more when I have understood it’. And finally Marx’s conception of praxis.

 “The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.”

Marx Thesis III on Feuerbach

This is the predicament of ecology caught between science and politics. As a science, opposing the knowledge of the educators to mere opinion, ecology divides society into two parts, one of which is superior to the other. But no-one learns truth in this way. Marx thus affirms the unity of theory and practice – knowledge both informing and being informed by human activity – by affirming the changing of circumstances as a self-change on the part of the people. “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” (Marx Thesis XI on Feuerbach)

Philosophy as praxis implies that the science of ecology becomes an ecological praxis in which the ecological sensibility emerges in the process of creating the ecological society. 

THE COUNTERMOVEMENT AS A CIVIC PUBLIC
Whilst economists assert the independence of ‘the economy’ from the world of politics, society and ecology, governments cannot claim such sovereignty. Governments are structurally embedded in market society. Increasing numbers of people believe that their governments are run in the interests of big business, diminishing numbers think that their governments represent the will of the people. People continually demand that government should reflect the popular will more than it does.

But here's the difficulty. The people making those demands on government – which amounts to an assertion that government separate themselves from ‘big interests’ and serve the people, are also part of the market economy in one way or another. Government cannot autonomize itself from private economic power if the people do not also take steps to autonomize themselves. Government and politics cannot act against private economic power without an organised social movement on the part of the people. An inchoate reaction on the part of the people could easily take xenophobic, parochial and chauvinistic form, falling into the hands of the very elites controlling the system. Everyone believes in community. The question is which one. There is a danger of countering the assertion that markets know best with a similarly misguided communities know best. Not always. A reactionary notion of community leaves minorities vulnerable to persecution. Social transformation means moving forwards to realise immanent potentialities for a broader and deeper conception of freedom. This is a fundamentally open, outward looking and other regarding notion, not a nostalgic retreat into a politics of exclusion. This requires more than hard thinking, but the integration of strategic thought into social praxis. To argue that people should stop thinking of themselves as consumers and start thinking of themselves as citizens sounds worthy but begs the question as to why people, in given social relations and engaged in existing social practices, are much more inclined to act as consumers rather than citizens. The citizen identity comes with a whole range of roles, practices, ties and institutions that are not available in the market society. People cannot choose to be citizens or think themselves into a citizen identity, the extensive, empowered public spaces to exercise citizenship do not exist. These spaces need to be created. The danger is that without the reality of citizenship, the citizen identity becomes a mask for some repressive policies in the name of the national interest. The Stoics advanced on the ancient Greeks with a broader conception of what it is to be a citizen, a human being, affirming the cosmopolis over the polis, a citizenship of the cosmos or the universe rather than of one tiny part of it. It is this expansive notion that is needed at a time of global ecological crisis.

The expansive notion of politics derives from ancient Greece and the idea that the human being is a zoon politikon or social animal requiring a politikon bion or public life in order to realise individuality in relation to other social beings. This is different to arguing that a common humanity unites individuals as a species. This is a biological basis for justice and equality. The arguments of Plato and Aristotle take this a stage further by focusing on the social and political nature of human beings, so that justice and equality are political principles capable of forming the basis of public life. This conception can delineate what is involved in building a politics around a common humanity. 

This is well trodden ground in political philosophy. The argument of this thesis favours the line taken from Plato and Aristotle through to Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx.

The split between knowledge and opinion, affirming nous over doxa, is certainly open to the charge of being anti-democratic. It implies the rule of the few who know over the many who don’t. It seems to be a modern version of Plato’s Philosopher-Ruler.

There are a number of ways of qualifying this criticism, although it involves a redefinition of democracy. Plato did not deny the possession of a rational faculty on the part of all human beings as an essential part of their human nature. All are members of the species homo sapiens, rational and thinking man. All are therefore capable of exercising reason, attaining knowledge, becoming philosophers. Plato’s Philosopher Ruler becomes the view that Philosophy should Rule. Plato also is the origin of organic functionalism in politics, all parts in their respective place. Hence the meaning of the phrase ‘mind your own business’. Each part is fitted to the function it performs within the whole. The whole flourishes when each minds its own business. This is to oppose a democracy of function to a democracy of opinion. A modern variation of this democracy exists in Marx and the notion of functional representation. 

The question is how to embed this capacity within a political and institutional framework. Rational choice – games theory – demonstrates the need to operate according to cooperative, communicative mechanisms. This can be delineated in terms of a switch from top down, hierarchical, bureaucratic monological modes of thought, organisation and action to dialogical modes which emphasise cooperation, communication, networking. Public life is reconstituted as good government via an active sovereignty and citizen democracy that canalises individuals towards the long term common good. Plato’s Philosopher Ruler is realised as the realisation of philosophy through the rule of the rational element which is the human nature of each individual and all individuals. This is what Marx called ‘true democracy’.


